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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 Chief executive officer (CEO) compensation has increased dramatically in recent 
years. The mean of CEO compensation for S&P 1500 firms increased from $2.5 million 
in 1992 to over $8.8 million in 2006. The appropriateness of CEO compensation is an 
issue of concern to shareholders, regulators, academics, and the financial press. For 
instance, the U.S. Congress held a hearing on CEO compensation on May 20, 2003, to 
consider the appropriateness of CEO compensation in the post-Enron era. A survey 
indicates that about 40 percent of the members of boards of directors believe that CEO 
pay is too high1. Besides the amount of pay, the criteria for setting pay for CEOs have 
received attention. Many studies have explored the determinants of CEO compensation 
and types of compensation (e.g., Agarwal 1981; Daily et al. 1998; Vafeas 2003).
                                                 
1
 According to a study of U.S. boards of directors conducted by Heidrick & Struggles International Inc., 
and the Center of Effective Organizations at the University of Southern California’s Marshall School of 
Business.  
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One stream of CEO compensation research relates to the pay-performance 
relationship. Holmstrom (1979) argues that a CEO should receive compensation based on 
his/her actions. Many types of performance measures are used in practice (e.g., 
accounting numbers, stock returns, and customer satisfaction rates) because a CEO’s 
actions are unobservable. Earnings are the most common performance measure in a pay-
performance system (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Gaver et al. 
1995; Core et al. 2003). According to contemporary economic theory, earnings provide 
information about management’s actions and also encourage efficient risk-sharing 
between contracting parties (Holmstrom 1979; Gjesdal 1981). Moreover, they shield 
CEOs from fluctuations in firm values that are beyond CEOs’ control and can remove the 
“noise” in stock prices (Sloan 1993; Kim and Suh 1993; Bushman and Indjejikian 1993; 
Leone 2006).  
Earnings, however, may be subject to manipulation and are often viewed as a 
short-term measure, and thus may not be as connected to firm value as desired (Dechow 
and Sloan 1991; Healy 1985). In general, the earnings of each firm have unique 
characteristics, which are called "earnings attributes.” Francis et al. (2004) classify 
earnings attributes into two types: accounting-based and market-based. The accounting-
based earnings attributes are persistence, accrual quality, predictability, and smoothness. 
The market-based earnings attributes are value relevance, timeliness, and conservatism. 
Accounting-based earnings attributes are expected to be more related to CEO 
performance because they are derived from accounting numbers, which are not affected 
by the volatility of the stock market. 
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Accounting-based earnings attributes may reveal the presence of manipulation 
and may also reflect long-term prospects of firms. Therefore, compensation contracts that 
include earnings attributes are likely to motivate managers to look beyond the current-
period earnings, without sacrificing the use of earnings as a contracting vehicle. 
Theoretically, compensation committees should rely on a performance measure that has 
less “noise” (Banker and Datar 1989)2. Earnings attributes can be used as one of the 
determinants to assign a weight to earnings in compensation contracts because they also 
indicate the level of “noise” in earnings and can be used to reduce this noise. 
How earnings are used is also affected by corporate governance. CEOs in firms 
with weak corporate governance have high bargaining power on compensation matters 
(Newman and Mozes 1999). Such CEOs influence compensation committees to rely 
more on controllable performance measures such as current accounting earnings (Core et 
al. 1999) and to ignore the quality of earnings (Peng 2005). However, strong corporate 
governance can improve the use of earnings by adjusting compensation to reflect 
underlying earnings attributes that may indicate earnings management and will also 
capture the long-term effect of earnings. Consequently, a stronger correlation between 
desirable earnings attributes and compensation is expected in firms with strong corporate 
governance. 
Prior studies indicate that desirable accounting-based earnings attributes are 
assigned greater value in securities markets (e.g., Lev and Kunitzky 1974; Francis et al. 
                                                 
2
 Prior studies generally measure “noise” as the variance of the performance measure (e.g. Lambert and 
Larcker 1987; Sloan 1993). 
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2005). Prior research also indicates that compensation committees use additional 
information to adjust earnings-based performance measures (e.g., Dechow et al. 1994; 
Gaver and Gaver 1998). Some studies find that they adjust for earnings persistence 
(Baber et al. 1998) or earnings accruals (Peng 2005). However, whether compensation 
committees simultaneously adjust for all four accounting-based earnings attributes in 
executive compensation contracts has not been investigated.  
This study differs from earlier studies in three ways. First, it investigates the 
simultaneous effects of accounting-based earnings attributes on CEO compensation. A 
few studies separately investigate either earnings persistence or accrual quality (Baber et 
al. 1998; Ashley and Yang 2004), but none so far has explored the effects of four 
earnings attributes. Second, this study considers the impact on CEO pay of corporate 
governance and the simultaneous use of accounting-based earnings attributes. Prior 
studies that examined corporate governance and some earnings attributes separately have 
found that they are related to CEO compensation (e.g., Baber et al. 1998; Core et 
al.1999). Finally, this study extends prior research by using five different measures of 
CEO compensation: (1) salary, (2) cash bonuses, (3) cash salary plus cash bonus, (4) 
stock-based compensation, and (5) total compensation.3 Prior research has typically used 
cash compensation (salary plus bonus) as a proxy for CEO compensation. Different 
measures of compensation produce different results (Core et al. 2003). This distinction 
has become an especially important issue because cash compensation for top executives 
                                                 
3
 See definitions of variables in Appendix A. 
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appears to have become a less important component of the overall CEO pay (Bushman 
and Smith 2001).  
 There are thus three research questions. First, when designing CEO 
compensation, do compensation committees simultaneously consider the interactions 
between each of the four accounting-based earnings attributes and the accounting 
earnings measure? Second, is the effect of earnings attributes on the relationship between 
earnings and CEO compensation higher in firms with strong corporate governance? 
Third, are the relationships affected by the definitions of compensation?   
1.2 Motivation  
The motivation for this study is based on the usefulness of accounting-based 
earnings attributes for evaluating earnings as a performance measure. The compensation 
literature indicates that CEOs are evaluated using earnings and stock returns (Lambert 
and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Bushman et al. 1998, 2006). In capital 
markets research, several studies find that the accounting-based earnings attributes 
provide information for estimating the firm’s value (Lev and Kunitzky 1974; Kormendi 
and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Ali and Zarowin 1992; Luttman and Silhan 
1995; Francis et al. 2005; Chan et al. 2006). In addition, the accounting-based earnings 
attributes indicate the quality of earnings and measure properties of earnings in several 
aspects. For example, the attributes imply characteristics such as persistence of earnings. 
Therefore, accounting-based earnings attributes should be useful for CEO performance 
evaluation and should be considered when compensation committees make decisions 
about how much weight to place on earnings.  
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The use of earnings attributes in compensation contracts likely depends on the 
level of the firms’ governance (e.g., the structure of compensation committees or boards 
of directors). The reason is that CEOs in firms with weak corporate governance firms 
may persuade compensation committees to ignore earnings attributes. Hence, the study 
on the effect of accounting-based earnings attributes on CEO compensation should 
include corporate governance factors.  
1.3 Contribution 
 This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, it contributes to the 
CEO compensation literature (Clinch 1991; Balsam 2002; Carter et al. 2007).  Although 
prior research tests the effect of earnings attributes on CEO compensation, only 
persistence and accruals are investigated for their effect on salary, bonus, and cash 
compensation (Baber et al. 1998; Ashley 2004; Peng 2005). This research is the first 
attempt to explore the effect of all four accounting-based earnings attributes on several 
definitions of CEO compensation.  
Second, this study provides guidelines for compensation committees to set CEO 
compensation packages. The review of the literature in capital market research shows the 
positive relationship between of earnings attributes and stock prices. Hence, the earnings 
attributes should be included in CEO compensation models. However, no studies show 
how to use accounting-based earnings attributes in CEO compensation. This study is 
more comprehensive, including using accounting-based earnings attributes in several 
types of CEO compensation. Thus, the results of this study may provide guidelines to 
compensation committees in applying earnings attributes to specific types of 
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compensation. The results of this study may reduce the conflict among shareholders, 
compensation committees, and CEOs when setting performance measures and 
compensation contracts. 
Finally, this study might also be of interest to shareholders, standard setters, and 
regulators. The results could enhance these groups’ understanding of the impact of 
accounting-based earnings attributes and corporate governance on CEO compensation. 
Shareholders can use this study as a guideline to evaluate the appropriateness of CEO 
compensation contracts. They can monitor whether compensation committees consider 
the long-term values of their firms by including earnings attributes in the contracts. In 
terms of standard setters, this study provides evidence for the usefulness of earnings 
attributes in decision making. Hence, standard setters are encouraged to focus on earnings 
attributes when announcing new accounting standards. Regulators, such as the SEC, can 
also use this study to determine appropriate regulations and disclosures about CEO 
compensation and corporate governance. In addition, the SEC can use the methods and 
results of this study to detect firms where CEO pay is unreasonably high. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
  This study integrates three research areas: earnings attributes, CEO pay-
performance relationships (performance measures weights), and corporate governance. 
This chapter discusses the roles of accounting-based earnings attributes and corporate 
governance on the CEO pay-performance relationship. 
2.1 Literature on the Effect of Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes on CEO 
Compensation 
 Francis et al. (2004) use “earnings attributes” to represent earnings quality. 
Earnings attributes are classified into two categories: accounting-based and market-based. 
The accounting-based attributes are measured using accounting information only. On the 
other hand, the market-based attributes are based on the relationship between stock 
market and accounting data. The accounting-based attributes assume that the function of 
earnings is effective allocation of cash flows to reporting periods via the accruals process. 
In terms of the market-based earnings attributes, the assumption is that the function of 
earnings is to reflect economic income as represented by stock returns. Stock returns are 
also affected by several factors in addition to managers’ actions. 
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Accounting-based earnings attributes are more related to managers’ efforts than are 
market-based earnings attributes. Hence, this study focuses on the effect of accounting-
based earnings attributes. In this section, prior studies on accounting-based earnings 
attributes and CEO compensation are discussed in detail.   
2.1.1 Persistence  
Persistence indicates the sustainability or recurrence of earnings (Francis et al. 
2004). Lipe (1990) describes persistence as the time-series relationship between current-
period unexpected earnings and future earnings. He finds that components of earnings 
differ in persistence, and these differences are useful in explaining cross-sectional 
differences in security market reactions to accounting disclosures. The effect of 
persistence is positive because greater persistence means a larger reaction to unexpected 
earnings. 
 Prior empirical studies show that investors value earnings persistence. Capital 
market studies find that earnings persistence is positively related to stock prices (Lev 
1983; Kormendi and Lipe 1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Ali and Zarowin 1992). CEO 
compensation researchers are motivated by capital market contexts to investigate the 
effect of earnings persistence on compensation. Baber et al. (1998) show that 
compensation committees consider earnings persistence when rewarding managers based 
on earnings. They find that the strength of the relationship between CEO cash 
compensation (salary and bonuses) and earnings is associated with measures of earnings 
persistence. However, earnings persistence does not appear to affect equity-based 
compensation (options and restricted stock). Including the level of earnings in their 
10 
 
compensation model, Baber et al. (1999) still support the positive relationship between 
earnings persistence and the weight on earnings as performance measures.  
 Like Baber et al. (1998), Ashley and Yang (2004) discovered that firms with high 
earnings persistence place more weight on earnings than do firms with low earnings 
persistence. In addition, they also find that firms with high earnings persistence use more 
cash compensation to pay CEOs than do firms with low earnings persistence. Similarly, 
Nwaeze et al. (2006) use earnings persistence as one of the determinants of earnings 
qualities. They show that an increase in ratio of the quality of cash flow from operations 
to the quality of earnings has a negative impact on the weight of earnings in CEO 
compensation contracts. 
2.1.2 Accruals Quality 
 When accruals are included, the earnings numbers can reflect firm performance 
better than can cash flows. However, managers have some discretion over the recognition 
of accruals. They can use accrual numbers as signals for their private information or to 
opportunistically manage earnings. Several studies show that signaling is expected to 
improve the ability of earnings to measure firm performance because managers have 
more information about their firms’ cash-generating ability (Holthausen and Leftwich 
1983; Holthausen 1990; Healy and Palepu 1993). Dechow and Dichev (2002) introduce a 
measure of earnings quality by relating current accruals to the last-period, current-period, 
and next-period cash flows from operations.  
In terms of CEO compensation contracts, shareholders should not only use 
earnings but also additional information about the CEO’s actions relating to cash flow. 
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Kumar et al. (1993) investigate whether cash flows from operations and working capital 
from operations provide incremental information over earnings in explaining mangers’ 
annual compensation. They find that compensation models that include working capital 
from operations can explain executive compensation better than models based on 
earnings alone. Natarajan (1996) investigates the role of operating cash flows and 
accounting accruals in executive compensation.  The results show that earnings and cash 
flows together can better explain cash compensation than can earnings alone. Hence, 
current accruals and cash flows from operations are aggregated for setting performance 
evaluations. Balsam (1998) also finds that discretionary accruals are positively associated 
with CEO cash compensation. Based on these studies, operating cash flows and accruals 
provide additional information to explain executive compensation. In terms of 
performance weight, Peng (2005) finds that accrual quality is positively related to the 
weight on earnings as a performance measure in cash compensation and total CEO 
compensation, but not for equity-based compensation. 
2.1.3 Predictability 
Earnings predictability is defined as the ability of past earnings to predict future 
earnings, which is reflected in the variance of the shocks in the univariate earnings 
process (Lipe 1990). Predictability of earnings increases when the variance decreases. 
Analysts and investors prefer earnings with high predictability because the current 
earnings information becomes more useful in predicting future earnings. Although both 
predictability and persistence are measured by earnings and lag earnings, these two 
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earnings attributes are different. Predictability is measured by the variances of the shocks 
in earnings, whereas persistence reflects the autocorrelation in earnings (Lipe 1990). 
 This study had found only one paper about the effect of earnings predictability on 
CEO performance, and it is not directly relevant. Asthana and Ye (2007) explore the 
determinants of the asymmetrical weighting of transitory gains over losses for CEO 
compensation. Unlike Lipe (1990), they use the standard deviation of returns on assets as 
a proxy for earnings predictability. The results show an increase in the relationship 
between CEO compensation and transitory gains when earnings predictability declines. 
In addition, they also find that the asymmetrical weighting is strong in firms where the 
CEO is also the Chairman of the Board, but it is weak in firms with a high level of 
external monitoring (firms in regulated industries). 
2.1.4 Smoothness 
There are two opposing opinions on whether earnings smoothness is a desirable 
attribute. On one hand, some researchers support the benefits of smooth earnings (Ronen 
and Sadan 1981; Chaney and Lewis 1995; Demski 1998). They reason that managers can 
use their private information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuations. 
Smooth earnings numbers are more useful for making decisions. On the other hand, some 
researchers view earnings smoothness as an undesirable earnings characteristic because 
managers can manipulate earnings smoothness by timing recognition or changes in 
accounting policies. Hence, some studies use earnings smoothness as a proxy for earnings 
management (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003; Boonlert-U-thai et al. 2006).  
13 
 
No study directly focuses on the effect of earnings smoothness on CEO 
compensation contracts, but three papers are relevant to earnings smoothness. Francis et 
al. (2004) define earnings smoothness as the ratio of the variance of earnings to the 
variance of cash flow from operations. Therefore, smoothness relates to the weight of the 
accounting performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) and Adams (1987) show that market performance measures are weighted more 
than accounting performance measures when the variance of accounting performance 
measures is high relative to the variance of market performance measures. Demski (1998) 
views earnings smoothness as a desirable attribute and uses a two-period principal-agent 
model to explain that the principals can motivate the managers to smooth earnings by 
using incentive plans.  
2.2 Literature on the Effects of Governance Structure on CEO Compensation 
As one of the main promoters to lay the foundations for corporate governance, the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)4 defines corporate 
governance as follows: 
 “Procedures and processes according to which an organisation is 
directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies 
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among the different 
participants in the organisation – such as the board, managers, 
                                                 
4
 OECD is an international organization that helps governments to tackle the economic, social and 
governance challenges of a globalized economy. Source: http://stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail.asp?ID=6778. 
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shareholders and other stakeholders – and lays down the rules and 
procedures for decision-making.”  
 
Corporate governance is associated with a variety of firm-level mechanisms. 
These mechanisms can be classified into two broad categories: external and internal 
(Cremers and Nair 2005).  
2.2.1 External Mechanisms: Takeover Protection 
Takeover protection and the market for corporate control are the primary external 
mechanisms for corporate governance. Theory and empirical evidence suggest that 
takeover protections address governance problems (e.g., Jensen 1988; Scharfstein 1988). 
High takeover protection implies weak corporate governance. Borokhovich et al. (1997) 
investigate CEO compensation of companies that adopt particular provisions such as 
various types of anti-takeover charter amendments. They find that these firms report 
higher CEO compensation in the year of adoption and the subsequent three years 
compared to firms that do not adopt these provisions. Similarly, Bernard and 
Mullainathan (1998) investigate the impact on executive compensation of changes in 
states’ anti-takeover legislation. They find that pay-for-performance sensitivities and 
levels of CEO pay increase after the adoption of anti-takeover legislation. In terms of 
CEO performance measures, Davila and Penalva (2006) find that firms with higher 
takeover protection put more weight on accounting-based performance measures (return 
on assets) than on stock-based performance measures (market return).  
15 
 
2.2.2 Internal Mechanisms 
Blockholders of stocks and the boards of directors are often seen as the primary 
internal monitoring mechanisms (Cremers and Nair 2005). Klein (2002) measures the 
internal governance mechanism using four aspects: audit committee independence, board 
independence, relationship investing, and CEO shareholdings. However, Section 301 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 mandates that firms have audit committees comprised 
solely of independent directors. Therefore, in this study, the audit committee aspect is 
omitted. Based on Core et al. (1999), CEO duality, board size, and the effectiveness of 
outside directors are additional aspects in this study. Overall, this study focuses on the 
following internal mechanisms: board independence, CEO duality, board size, outside 
director effectiveness, relationship investing, and CEO shareholdings. 
2.2.2.1 Board Independence 
The governance literature documents that the two most important functions of a 
corporate board of directors are monitoring executive management and designing 
executives’ compensation contracts (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). The major role of 
the board of directors is to encourage CEOs to act in the shareholders’ best interests and 
to protect shareholders from CEOs’ opportunistic behavior (Brown and Lee 2006). 
Boards are likely to be ineffective, however, if executives have significant influence over 
them (Jensen 1993; Bebchuk and Fried 2003). 
The studies on the relationships between top executive compensation and board 
independence show mixed results. For example, Weisbach (1988) finds that outside-
dominated boards inherently do a better job of monitoring managers. Finkelstein and 
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Hambrick (1989) show that executive compensation is not related to the percentage of 
outside directors. On the other hand, Lambert et al. (1993), Boyd (1994), and Core et al. 
(1999) find a positive relationship between CEO compensation and the percentage of 
outside directors on the board. 
2.2.2.2 CEO Duality 
Prior studies find that the effectiveness of board control decreases when a CEO is 
the chair of the board (Finkelstein and Hambrick 1989; Yermack 1996).A CEO who also 
serves as the chair has the influence to increase his compensation. Core et al. (1999) and 
Cyert et al. (2002) find that the existence of CEO duality increases the level of CEO 
compensation. Davila and Panalva (2006) find that firms with CEO duality tend to place 
more weight on earnings as a performance measure. 
2.2.2.3 Board Size 
Large board size has been viewed as having a negative impact on firms. A large 
board is less effective in monitoring the CEO and is susceptible to the influence of the 
CEO because of the poor communication and decision-making abilities characteristic of 
larger groups (Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Jensen 1993). Several studies use board size as a 
measure of board quality (Yermack 1996; Cyert et al. 2002; Weber 2006). Core et al. 
(1999) also find that firms with larger boards pay greater compensation.  
2.2.2.4 Outside Director Effectiveness 
The board may have low monitoring effectiveness when it is composed of 
directors who are too old or serve on too many boards. Core et al. (1999) find that firms 
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with low outside director effectiveness pay high CEO compensation. The National 
Association of Corporate Directors (NACD) also considers age and availability as 
indicators of the quality of directors. Based on NACD guidelines (1996), outside 
directors are classified as “old” directors when they are 70 years old or older. Outside 
directors are classified as “busy” directors when they serve on three or more other 
corporate boards.  
2.2.2.5 Relationship Investing 
Core et al. (1999) show that outside blockholders play monitoring roles such that 
firms with influential external owners have stronger governance than those without 
significant investors. Like Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Core et al. (1999) show that 
CEO compensation decreases when a firm has an external blockholder who owns at least 
5% of the equity. Cyert et al. (2002) find a negative relationship between stock ownership 
by a large shareholder and the level of salary, equity, and bonus compensation. 
Relationship investing involves a large blockholder who takes an active role in 
monitoring a major firm’s activities. Relationship investing is often achieved by giving a 
large non-management shareholder or one of his representatives a seat on the board of 
directors (Klein 2002). Being on the board gives this investor the opportunity to monitor 
the firm’s financial reporting process. 
2.2.2.6 CEO Shareholdings 
CEO shareholdings is one of the proxies for corporate governance mechanisms. 
The results of the studies on the relationship between CEO shareholdings and earnings 
management are unclear (e.g., Klein 2002). The effects of CEO shareholdings on 
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compensation are also inconclusive. On one hand, Lambert et al. (1993), Core et al. 
(1999), and Randoy and Nielsen (2006) find a significant negative relationship between 
CEO ownership and CEO compensation. On the other hand, Holderness and Sheehan 
(1988) find that managers who are majority shareholders in publicly held companies get 
higher compensation than other top officers. Similarly, Cyert et al. (2002) show that 
CEOs with high stockholdings receive higher compensation than CEOs with low 
stockholdings.  
2.3 Summary 
 In conclusion, capital market studies investigate the effects of earnings attributes 
on firm values. Only a few studies focus on the influence of persistence and accruals 
attributes on CEO pay. In terms of corporate governance, several studies examine the 
effect of corporate governance on the level and compensation mix of CEO compensation.  
However, prior studies examine the effects of earnings attributes and corporate 
governance on CEO compensation contracts separately. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 THEORY, MODELS, MEASUREMENT, AND VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
3.1 How Performance Measures are Weighted in Setting Compensation 
 According to agency theory, CEO compensation contracts are based on the 
principal-agent relationship. The shareholders represent a principal and a CEO represents 
an agent. Using an agency model, Holmstrom (1979) explains the principal-agent 
relationship. The agent privately takes an action (e.g., provides effort) which, together 
with a random state, determines a monetary payoff. The problem is determining how this 
payoff should be shared optimally between the principal and the agent. If the principal 
can observe actual actions, the optimal solution is called “the first-best solution.” In the 
event that efforts are not observable, the principal contracts with the agent based on the 
jointly observable monetary payoff. In this case, the optimal solution for the principal is 
“the second-best solution,” and the expected utility for the principal is lower than the 
utility emanating from the first-best solution. The principal would like to see the agent 
increase his/her effort level and therefore chooses the reward or incentive function 
subject to the reservation price constraint and the incentive compatibility constraint. The 
reservation price constraint requires the principal to pay a minimum amount in order to 
employ the agent. 
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The second constraint is that the agent maximizes his/her expected utility by choosing 
actions subject to the payoff function chosen by the principal. If additional information 
can be provided, such as earnings attributes, then it is possible that a better contract can 
be written, improving the well-being of the principal.  
 Holmstrom (1979) also proposes the “informativeness principle.” Based on this 
principle, any costless performance measure that is marginally informative about the 
agent’s action should be added to other available measures in compensation contracts. 
Although Holmstrom shows criteria for deciding whether a variable is included in the 
contract, he does not show how to assign weight to each performance measure. 
Subsequently, Banker and Datar (1989) studied the relative weights placed on two 
performance measures.  
 The optimal compensation contract is assumed as S[x(a),y(a)], where x and y are 
independently distributed performance measures, and a is the amount of effort that the 
agent supplies. Banker and Datar (1989) assume that these two performance measures are 
imperfect signals about the efforts of the agent. They are linearly aggregated for setting 
an optimal compensation contract (S). Assuming the weight for performance measures x 
and y are βx and βy respectively, S = β0 +βxx(a) + βyy(a). Banker and Datar prove that the 
relative weights of two given performance measures in the contract are proportional to 
the “signal-to-noise” ratios of the measures. The relative weights of the two measures 
(βx/βy) in the contract satisfy the following criterion: 
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In terms of signal, aaxE ∂∂ /)|(  indicates the change in expected value of the 
measure given the change in the agent’s effort level. The signal is the sensitivity of 
performance measure x on the agent’s action. In terms of noise, )]|([ axEVar measures 
the variance of performance measure x, conditional on the agent’s actions. The relative 
weight on a performance measure is inversely related to the relative noise in the measure. 
 Prior researchers have identified and tested the impact of different measures of 
relative “noise” on the incentive weight placed on stock returns and accounting earnings. 
They assume that earnings and stock returns both reflect the agent’s effort. Thus, they use 
the time-series properties of earnings and stock returns to measure the variance of each 
performance measure. For example, Lambert and Larcker’s (1987) cross-sectional 
analyses show that the relative weight put on earnings and stock returns in executive 
compensation decreases when the relative time-series variance increases.  
 However, the accounting-based earnings attributes measure not only the variance 
of earnings as reflected by the predictability attributes, but also other information related 
to earnings. Earnings attributes may indicate how well the agent’s efforts are reflected in 
earnings. They provide more information about the quality of earnings in addition to the 
“noise” (the variance of expected earnings) and the “signal” of earnings (the change in 
expected value of earnings when the agent’s action changes).  
The association of each attribute to the noise and signal of earnings can be 
explained as follows. Firms with low earnings persistence may have a high variance of 
expected earnings (high noise). These firms cannot forecast earnings as well as firms with 
high earnings persistence. Accrual quality indicates how closely accounting earnings map 
into cash. Accrual quality shows the extent to which earnings deviate from a systematic 
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association between firm performance and the agent’s true contribution (Peng 2005). 
High accrual quality can, therefore, better indicate an agent’s actions. Like persistence, 
prior earnings with low predictability are less accurate in estimating future earnings. 
Thus, the variance of expected earnings increases. Additionally, the sensitivity of 
earnings to agents’ actions in firms with low earnings persistence is inaccurate. The 
rationale is that no matter how hard these agents work, earnings in these firms are not 
significantly different from previous years. Earnings smoothness not only provides 
information on the variance of earnings (noise), but also on the variance of cash flow 
from operations (CFO) because earnings smoothness is measured by using the variance 
of earnings and the variance of cash flow from operations. Consequently, agency theory 
suggests that accounting-based earnings attributes should be considered when 
compensation committees make decisions about the weight that should be placed on 
earnings. 
3.2 The Pay-Performance Models 
 Based on prior studies, CEO compensation is regressed on the two performance 
measures: accounting returns and stock returns. The multiperiod agency model suggests 
the following function to find the association of change in compensation with unexpected 
returns and unexpected earnings: 
titititi exUERUECOMP ,,2,10, )()( +++=∆ βββ   (2) 
where  
∆ COMPi,t  =  the change in executive compensation for firm i at time t,  
UE(Ri,t)  = the unexpected common stock returns for firm i at time t,  
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UE(Xi,t)  = the earnings innovation (unexpected earnings).  
 In equation (2), β1 and β2 are expected to be positive. In other words, the changes 
in compensation have positive associations with unexpected stock returns as well as 
unexpected earnings. The measurement of the change in executive compensation, 
unexpected return, and unexpected earnings is discussed next. 
 The cross-sectional variation in the weight of the performance measures can be 
examined by using a change-specification to avoid an omitted-correlated-variables 
problem. Murphy (1998) explains that this problem applies to a level specification in 
compensation studies. The change-specification minimizes the effect of omitted variables 
that remain relatively constant over one year (e.g., industry variables and firm specific 
factors). 
 Based on the model above, relevant measures for performance variables are 
“surprise” components. Lambert and Larcker (1987) recommend the use of change in 
return on equity (ROE) as a measure for the “surprise” earnings component in the 
multiperiod agency model in equation (2), because ROEs are positively autocorrelated 
(Foster 1986). This explanation can be implied when ROA is used as a measure of 
earnings. However, stock returns are generally considered to be uncorrelated as well as 
cross-sectionally and inter-temporally constant (Jensen and Murphy 1990; Baber et al. 
1996; Baber et al. 1998). Hence, the level of stock returns is used as a proxy for 
unexpected stock returns (UE(R)).  
 Lambert and Larcker (1987), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Baber et al. (1996), and 
Baber et al. (1998) use return on equity (ROE) as a proxy for accounting returns and raw 
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common stock returns (RETURN) as a proxy for market returns. They test the pay-
performance relationship by using the following model: 
 ttRETURNttROEti eRETURNROEROECOMP ++−+=∆ − βββ )( 10,   (3) 
 However, recent research on compensation and corporate governance uses return 
on assets as accounting performance measures (e.g., Core et al. 1999; Davila and Penalva 
2006). To follow recent research, this study uses change in return on assets (Chgroa) as a 
proxy for a change in accounting performance measures. In addition, the problem from 
negative ROE firms can be solved by using ROA as an accounting performance measure. 
The following basic model is used in this study: 
 titititi eRETURNChgROACOMP ,,2,10, +++=∆ βββ   (4) 
3.3 Measurement 
3.3.1 Measurement of Earnings Attributes 
 Four accounting-based earnings attributes are measured based on Francis et al. 
(2004). However, the interpretations of accounting-based earnings attributes proxies are 
adjusted to make them more easily show the relationships in the compensation models. 
The large value of each proxy implies a good earnings attribute. 
3.3.1.1 Persistence 
Earnings persistence can be measured as the slope coefficient from a regression of 
current earnings on lagged earnings (Lev 1983; Ali and Zarowin 1992).  
titiiiti XX ,1,,,1,0, νφφ ++= −  (5) 
25 
 
 The autoregressive model of order one (AR1) is used. Earnings in the model (Xi,t) 
are measured by return on assets (ROA), which is firm i’s operating income after 
depreciations in year t (#178), divided by the average total assets of year t (#6).   
 For each firm year, equation (5) is estimated by using maximum likelihood 
estimation and rolling ten-year windows. The value of the coefficient is used for 
measuring the persistence level. PERSIST = φ1,i. A greater PERSIST value indicates more 
earnings persistence.  
3.3.1.2 Accrual Quality  
 Dechow and Dichev (2002) propose and test a measure of accrual quality that 
captures the mapping of current accruals into last-period, current-period, and next-period 
cash flows. The earnings of firms with high accrual quality become cash more quickly 
than those of firms with low accrual quality. McNichols (2002) comments that Dechow 
and Dichev’s (2002) model does not separate the effect of discretionary accruals from the 
effect of total accruals. Based on Jones’s (1991) model, McNichols (2002) proposes the 
following model for measuring accrual quality.
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where: 
∆WC
 i,t  =  firm i, time t change in working capital accounts as disclosed on the 
statement of cash from operations; or  
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 = increase in accounts receivable + increase in inventory + decrease in 
accounts payable and accrued liabilities + decrease in taxes accrued + 
increase (decrease) in other assets (liabilities), which is - [(#302) + 
(#303) + (#304) + (#305) + (#307)];
 
Assets
 i,t =  firm i the average total assets in year t (#6); 
CFO
 i,t-1  =  firm i cash flow from operations in year t-1; 
CFO
 i,t  =  firm i cash flow from operations in year t (#308); 
CFO
 i,t+1  =  firm i cash flow from operations in year t+1; 
∆Sales
 i,t  =  firm i, time t change in sales ( #12); 
PPE
 i,t  =  firm i, time t property, plant, and equipment (#7); 
ν
 i,t  =  firm i, time t error term. 
 Accrual quality is equal to the negative value of the standard deviation of firm i’s 
estimated residuals from equation (6), Accrual = )ˆ(
,tiνσ− . A low negative value for 
Accrual indicates good accrual quality.  
3.3.1.3 Predictability 
Predictability is calculated from equation (5). Predictability is equal to the 
negative value of the standard deviation from equation (5). PREDICT = )~(
,tivσ− . A low 
negative value for PREDICT indicates that earnings can be predicted by previous 
earnings, which implies a good predictability attribute. 
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3.3.1.4 Smoothness 
 Francis et al. (2004) use the same measurement as Leuz et al.’s (2003) study to 
measure earnings smoothness. Leuz et al. (2003) use smoothness as a proxy for earnings 
management. They suggest the following method to measure earnings smoothness: 
 Smooth i,t = )/(
)/(
,,
,,
titi
titi
AssetsCFO
AssetsNIBE
σ
σ
 (7) 
where: 
σ
 i =  firm i standard deviation 
NIBE
 i,t = firm i, time t net income before extraordinary items (#18). 
CFO
 i,t =  firm i, time t operating cash flows (#308). 
Assets
 i,t  =  firm i, time t average total assets (#6). 
 Standard deviations are calculated over rolling ten-year windows. Larger values 
of Smooth indicate low earnings smoothness, which is assumed to be a good earnings 
attribute. 
3.3.2 Measurement of Corporate Governance 
3.3.2.1 Takeover Protection 
Gompers et al. (2003) construct a takeover protection index (G index). The G 
index for each firm in their sample is formed by adding one point for every provision that 
reduces takeover vulnerability. There are 24 provisions to construct the G index. A higher 
G index value implies weak external corporate governance. The G index is collected from 
the Web site www.finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/data. For ease in interpretation, a 
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linear transformation is used: EG = 24 - G index. A higher value for EG (low takeover 
protection) implies stronger external corporate governance.  
3.3.2.2 Board Independence  
Agency theory suggests that the effectiveness of the board’s monitoring function 
is enhanced by director independence (Vafeas 2003). This study uses the criteria for 
board independence from Klein (2002)5. Ind is measured by the percentage of outside 
directors on the board. 
3.3.2.3 CEO Duality 
Prior studies find that CEO compensation increases when the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board (Core et al. 1999; Cyert et al. 2002). An indicator variable is a 
proxy for CEO duality. For ease in interpretation, Nodual is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the CEO is “not” chairman of the board, and zero otherwise.  
3.3.2.4 Board Size 
Prior studies show that CEOs have more influence and firms have weak corporate 
governance when board sizes are too large.  An indicator variable, Size, is equal to one if 
the board has 7-12 members, and zero otherwise. The variable Resize is also used as an 
                                                 
5
 Directors are classified as insiders, outsiders, or affiliated (“grey”) with the firm. Insiders are current 
employees of the company. Outsiders have no ties to the firm beyond being a board member. Affiliated 
directors are past employees, relatives of the CEO, or those who have significant transactions and/or 
business relationships with the firms as defined by Items 404(a) and (b) of Regulations S-X, or are on 
interlocking boards as defined by Item 402(j)(3)(ii) of Regulation S-X. 
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additional proxy. Resize is defined as 1/total number of directors on the board. Consistent 
with other variables, a higher value for Resize indicates strong corporate governance.   
3.3.2.5 Outside Director Effectiveness 
Based on the National Association of Corporate Directors’ (NACD) guidelines 
(1996), outside directors are classified as “old” directors when they are 70 years old or 
older. NACD also defines “busy” directors as directors who serve on three or more other 
corporate boards. Following Core et al. (1999), two proxies are used to measure outside 
director effectiveness. First, Pnotold is the percentage of the outside directors who are 
less than 70 years old. Second, Pnotbusy is the percentage of outside directors who do 
“not” serve on three or more other boards. Similar to other variables, greater values for 
Pnotold and Pnotbusy indicate stronger corporate governance. 
3.3.2.6 External Blockholders 
Similar to Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Core et al. (1999) find that CEO 
compensation is low in firms with an outside 5% blockholder. The existence of a 
blockholder implies strong corporate governance. An indicator variable Outside is used 
as a proxy for relationship investing. Based on Klein (2002), Outside takes on the value 
of one if an outside 5% blockholder sits on the board and zero otherwise.  
3.3.2.7 CEO Shareholdings 
Share is a proxy for CEO ownership. It is measured by the percentage of common 
equity owned by the CEO. High CEO ownership does not imply strong corporate 
governance because the relationship between managerial stockholdings and earnings 
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management as well as the relationship between CEO shareholdings and CEO 
compensation are both inconclusive (Klein 2002).  
3.4 Variable Definitions 
3.4.1 CEO Compensation  
 The use of various definitions of CEO compensation has been supported: First, 
theoretically, Baker (1987) notes that the slope coefficients estimated from regressions of 
cash compensation on performance measures do not have any theoretical interpretation 
derived from the model. Second, recent compensation studies also support using a variety 
of compensation definitions. Core et al. (2003) find that the differences in definitions lead 
to different results. Finally, Bushman and Smith (2001) document that the cash 
compensation of top executives appears to have become a less important component of 
the overall CEO pay.  
 Hence, this study uses five specifications of the dependent variable ∆COMP to 
evaluate whether various compensation components are structured differently based on 
earnings attributes. Five specifications are defined as follows: 
 - Salary 
- Cash bonus is measured by annual bonus only. 
- Cash is the sum of salary and annual bonus. 
- Stock-based compensation is the sum of the value of stock options, stock 
appreciation rights, phantom stocks, and restricted stock. 
- Total compensation is the sum of the value of all seven compensation 
categories: salary, bonus, other annual compensation, restricted stock, value of 
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option grants, long- term incentive plan payouts (LTIP payout), and other 
compensation6. 
 
 In order to reduce heteroscedasticity, CEO compensation is changed to the natural 
log form. For example, ∆ log(CEO compensation) = log (Casht / Casht-1) This approach 
was previously used by Finkelstein and Hambrick (1989), Boyd (1994), Randoy and 
Nielsen (2006), and Davila and Penalva (2006). 
3.4.2 Performance Measures 
3.4.2.1 Change in Accounting-Based Performance Measures   
 Using survey data, Murphy (1998) finds that most firms use at least one measure 
of accounting profits, either the dollar amount of profits, earnings per share, a profit 
margin, or percentage return. Thus, prior studies use different measures of accounting 
earnings: net income before extraordinary items (Baber et al. 1999), return on equity 
(Lamber and Larcker 1987; Baber et al. 1996, 1998, 1999), return on assets (Sloan 1993; 
Core et al. 1999; Core and Larcker 2002; Davila and Penalva 2006), and earnings per 
share (Sloan 1993; Core et al. 2003). There is no consensus on a particular accounting 
measure of performance. In this study, return on assets (ROA) is used as a proxy for 
accounting-based performance measures, consistent with more recent studies.  
                                                 
6
 See Appendix A for details 
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3.4.2.2 Stock-Based Performance Measure  
 Annual stock market return on the common stock is usually used as a stock-based 
performance measure in CEO compensation research (Lambert and Larcker 1987; Sloan 
1993; Core et al. 1999; Davila and Penalva 2006). Stock returns (Return) are defined by 
annual stock returns, which are calculated from monthly stock returns. Return is equal to 
continuous compound returns. Prior studies have assumed that the expected stock returns 
are both cross-sectionally and intertemporally constant. Therefore, this study uses level of 
Return, instead of change in Return, as a proxy for stock-based performance measures. 
3.4.2.3 Interaction Terms between each Accounting-Based Earnings Attribute and 
Earnings 
There are four interaction terms in this category: change in ROA and persistence 
(ChgroaPersist), change in ROA and accruals (ChgroaAccruals), change in ROA and 
predictability (ChgroaPredict), and change in ROA and smoothness (ChgroaSmooth). 
They are included simultaneously in the model to examine whether accounting-based 
earnings attributes increase the weight of ROA in compensation contracts. Each 
interaction term is also examined separately.  
The interaction terms between stock returns and earnings attributes are not 
included in the model. Prior studies find that accounting-based earnings attributes are 
properly impounded in security prices (Lev and Kunitzky 1974; Kormendi and Lipe 
1987; Collins and Kothari 1989; Luttman and Silhan 1995; Francis et al. 2005; Chan et 
al. 2006). Therefore, it is redundant to include these interaction terms because their 
coefficients are expected to be zero.  
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3.4.3 Control Variables 
 Based on prior research, five control variables are included in the model: two 
interaction control variables and three individual control variables. 
3.4.3.1 Interaction Control Variables 
Two interaction terms are used as control variables because they affect the weight 
of performance measures in the CEO contracts rather than the level of CEO 
compensation directly. First, the model controls for firm growth. Lambert and Larcker 
(1987) and Adams (1987) find that firms place more weight on market than on 
accounting performance measures when firms have high growth opportunities. Similarly, 
Baber et al. (1996) show that the association between CEO compensation and stock 
returns is higher in firms that have a larger investment opportunity set. This paper uses 
the market-to-book ratio (MB) at the beginning of the year as a proxy for the firm’s 
investment opportunities. Firms with low growth opportunities (low MB) put more 
weight on accounting performance measures.  
Second, the percentage of CEO ownership (Share) is also controlled. Sloan 
(1993) explains that CEOs could affect the sensitivity of CEO pay to accounting 
performance in two different ways. On one hand, CEOs with high stockholdings decrease 
the sensitivity of salary and bonus compensation to earnings performance. The reason is 
that when high CEO shareholdings provide a strong link between CEO wealth and firm 
performance, it is unreasonable to tie CEO compensation to earnings numbers. On the 
other hand, CEOs with high stockholdings increase the sensitivity of salary and bonus 
compensation to earnings performance. High CEO stockholdings provide a strong link 
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between CEO wealth and stock-price performance, including the noise in stock-price 
performance. Consequently, compensation committees try to limit the sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to noise in stock-price performance by placing more weight on accounting 
earnings as performance measures.  
Lambert and Larcker (1987) and Adams (1987) find that firms place relatively 
more weight on stock returns than on accounting earnings when CEOs have low stock 
ownership in the firm. Sloan (1993) finds that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to 
earnings performance (ROA) decreases when firms have high CEO stockholdings. The 
Share variable is excluded when the study tests the effect of earnings attributes and 
corporate governance on CEO compensation. The reason is that CEO ownership is used 
as a measure of corporate governance.  
 Some prior studies include the variances of the performance measures (especially 
variance of earnings) as control variables (Peng 2005; Davila and Penalva 2006). 
However, the variances of accounting-based performance measures are excluded from 
this study because they relate to the earnings attributes examined in this study7. In 
addition, prior studies on the effect of earnings persistence on CEO compensation often 
do not incorporate the variances of performance measures into the model (e.g., Baber et 
al. 1998 and 1999).  
                                                 
7
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3.4.3.2 Individual Control Variables 
 Individual control variables are industry (INDUSTRY), firm’s size (SIZE), and 
year (YEAR). INDUSTRY controls for industry trends and is measured based on two-digit 
SIC codes. Core et al. (1999) explain that larger firms demand higher-quality managerial 
talent and pay compensation. Cyert et al. (2002) also find that CEOs in large firms 
receive higher compensation. Hence, a firm’s size may affect CEO compensation. SIZE is 
measured by the natural logarithm of average total assets. YEAR is an additional dummy 
variable to control for trends.
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CHAPTER 4 
STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
 Based on prior literature, accounting-based earnings attributes provide important 
information, in addition to stock prices and accounting earnings, to design executive 
compensation contracts. Both analytical and empirical studies show that the weights on 
performance measures depend on “signal” and “noise” among performance measures. 
The accounting-based earnings attributes provide such information. Hence, compensation 
committees should use the earnings attributes to make decisions on placing the relative 
weight on earnings. To investigate whether compensation committees simultaneously use 
all four accounting-based earnings attributes for designing compensation contracts, four 
hypotheses are tested. In addition, this study examines whether the results are consistent 
with other definitions of CEO compensation.  
4.1 Persistence 
 Earnings persistence indicates the reoccurrence of earnings. Earnings with low 
earnings persistence may not be an appropriate performance measure for CEOs because 
earnings may not signal their efforts. For example, if earnings persistence of a firm is 
low, a CEO who works harder (using more effort) may not be able to increase future 
accounting earnings. 
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Baber et al. (1998 and 1999) find that the weight on earnings increases when a firm’s 
earnings persistence increases. Unlike prior studies, this study tests whether earnings 
persistence affects CEO compensation when the pay-performance model controls for the 
other three accounting-based earnings attributes. The first hypothesis is stated in an 
alternative form, as follows: 
H1: The sensitivity of CEO compensation to change in earnings is greater when 
earnings have higher levels of persistence. 
4.2 Accrual Quality 
 High accrual quality is desirable to shareholders and investors. Accrual quality 
shows the extent to which earnings deviate from a systematic association between firm 
performance and the agent’s true contribution (Peng 2005). High accrual quality indicates 
that earnings can represent the relationship between firm performance and the agent’s 
true contribution. Firms with high accrual quality should assign more weight to earnings 
than to stock returns in compensation contracts. Peng (2005) finds that accrual quality 
increases the weight on earnings as a performance measure in CEO compensation. Unlike 
Peng (2005), this study tests whether accrual quality affects CEO compensation when the 
pay-performance model includes the other three accounting-based earnings attributes.  
The second hypothesis is stated in an alternative form, as follows: 
H2: The sensitivity of CEO compensation to change in earnings is greater when 
earnings have higher levels of accrual quality.  
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4.3 Predictability 
 Earnings predictability is a desirable accounting-based earnings attribute because 
investors use past earnings to predict future earnings more accurately. In addition, Lipe 
(1990) shows that the ERC increases when earnings predictability increases. This means 
that accounting earnings with high predictability provide better information for pricing a 
firm’s value. Firms with high earnings predictability may assign more weight to earnings 
to evaluate the CEOs’ performances because these firms have less variance in earnings. 
The third hypothesis tests whether predictability affects CEO compensation when the 
pay-performance model includes the other three accounting-based earnings attributes.  
The third hypothesis is stated in an alternative form, as follows: 
H3: The sensitivity of CEO compensation to change in earnings is greater when 
earnings have higher levels of predictability. 
4.4 Smoothness 
On one hand, Leuz et al. (2003) believe that managers can hide changes in their 
firm’s economic performance using both real operating decisions and financial reporting 
choices. They interpret low volatility of earnings relative to cash flows as indicating 
greater earnings smoothness and implying high earnings management. On the other hand, 
other researchers approve of earnings smoothness because managers use their private 
information about future income to smooth out transitory fluctuation (Demski 1998). 
Because of these two different opinions on earnings smoothness, the directional effect of 
earnings smoothness on the relationship between CEO compensation and earnings 
becomes an empirical question. The fourth hypothesis tests the effect of smoothness on 
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CEO compensation when the pay-performance model includes the other three 
accounting-based earnings attributes. The fourth hypothesis is stated in an alternative 
form, as follows: 
 H4: The sensitivity of CEO compensation to change in earnings is associated with 
earnings smoothness. 
4.5 Corporate Governance 
In addition to the four earnings attributes discussed previously, corporate 
governance also impacts the design of CEO performance evaluation. Based on prior 
research (Core et al. 1999; Davila and Penalva 2006), CEOs in weak corporate 
governance firms have high bargaining power on compensation contracts. Therefore, 
corporate governance may influence the use of earnings attributes to weight earnings in 
compensation contracts. This study explores how differences in corporate governance 
affect compensation committees’ ability to consider accounting-based earnings attributes 
when they set performance evaluations in CEO compensation. The fifth hypothesis tests 
the effect of corporate governance on the use of the four earnings attributes in CEO 
compensation contracts. The alternative form is stated as follows: 
H5: The association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation to change in 
earnings and earnings attributes is greater for firms with strong corporate 
governance.
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CHAPTER 5 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
5.1 Data and Sample Selection 
To test H1 to H4, this study includes all firm-year observations in the S&P 1500 
(S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400, and S&P SmallCap 600) from the years 1998 to 2005 that 
have the required CEO compensation and financial data. CEO compensation data is from 
the ExecuComp database. Monthly stock returns are collected from the CRSP database. 
This return is a holding period return with dividends (variable name = RET). Monthly 
stock returns are used to calculate annual stock returns. All financial data is from the 
COMPUSTAT database for the years 1988 to 2005. Although the study period is 1998-
2005, data from the previous 10 years is needed to calculate earnings attributes. 
 To investigate the corporate governance effect (H5), all firms in the S&P1500 in 
2004 are selected because of the availability of data for the takeover protection index (G 
index). G index are collected from Web site finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~metrick/data.  
CEO compensation data is from the ExecuComp database for the year 2003 to 2004. The 
internal corporate governance data are hand-collected from proxy statements (DEF 14A).   
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The internal corporate governance variables are the following: number of 
independent directors, CEO duality, board size, number of outside directors who are 
sitting on fewer than three boards, number of outside directors who are younger than 70 
years old, number of outside directors having at least 5% common equity, and the 
percentage of common equity owned by the CEO. The corporate governance data showed 
no firm with outside directors having at least 5% of common equity.   
Control for outliers for both sample groups is as follows. First, to increase the 
homogeneity of the sample, all firms with SIC codes 6000-6999 and 9000-9999, which 
are banks and financial institutions, are excluded. These firms have special accounting 
and monitoring standards. Second, to reduce the effect of outliers, the top and bottom 1 
percent of the sample with respect to each earnings attribute are trimmed. Third, the 
statistics test (the Cook’s D) to eliminate the outliers is used. Finally, a firm is excluded if 
the previous year’s compensation data is for a different CEO than the current CEO. The 
reason is that CEO compensation is expected to be indicated by some CEO-specific 
factors (Sloan 1993). 
In Table 1, Panel A, the sample firms are classified based on a two-digit SIC 
code. Chemical (SIC 28), electrical equipment (SIC 36), utility (SIC 49), and service 
(SIC 73) industries have more than 400 firm-year observations. However, some 
industries have few observations. Hence, they are reclassified into 15 groups based on 
industry types. These 15 groups with the number of firms are the following: Agriculture 
and food (214), mining and construction (348), manufacturing (244), paper and printing 
(374), chemical (543), material (436), machinery (392), electrical equipment (504), 
transportation equipment (285), instrument (363), transportation and communications 
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(312), utility (493), wholesale and retail trade (932), service (487), and advertising and 
computer service (298) industries. 
5.2 Model for Testing 
 The earnings attributes are hypothesized to affect the weight on earnings, rather 
than on the level of the compensation directly, in the CEO compensation model. Their 
effects are tested by using interaction terms between proxies for four earnings attributes 
and accounting performance measures (ROA) after controlling for other variables. Two 
linear regression models are used in this study. First, the effects of accounting-based 
earnings attributes on the weight of earnings are tested. Second, the effects of accounting-
based earnings attributes and corporate governance on the weight of earnings are tested. 
The details for each model are explained in the following sections. 
5.2.1 Model for Testing the Effects of Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes on CEO 
Compensation 
 To test whether earnings attributes affect the weight of earnings (H1 to H4), the 
change in compensation is regressed on the related variables and control variables. The 
regression runs cross-sectionally for the years 1998 to 2005. The following is the 
regression specification:  
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∆COMPi,t = β0 + β1 Chgroai,t + β2 Returni,t  
 (+)  (+)  
 
+ β3Persist i,t + β4 Accruals i,t  
 (+/-) (+/-) 
  
 + β5Predict i,t + β6 Smooth i,t  
 (+/-)  (+/-)  
 
+ β7 ChgroaPersisti,t + β8 ChgroaAccruals i,t  
 (+) (+) 
  
 + β9 ChgroaiPredict i,t + β10 ChgroaSmoothi,t  
 (+)  (+/-)  
 
+ β11 ChgroaMBi,t + β12ReturnMBi,t  
(-)  (+)  
  
+ β13 ChgroaSharei,t + β14 ReturnSharei,t 
(?)  (?)  
 
+ β15 SIZE i,t + ∑ φ j INDUSTRYi,t + ∑ γ lYEARi,t + ε  (8) 
 
 (+) 
 
The predicted signs of the estimates are displayed in parentheses. 
where  
∆COMPi,t  = firm i, time t change in CEO compensation specified as: 
(1)  salary defined as the natural log of cash salary in year t divided 
by cash salary in year t-1, 
(2)  cash bonuses defined as the natural log of bonus
 
in year t 
divided by bonus
 
in year t-1,  
(3)  cash compensation defined as the natural log of cash salary   
plus bonus
 
in year t divided by cash salary plus bonus
 
in  
year t-1, 
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(4)  stock-based compensation defined as the natural log of the 
sum of the value of stock options (using S&P’s Black Scholes 
methodology) and the value of restricted stock granted during 
the year t (#BLK_VALUE + #RSTKGRNT) divided by the 
sum of the value of stock options and the value of restricted 
stock granted during the year t-1,  
(5)  total compensation defined as the natural log of the sum of 
salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
(#TDC 1) in year t divided by the sum in year t-1; 
RETi,t  =  firm i, year t common stock return, calculated from monthly 
returns
 
for firm i; 
Chgroai,t  =  firm i, year t-1 to year t change in firm i’s return on assets (ROA) 
ROA is calculated by firm i’s operating income after depreciations 
in year t (#178), divided by the average total assets of year t (#6); 
Persist
 i,t  =  firm i, year t earnings persistence estimated as φ1,j from equation 
(5) rolling ten-year windows; 
Accruals
 i,t  =  firm i, year t earnings accruals estimated as )ˆ( ,tjνσ− from 
equation (6) rolling ten-year windows; 
Predict
 i,t  =  firm i, year t earnings predictability estimated as - )~( ,tjνσ from 
equation (5) rolling ten-year windows; 
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Smooth
 i,t  = firm i, year t earnings smoothness estimated as equation (7) rolling 
ten-year windows; 
MB,t = firm i, year t ratio of market value to book value of assets 
measured at the beginning of the period. The market value of 
assets equals the market value of equity plus the book value of 
total liabilities. The ratio is the market value of assets [(#6 – #60) + 
(#199 x #25)] divided by the book value of assets (#6);  
Sharei,t = firm i, year t the percentage of shares owned by the CEO; 
SIZEi,t  =  firm i, year t the natural logarithm of average total assets (#6); 
INDUSTRYi,t  =  firm i, year t the two-digit SIC codes; 
YEARi,t =  firm i, year t; 
βk(k = 0,…, 15)  =  regression parameters; 
φ
 j(j=1-14)  =  regression parameters for INDUSTRY; 
γ
 l(l=98-04) =  regression parameters for YEAR; 
ε =  error term; 
 
To examine whether accounting-based earnings attributes interact with earnings 
to explain change in compensation, the coefficients of the interaction terms between the 
change in ROA and each accounting-based earnings attribute (β7, β8, β9, and β10) are the 
principal focus of the study. Under the alternative hypotheses, the weight assigned to 
change in earnings increases as persistence, accruals, and predictability increase, and 
thus, the estimated coefficients of β7, β8, and β9 are expected to be positive. In terms of 
46 
 
smoothness, the estimated coefficient of the interaction terms between change in ROA 
and smoothness (β10) is expected to be nonzero.  
Expectations for other parameters are as follows. Prior studies show that stock 
return and accounting earnings are used as performance measures to pay managers 
(Lambert and Larcker 1987; Jensen and Murphy 1990; Clinch 1991; Ely 1991; Sloan 
1993; Kaplan 1994; Bushman et al. 1998; Bushman and Smith 2001; Core et al. 2003). 
Therefore, positive relationships between compensation and stock returns as well as 
between compensation and accounting earnings are expected (β1>0, β2 >0). 
 Prior studies (e.g., Adams 1987; Baber et al. 1996) find cross-sectional variation 
in the sensitivity of CEO compensation to earnings and stock-price performance. Their 
results show that CEO compensation is relatively less sensitive to earnings performance, 
but more sensitive to stock-price performance, when there is a high ratio of the market-
to-book value of equity (a proxy for growth opportunities). Low growth firms (low MB) 
are expected to rely more on earnings than on stock returns as performance measures (β11 
<0 and β12 >0). Regarding CEO shareholdings, the signs for the interaction terms 
between performance measures (ROA and RET) and Share are unpredictable because of 
two different opinions on the effect of CEO ownership on the weight of earnings in 
compensation contracts.  
5.2.2 Model for Testing the Effects of Accounting-Based Earnings Attributes and 
Corporate Governance on CEO Compensation 
 To test whether earnings attributes as well as corporate governance affect the 
weight of earnings (H5), each corporate governance variable is used as a GOV variable 
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one at a time. GOV interacts with ROA and each earnings attribute. GOV also interacts 
with ROA and each earnings attribute. The change in compensation is regressed on the 
related variables and control variables. Because of the limitation of data availability, the 
test uses only data from 2004. The regression runs cross-sectionally for the year 2004. 
The following is the regression specification:  
∆COMPi,t  =   β0 + β1 Chgroai,t + β2 Returni,t + β3Prini,t  
 (+) (+) (+/-)  
   
+ β4 ChgroaPrini,t+ β5 GOV i,t + β6 ChgroaPrini,t*GOV i,t + εi,t  
 (+)  (-)   (+)     (9) 
where  
(1)  salary is defined as the natural log of cash salary in year t 
divided by cash salary in year t-1, 
(2)  cash bonus is defined as the natural log of bonus
 
in year t 
divided by bonus
 
in year t-1,  
(3)  cash compensation is defined as the natural log of cash salary 
plus bonus
 
in year t divided by cash salary plus bonus
 
in  
year t-1, 
(4) stock-based compensation is defined as the natural log of the 
sum of the value of stock options (using S&P’s Black Scholes 
methodology) and the value of restricted stock granted during 
the year t (#BLK_VALUE + #RSTKGRNT) divided by the 
sum of the value of stock options and the value of restricted 
stock granted during year t-1,  
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(5) total compensation is defined as the natural log of the sum of 
salary, bonus, other annual, total value of restricted stock 
granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total 
compensation (#TDC 1) in year t divided by the sum in year t-
1; 
Returni,t  =  annual returni,t is firm i, year t  common stock return, calculated 
from monthly returni; 
Prini,t = firm i, year t the linear combination of PersistZ, AccrualsZ, 
PredictZ, and nSmoothZ by using principal component method; 
Chgroai,t  =  firm i, year t-1 to year t change in firm i’s return on assets (ROA) 
ROA is calculated by firm i’s operating income after depreciations 
in year t (#178), divided by the average total assets of year t (#6); 
GOV
 i,j,t = firm i, corporate governance variable j, year t. Corporate 
governance variables are EG, Nodual, Share, Size, Resize, Ind, 
Pnotold, and Pnotbusy; 
EG = 24- Gompers Index; 
rEG = ascending order rank of 24- Gompers Index; 
Nodual = an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is “not” chairman of 
the board, and zero otherwise;  
Share = the percentage of common equity owned by the CEO 
rShare = ascending order rank of  the percentage of common equity owned 
by the CEO; 
49 
 
Size = an indicator variable equal to one if firms have 7-12 board of 
directors members, and zero otherwise; 
Resize = 1/total number of directors on the board; 
rResize = ascending order rank of 1/total number of directors on the board; 
Ind = the percentage of outside directors on the board. 
rInd = ascending order rank of percentage of outside directors on the 
board; 
Pnotold = the percentage of the outside directors who are younger than 70 
years old; 
rPnotold = ascending order rank of the percentage of the outside directors who 
are younger than 70 years old; 
Pnotbusy = the percentage of outside directors who sit on less three boards; 
rPnotbusy = ascending order rank of the percentage of outside directors who sit 
on less three boards; 
βk(k = 0,…, 6)  =  regression parameters; 
ε  =  error term; 
The predicted signs of the estimates are displayed in parentheses. 
 
To examine whether corporate governance and accounting-based earnings 
attributes interact with earnings to explain change in compensation, the coefficient for the 
interaction term between the change in ROA and the combination of accounting-based 
earnings attribute (β6) is the main focus of the part. Under the alternative hypotheses, 
stronger corporate governance and increases in earnings attributes are expected to 
50 
 
increase the weight assigned to change in earnings in the compensation model. Hence, 
the estimated coefficient of β6  is expected to be positive. The other estimated coefficients 
are expected to have the same sign as explained in section 5.2.1. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RESULTS 
 
This chapter presents the results of this study on the effect of earnings attributes 
on CEO compensation. Section 6.1 discusses descriptive statistics about compensation 
and earnings attributes. Section 6.2 provides the Pearson and Spearman-rank correlation 
matrix between variables in the study. Regression analysis for testing hypotheses 1-4 and 
hypothesis 5 are presented in Sections 6.3 and 6.4, respectively. Finally, Section 6.5 
reports sensitivity tests.  
6.1 Descriptive Statistics  
This section provides descriptive statistics for CEO compensation, earnings 
attributes, corporate governance, and control variables. Section 6.1.1 presents descriptive 
statistics for CEO compensation, earnings attributes, and firm characteristics for 1998-
2005. Section 6.1.2 presents descriptive statistics for the pooled data in detail. Section 
6.1.3 presents descriptive statistics for corporate governance variables for 2004.
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6.1.1 Descriptive Statistics for 1998-2005: CEO Compensation, Earnings Attributes, and 
Firm Characteristics 
Using yearly data from 1998 to 2005, Table 2, Panel A shows that salaries and 
bonuses increase during the study period, except in 2001. Therefore, cash compensation 
(the sum of salary and bonus) increases every year except in 2001. The stock option 
compensation greatly increases from 1998 to 2000 and begins to drop in 2001 due to 
SFAS 123 (implemented in 2004), which requires firms to record stock option 
compensation as an expense. The mean of restricted stock awards increases from 
$372,324 in 2001 to $994,828 in 2005, whereas the mean of stock options decreases from 
$2,739,200 in 2001 to $1,770,110 in 2005. This evidence shows that firms substitute 
restricted stock for stock option compensation. Regarding total compensation, the two 
highest amounts are equal to $5,330,360 and $5,341,100 in 2000 and 2005, respectively.  
 In terms of earnings attributes, the average value is consistent across the years. 
The absolute values of the means of persistence, accruals, predictability, and smoothness 
attributes are 0.519, 0.014, 0.039, and 1.082, respectively. The sample firms have a mean 
LnAssets equal to 7.405 or $1,644,184. The average Market-to-Book ratio is equal to 
2.004. The average of accounting return (ROA) and market return are 10.30% and 
14.00%, respectively. The mean of stock ownership by the CEOs is approximately 2.27% 
of the outstanding equity of their firms. 
53 
 
6.1.2 Descriptive Statistics for Pooled Data: CEO Compensation, Earnings Attributes, 
and Firm Characteristics 
 Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the pooled data. The table 
shows that ten percent of sample firms do not provide bonuses or stock options and half 
of sample firms do not provide restricted stock. During the 1998-2005 period, means 
(medians) of salary, bonus, and total compensation were $700,377($650,000), 
$785,404($446,270), and $4,567,150($2,606,479), respectively. Consistent with previous 
studies (e.g., Core et al. 2003 and Davila and Penalva 2006), CEO compensation has a 
high standard deviation. Unlike the levels of compensation, changes in compensation do 
not have high standard deviations. This evidence supports the conclusion that the change 
in compensation should be used in this study. The average change in salary, bonus, cash, 
equity, and total compensation is 0.06, 0.114, 0.072, 0.073, and 0.066, respectively. 
Similar to prior studies (e.g., Davila and Penalva 2006), sample firms have a negative 
change in ROA with mean (median) equal to -0.003(-0.001).  In terms of earnings 
attributes, no earnings attribute has large variation, especially regarding accruals and 
predictability. 
6.1.3 Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Governance for the Year 2004 
 The results of Table 2, Panel C show that the median board size is nine and the 
median of independent directors is seven. The mean (median) percentage of independent 
directors is about 73 (75) percent. In terms of the effectiveness of independent directors, 
on an average, each firm has six independent directors who sit on fewer than three 
boards, and six independent directors who are younger than 70 years. In other words, 
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about 80 percent of independent directors are neither busy nor old. More than half of the 
CEOs are chairmen of their boards. On an average, firms use ten types of anti-takeover 
protection mechanisms. 
6.2 Pearson and Spearman-Rank Correlation  
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients in the upper half and the 
Spearman-rank correlation coefficients in the lower half of the correlation table. In the 
following discussion, the Spearman correlation is shown within parentheses after the 
Pearson correlation. 
Table 3, Panel A shows the positive associations between all types of CEO 
compensation as well as all types of changes in compensation. However, CEO stock 
ownership is negatively associated with compensation. The positive relationships 
between compensation and firm size (Lnassets) indicate that larger firms pay higher 
compensation.  Accounting returns (ROA) and stock returns have positive correlations to 
CEO compensation. The correlations between changes in compensation and change in 
ROA are higher than those between changes in compensation and stock returns. Based on 
the positive relationship between stock options and MB, firms with higher growth 
opportunity pay higher stock option compensation. These findings are consistent with 
prior studies. 
In terms of earnings attributes, the results in Table 3, Panel B show that most 
earnings attributes are moderately correlated to each other, except for accruals 
(Accrualsz) and predictability (PredictZ) with a correlation of 0.548 (0.564). Smoothness 
is negatively associated with accruals and predictability. To construct positive 
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relationships between smoothness and other earnings attributes, smoothness is 
transformed by multiplying by a negative one. The transformed variable is nSmoothZ. 
After transformation, nSmoothZ is moderately positively related to Accrualsz and 
PredictZ with Pearson correlations of 0.170 and 0.239, respectively.  
 Regarding correlations of interaction terms, Table 3, Panel C presents remarkably 
high correlations among interaction terms, especially interaction terms for rank, ranging 
from 0.62 to 0.75 (0.88-0.93). The Pearson correlation among interaction terms of 
standardized earnings attributes ranges from 0.16 to 0.59. To reduce multicollinearity 
problems, two new variables, Index and PCA, represent the combination of the four 
earnings attributes. The details for these two methods are explained in Section 6.3.3. The 
Pearson (Spearman) correlations for Index and four standardized earnings attributes range 
from 0.38 to 0.67 (0.37 to 0.74). The Pearson (Spearman) correlation for Prin and four 
standardized earnings attributes range from 0.14 to 0.85 (0.16 to 0.85).  
Table 3, Panel D reports the Pearson and Spearman correlations among corporate 
governance variables. The correlations among number of directors, number of 
independent directors, number of busy directors, and number of old directors are high, 
ranging from 0.74 to 0.93. In addition, the correlations between EG and the other 
directors variables (e.g., Ind) are negative.  
 
6.3 Regression Analysis: Earnings Attributes 
 This study uses multiple regressions to examine the effect of earnings attributes 
on CEO compensation. Section 6.3 reports the results of the estimation of hypotheses H1-
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H3, which predict that the compensation-earnings relationships are positively related to 
persistence, accruals, and predictability attributes. However, hypothesis 4 predicts a non-
directional effect of earnings smoothness on a compensation-earnings relationship. In 
other words, the coefficients of the variables, ChgROAPersist, ChgROAAccruals, and 
ChgROAPredict are expected to be positive and the coefficient of the variable, 
ChgROASmooth is expected to be non-zero. Two types of regression models are used to 
examine the effect of earnings attributes on each type of CEO compensation. First, the 
model includes each earnings attribute one at a time, hereafter individual model. Second, 
the model simultaneously includes all four earnings attributes, hereafter simultaneous 
model. The following sections report the results of the multiple regressions. 
6.3.1 Regression Analysis: Continuous Value of Earnings Attributes 
To compare with prior studies, CEO compensation is regressed on each earnings 
attribute one at a time (individual model).  The results are shown in Table 4, Panel A. 
Like Baber et al.(1998), the coefficient of the variable ChgROAPersist is positively 
significant in the salary model, 0.177 (with a t-statistic of 1.97). However, this interaction 
term is not related to other types of CEO compensation. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is 
weakly supported only when CEO compensation is defined as salary. It means that 
change in salary increases when change in ROA and persistence increase. Similar to 
Peng’s (2004) findings, the coefficient of the variable ChgROAAccruals is positively 
related to change in cash, 49.85 (with a t-statistic of 6.73). Hypothesis 2 is strongly 
supported because of positive associations between ChgROAAccruals and changes in 
bonus, cash, equity, and total compensation. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the variable 
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ChgROAPredict is positively related to all kinds of change in compensation, except for 
salary. Hence, changes in compensation, except for salary, increase when change in ROA 
and accruals or predictability increase. Also consistent with hypothesis 4 the variable 
ChgROASmooth is negatively associated with the above-mentioned changes in 
compensation. This evidence implies that compensation committees prefer smooth 
earnings, consistent with Francis et al.’s (2004) results that firms with less earnings 
smoothness bear a higher cost of capital. Overall, hypotheses 2-4 are strongly supported, 
whereas hypothesis 1 is weakly supported. These results suggest that accruals, 
predictability, and smoothness attributes are used by compensation committees in making 
CEO compensation decisions. In contrast, persistence is an important earnings attribute 
for determining salary.  The results also indicate that the use of each earning attribute is 
not strongly affected by the types of CEO compensation. 
Table 4, Panel B reports multiple regressions between CEO compensation and 
four earnings attributes simultaneously (simultaneous model). Weakly consistent with 
hypotheses 1, ChgROAPersist is positively related only to change in salary. Inconsistent 
with hypothesis 2, ChgROAAccruals is not positively associated with change in salary 
and bonus. In support of hypothesis 3, ChgROAPredict is positively associated with the 
changes of all types of compensation, excluding salary. In terms of hypothesis 4, 
ChgROASmooth is negatively related to change in equity and total compensation at the 
conventional level. The different compensation definitions show inconsistent results. In 
conclusion, the results of the multiple regressions from the simultaneous model and the 
individual model are opposite. However, the positive coefficients of ChgROAPredict in 
58 
 
both models indicates that predictability always has a positive effect on the use of ROA 
as a CEO performance measure.  
6.3.2 Regression Analysis: Solving the Scaling Issue 
 Although section 6.3.1 shows that several earnings attributes affect CEO 
compensation, the most outstanding earnings attributes cannot be detected. To compare 
the effect of each earnings attribute on CEO compensation, each earnings attribute should 
be measured on the same scale. There are two methods to solve the issue of differences in 
the earnings attributes scale: the ranking and the standardizing methods. For the first 
method, the variables Persist, Accruals, and Predict are ranked yearly based on 
continuous values and named rPersist, rAccruals, and rPredict, respectively. The higher 
rank, the greater the earnings attribute. In terms of the variable Smooth, Table 4, Panel A 
shows that ChgROASmooth is negatively associated with CEO compensation. Thus, 
Smooth is multiplied by a negative one and then ranked in ascending order. The top rank 
of this transformed variable, rnSmooth, has the greatest negative value, which indicates 
the lowest earnings smoothness.  
The regression results from the ranked earnings attributes are quite similar to 
those from the continuous values of earnings attributes in Table 4. The results of the 
individual model in Table 5, Panel A show a strong positive relation between change in 
compensation, except for salary, and the following three interaction terms: (1) the 
interaction term of rank of accruals (ChgROA rAccruals), (2) the interaction term of rank 
of predictability (ChgROA rPredicts), and (3) the interaction term of rank of smoothness 
(ChgROA rnSmooth). Hence, these results support hypotheses 2-4.  Individually, the 
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effects of ChgROA rAccruals, ChgROA rPredicts, or ChgROA rnSmooth are consistent 
across CEO compensation definitions only in individual models. The results of the 
simultaneous models in Table 5, Panel B, report that ChgROArPersist and ChgROA 
rAccruals are not positively associated with change in bonus and cash, whereas 
ChgROArPredict is positively related to all changes in compensation, excluding salary. 
The ChgROArnSmooth is positively related only to change in equity. These findings 
support only hypothesis 3. They also indicate that some earnings attributes influence 
certain types of CEO compensation. In conclusion, although the ranking method fixes the 
different scales of earnings attributes, the results from the individual and simultaneous 
models are contradictory. 
The second method to solve the different scales in earnings attributes is the 
standardizing method. The original continuous values of earnings attributes are 
transformed to standardized values, Z-scores. To determine Z-scores, the continuous 
values of each earnings attribute are deducted from the mean of that earnings attribute 
and divided by the standard deviation of that earnings attribute. The variables, PersistZ, 
AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ, measure persistence, accruals, predictability, and 
smoothness attributes, respectively. Table 6, Panels A and B present the regressions of 
the individual models and the simultaneous models without control variables respectively.  
In Table 6, Panels C through F report the regressions of the individual models 
with control variables, whereas Panel G reports those of the simultaneous models with 
control variables. The results from the individual models with and without control 
variables show that the coefficients of ChgROAAccrualsZ, ChgROAPredictZ, and 
ChgROAnSmoothZ, are positively significant in all types of CEO compensation, 
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excluding salary. The ChgROAPersistZ is a significant factor only for salary. Like the 
results from the ranking method, the results from the Z-Scores method support 
hypotheses 2-4 and weakly support hypothesis 1. Therefore, accruals, predictability, and 
smoothness have positive effects on CEO compensation-earnings relationships. 
Remarkably, the effect of predictability on CEO compensation is outstanding because the 
coefficient of ChgROAPredictZ is higher than those of the other interaction terms. 
Contradictory to the results from the individual models, the results from the simultaneous 
model in Table 6, Panels B and G, show that the  coefficient of ChgROAPersistZ is 
positively significant only for salary. The coefficients of ChgROAAccrualsZ are not 
positively significant for all types of compensation. The coefficients of ChgROAPredictZ 
are positive for all types of compensation, except for salary. In addition, the coefficients 
of ChgROA nSmoothZ are positive for equity and total compensation. These results 
support only hypothesis 3 and weakly support hypothesis 4. This evidence also confirms 
that different types of earnings attributes are significant in certain definitions of CEO 
compensation.  
In conclusion, although the coefficients of the interaction terms from the 
standardizing method are comparable, the results from the individual and the 
simultaneous models are different. Based on the results of the individual models, several 
earnings attributes may be used for making decisions on CEO compensation. Therefore, 
all four earnings attributes should be combined before testing the effect on CEO 
compensation as in Section 6.3.3. 
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6.3.3 Regression Analysis: Combining Four Earnings Attributes 
 After solving the scaling issue, the results of the individual and simultaneous 
models are still mixed. These contradictory results may come from two sources. First, 
multicollinearity problems automatically occur in the simultaneous models because the 
four interaction terms (change in ROA with each earnings attribute) are included. Second, 
based on an econometrics issue, an additional variable may change the coefficients of 
other variables in a regression model from positive to be negative or vice versa. The 
reason is that other variables are held constant when the coefficient of an additional 
variable is interpreted. To resolve the contradictory results, the four earnings attributes 
should be combined. This study uses two combining methods: Index and Principal 
Component Analysis (PCA). 
 The first method, the variable Index is the average rank values of four earnings 
attributes, rPersist, rAccruals, rPredict, and rnSmooth. Table 7 presents the results of the 
regression of the Index model. Table 7, Panels A and B, present the results from the 
models with and without control variables. The estimated coefficients of ChgROAIndex 
for change in bonus, change in cash, change in equity, and change in total compensation 
are 0.002, 0.002, 0.001, and 0.001, respectively at a significance level of 0.01. Hence, the 
change in CEO compensation, excluding salary, increases when ROA and earnings 
attributes increase. In comparison, there is indifference in terms of explanatory power 
between models using Z-scores and models using Index because the adjusted R-squared 
values of the models in Table 7, Panels A and B are not different from those in Table 6, 
Panels G and B.  
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The principal component analysis (PCA) is the second method for combining the 
four earnings attributes (PersistZ, AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ). The standardized 
values of the four earnings attributes are used to identify principal components. Then, the 
first principal component (PC1) is chosen because it meets a threshold criterion 
(Eigenvalue =1). PC1 explains about 42% of the total variation in the four earnings 
attributes. The principal component score (Prin) for each observation is calculated by 
using PC1 and is used as a representative of the combination of the four earnings 
attributes. Based on eigenvectors, this PC1 is positively associated with PersistZ, 
AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ. The elements of the eigenvector of these four 
attributes are 0.11, 0.63, 0.64 and 0.39 respectively. Table 8 shows the effect of the 
combination of earnings attributes in PCA form on CEO compensation. In Table 8, Panel 
A, the coefficients of the variable ChgROAPrin for bonus, cash, equity, and total 
compensation are 0.812, 0.669, 0.484, and 0.533 respectively at a significance level of 
0.001. Similarly, the models without control variables in Table 8, Panel B show that the 
coefficients of the variable ChgROAPrin for bonus, cash, equity, and total compensation 
are 1.001, 0.737, 0.488, and 0.599 respectively at a significance level of 0.001. Consistent 
with the regressions using Index in Table 7, the regressions using Prin also support the 
hypothesis that the combination of earnings attributes is positively related to CEO 
compensation in the models both with and without control variables. However, the 
adjusted R-square values in Table 8 are marginally higher than those in Table 7.  
In conclusion, the results of both combination methods confirm that compensation 
committees consider earnings attributes as additional information, aside from stock 
returns and accounting earnings, in designing CEO compensation. Specifically, the 
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accounting-based earnings attributes of the firms are indicators for the weight ascribed to 
ROA in a compensation contract. Firms with good earnings attributes put more weight on 
ROA as a CEO performance measure than do the other firms. This conclusion is 
consistent for all types of CEO compensation, except for salary. In comparing the two 
methods, the PCA method is more appropriate for combining the four earnings attributes 
because of its higher explanatory power in regression models. Hence, Section 6.3.4 
shows the results of using the PCA method is used to test the effect of corporate 
governance on the use of earnings attributes for setting CEO compensation. 
6.3.4 Regression Analysis: Combining Three Earnings Attributes  
The tests using Z-scores in the individual models as shown in Table 6 highlight 
the positive effects of accruals, predictability, and smoothness on CEO compensation. In 
addition, the stepwise method, which is a systematic method for adding and removing 
variables from a multilinear regression model, chooses Accrualsz, PredictZ, and SmoothZ 
to explain the CEO compensation model. This section combines these three variables by 
using PCA. The first principal component (PC1) is chosen because it meets the threshold 
(Eigenvalue =1). PC1 explains about 55% of the total variation of the three earnings 
attributes. The elements of the eigenvector of AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ are 
0.64, 0.66 and 0.40, respectively. In Table 9, Panel A, the coefficients of ChgROAPrin in 
the bonus, cash, equity, and total compensation models are positively significant at the 
0.01 level (0.827, 0.680, 0.486, and 0.542, respectively). Without the control variables in 
the models, the coefficients of ChgROAPrin in the bonus, cash, equity, and total 
compensation models are still positively significant at the 0.01 level (1.019, 0.749, 0.491, 
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and 0.611, respectively). These results also support the conclusion that a high earnings 
attribute increases the weight on ROA as a CEO performance measure in a CEO 
compensation contract. Furthermore, this conclusion can be applied to changes in bonus, 
cash, equity, and total compensation. 
6.3.5 Summary 
In conclusion, the results from the individual models, using both ranking and 
standardizing methods, indicate that compensation committees use earnings attributes 
(predictability, accruals, and smoothness) to design CEO compensation, except for salary. 
In other words, compensation committees in firms with high earnings attributes increase 
the use of earnings as a CEO performance measure. The results show that the estimated 
coefficients of ChgROArPredict and ChgROAPredictZ are higher than the estimated 
coefficients of other attributes. It can be inferred that compensation committees consider 
predictability as the most important earnings attribute because high earnings 
predictability indicates high firm value. There is some evidence to support this 
conclusion. First, analysts value predictability for setting stock prices (AIMR (1993)). In 
addition, Lee (1999) discusses predictability as an important element of firm valuation.  
Regarding the accruals attribute, the results of this study agree with Peng’s (2004) 
results in that CEOs receive higher compensation when their firms have a higher ROA 
and higher accruals attribute. Compensation committees value accruals because this 
attribute is also a desirable attribute for investors. Some capital market studies support 
this conclusion. For example, Francis et al. (2004) show that a lower accrual attribute 
increases the cost of capital.  
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On the other hand, smoothness has a negative relation to CEO compensation. In 
other words, firms with an increased ROA and a higher earnings smoothness pay their 
CEOs higher compensation because low earnings smoothness is undesirable for 
investors. Francis et al. (2004) also show that lower earnings smoothness increases cost 
of capital.   
Like the individual models, the simultaneous models show that the effect of 
predictability on an earnings-compensation relationship is consistently positive in all 
definitions of CEO compensation, except for salary. However, smoothness has a positive 
effect on the equity compensation-earnings relationship as well as on the total 
compensation-earnings relationship. In addition, persistence and accruals are negatively 
associated with the earnings-compensation relationship. Therefore, only hypothesis 3 is 
strongly supported when simultaneous models are used. The results from the individual 
models and the simultaneous models are contradictory. Therefore, the four earnings 
attributes are combined and retested. 
This study uses two combination methods: Index and PCA. After combining all 
four earnings attributes and then the three earnings attributes (accruals, predictability, and 
smoothness), the results from both Index and PCA methods show that earnings attributes 
have positive effects on the compensation-earnings relationship. It can be inferred that 
compensation committees combine earnings attributes before using them to set CEO 
compensation. In other words, firms with good earnings attributes increase the weight on 
ROA as a CEO performance measure. This conclusion is valid for all types of CEO 
compensation, excluding salary. 
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6.4 Regression Analysis: Corporate Governance and Earnings Attributes 
 This section reports the results of testing hypothesis 5, which predicts that 
corporate governance has a positive effect on the use of earnings attributes and ROA in a 
CEO compensation contract. Results reported in Section 6.3 show that several earnings 
attributes are important factors in determining the use of ROA in CEO compensation. 
Therefore, earnings attributes should be combined before testing the effect of corporate 
governance on their use in CEO compensation. Because of its higher explanatory power, 
the PCA, instead of Index, method is more appropriate for use in combining the four 
earnings attributes. To support hypothesis 5, the coefficient of the interaction term of a 
corporate governance variable, change in ROA, and PCA is expected to be positive. 
Section 6.4.1 shows the results of tests using the individual corporate governance 
variables and Section 6.4.2 presents the results of tests by using the combination of 
corporate governance variables. 
 
6.4.1 Regression of Individual Corporate Governance 
 Table 10 reports the results of testing the effects of individual corporate 
governance variables. In this study, seven corporate governance variables are used to 
measure the quality of a firm’s corporate governance. A higher value for each variable 
indicates a higher quality of corporate governance. The ranks of corporate governance 
variables are also used in this study. A higher rank of a corporate governance variable 
indicates stronger corporate governance. 
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In Table 10, Panels B and C show that anti-takeover protection (EG) is not related 
to CEO compensation. Panel D indicates that the CEO duality does not affect the use of 
earnings attributes in CEO compensation. However, the change in salary for CEOs who 
are not chairmen of the board is lower than for CEOs who are chairmen (coefficient of 
Nodual = -0.015 and t-stat -1.98). This finding can imply two opposite conclusions. On 
one hand, CEOs-Chairmen may use their influence to increase their salary. On the other 
hand, these CEOs-Chairmen do more work. In terms of CEO ownership, Table10, Panel 
E reveals that CEOs, owning a larger portion of their firms’ shares does not have an 
influence on CEO compensation. 
Table 10, Panels G, H, and I show that board size does not impact the use of 
earnings attributes in CEO compensation. Regarding the effect of independent directors, 
Table 10, Panels J and K reveal that the coefficients of the variable, ChgROAPrin*Ind are 
not positively significant.  These findings imply that firms with a high percentage of 
independent directors do not place more weight on ROA in deciding CEO compensation. 
A possible explanation is that the percentage of independent directors is an inappropriate 
proxy for the effectiveness of independent directors. Hence, this study includes additional 
tests for the effectiveness of independent directors on CEO compensation decisions. In 
Table 10, Panels L and M show that the proportion of young independent directors does 
not affect CEO compensation. However, in Table 10, Panel N, firms having fewer busy 
directors use earnings attributes and ROA to increase CEO total compensation 
(coefficient of ChgROAPrin*Pnotbusy = 6.444 and t-stat=1.35). This evidence indicates 
that the number of less-busy independent directors, instead of only the number of 
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independent directors, influences the use of earnings attributes in weighting on ROA as a 
CEO performance measure.  
In conclusion, the results of tests show that hypothesis 5 is weakly supported. 
Only one corporate governance variable affects the use of earnings attributes in total 
compensation. In particular, the proportion of less-busy independent directors has a 
positive effect on the use of earnings attributes in total compensation. One possible 
explanation for the weak relationship between corporate governance variables and the use 
of earnings attributes is that each variable measures only one aspect of corporate 
governance. Therefore, corporate governance variables should be combined to include 
several corporate governance aspects. Section 6.4.2 reports the results using combined 
corporate governance variables. 
6.4.2 Regression of the Combination of Corporate Governance Variables 
Prior studies do not provide clear evidence as to which corporate governance 
variable is the best proxy for the quality of corporate governance. Therefore, this study 
combines several aspects of corporate governance variables using two combination 
methods: Index and PCA.   
The first method creates a new variable, CIndex, which is the average rank of six 
corporate governance variables: EG, Share, Resize, Ind, Pnotold, and Pnotbusy. Nodual 
is not included because it is a dummy variable and cannot be ranked. The results in Table 
11, Panels A and B, show that the coefficients of ChgroaPrinCindex are not positively 
significant. It means that the combination of corporate governance variables does not 
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have a positive effect on the use of earnings attributes in CEO compensation. Therefore, 
hypothesis 5 is not supported.  
The second combination method is the principal component method, PCA. Before 
combining, corporate governance variables are standardized to be presented in the same 
scale. The transformed variables for EG, Share, Resize, and Pnotbusy are EGZ, ShareZ, 
ResizeZ, and PnotbusyZ, respectively. Only these four variables are combined because 
they have positive correlations among them. The first principal component (PC1) is 
chosen to create the principal component score for each observation because its 
eigenvalue equal to 1. PC1 explains 35.88% of the total variation of the original four 
variables. In PC1, the element of eigenvector for EGZ, ShareZ, ResizeZ, and PnotbusyZ 
are 0.578, 0.342, 0.613, and 0.414, respectively. The principal component score, named 
Corp, is the combination of these four variables. In Table 12, Panels A and B report that 
Corp does not affect the use of earnings attributes in CEO compensation in either model 
with or without control variables. Consistent with the conclusion of the tests using 
CIndex, hypothesis 5 is not supported by the tests using Corp. This evidence also 
confirms that corporate governance does not have an effect on CEO compensation.  
6.4.3 Summary 
Corporate governance does not have an effect on the use of earnings attributes in 
CEO compensation. One possible explanation is that compensation committees in strong 
corporate governance firms may use subjective performance measures to evaluate CEO 
performance. Accounting ratios calculated from earnings (e.g., ROA) are classified as 
objective performance measures. Hence, these ratios and earnings attributes are not 
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significant factors to explain CEO compensation contracts for strong corporate 
governance firms that use subjective performance measures. 
6.5 Sensitivity Tests on the Combination of Earnings Attributes 
 Section 6.3 shows that each earnings attribute can explain CEO compensation.  
However, the conclusion is not consistent when all four earnings attributes are included 
in a model. Therefore, it is interesting to explore whether the effects of earnings attributes 
on CEO compensation show up when using two and three earnings attributes at a time. 
To reduce the effect of the difference in scales, the standardized earnings attributes,  
PersistZ, AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ, are used to set two and three combinations 
of earnings attributes. Because of the insignificance of control variables, the regression 
model without control variables is used. Section 6.5.1 discusses the results of 
simultaneous models that include three earnings attributes at a time. Section 6.5.2 
discusses the results of simultaneous models that include two earnings attributes at a 
time. Finally, section 6.5.3 presents the results of model selection for each CEO 
compensation definition. 
6.5.1 Sensitivity Tests on Three Earnings Attributes 
 There are four combinations for the models including three earnings attributes: (1) 
AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ , (2) PersistZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ , (3) PersistZ, 
AccrualsZ, and nSmoothZ, (4)  PersistZ, AccrualsZ, and PredictZ. The results show that 
predictability is an outstanding earnings attribute in explaining all types of CEO 
compensation, excluding salary. In Table 13, Panels A, B, and D, the coefficients of 
PredictZ are strongly positively significant and higher than the coefficients of the other 
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earnings attributes. In contrast, based on Table 13, Panels B, C, and D, the persistence 
attribute is not a significant explanatory variable in CEO compensation, except for salary. 
Remarkably, the coefficient of neither PersistZ nor AccrualsZ is positively significant 
when the model includes PredictZ. This finding may be caused by a multicollinearity 
problem or an additional variable. 
6.5.2 Sensitivity Tests on Two Earnings Attributes 
 There are six combinations for the models including two earnings attributes: (1) 
PersistZ and AccrualsZ, (2) PersistZ and PredictZ, (3) PersistZ and nSmoothZ, (4) 
AccrualsZ and PredictZ, (5) AccrualsZ and nSmoothZ , and (6) PredictZ and nSmoothZ. 
The results from these models are quite similar to those of the three-earnings attributes 
models. Table 14 shows that predictability is the most outstanding earnings-attribute to 
explain change in bonus, whereas the persistence attribute is a significant only in 
explaning change in salary. However, the coefficients of PersistZ and AccrualsZ are not 
significantly positive when the models include PredictZ. These unexpected results may 
occur from multicollinearity or an additional variable. 
6.5.3 Sensitivity Tests on Model Selection 
 Sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2 above present the results of several models. This 
evidence implies that some sets of earnings attributes are more appropriate to explain 
certain types of compensation, whereas others are not significant for explaining CEO 
compensation. For example, Table 14, Panel F shows that the model including 
predictability and smoothness simultaneously is appropriate for equity compensation, but 
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not for salary. This evidence motivates a search for the appropriate set of earnings 
attributes for each type of CEO compensation, model selection. 
 Although the objective of the study is not to choose the best set of earnings 
attributes to explain each type of CEO compensation, the findings are interesting and 
useful for future research.  Therefore, this section extends the study by exploring the 
appropriate set of earnings attributes for each CEO compensation model. 
 The compensation model that includes four earnings attributes at a time, the Full 
model, is compared with the ones that include three, two, one, and no earnings attributes 
at a time, the Reduced models. Table 15 summarizes the results of comparing the 
Reduced model to the Full model for each type of compensation.  
Table 15, Panel D shows no statistically significant difference between the Full 
models and no earnings attributes in the salary model.  This means that the change in 
salary compensation model can omit all earnings attributes. This result is not surprising 
because the exploratory powers of the salary models including an earnings attribute are 
very low (e.g., Tables 4, 5, and 6). In terms of bonus, Table 15 indicates that 
predictability is the most important earnings attribute. Table 6, Panel A also supports this 
conclusion. It shows that the bonus model including predictability has a higher 
explanatory power than those including other earnings attributes, and the estimated 
coefficient of ChgROApredictZ is higher than the others. Similarly to bonus 
compensation, the cash compensation model has predictability as the most important 
earnings attribute. The reason is that bonus compensation is a part of cash compensation. 
Regarding equity compensation, both persistence and predictability are important 
earnings attributes for this type of compensation. However, in Table 14, Panel A shows 
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that only the interaction terms of change in ROA and predictability are positively 
significant. In terms of total compensation, two combinations of earnings attributes 
should be included in the compensation model. They are (1) Accruals, Predictability, and 
Smoothness and (2) Persistsance, Predictability, and Smoothness.  However, Table 13, 
Panels A and B reveal that the interaction terms of change in ROA and Predictability as 
well as change in ROA and Smoothness are positively significant. Overall, the results 
show that different types of CEO compensation are explained by different sets of 
earnings attributes. However, predictability is an important earnings attribute in all 
compensation models, excluding salary. Compensation committees of firms with good 
earnings attributes set more weight on ROA as CEO performance measure for a CEO 
compensation.  
6.5.4 Summary 
Overall, the results from the sensitivity tests are consistent with the main results in 
section 6.3. First, they show that earnings attributes are significant factors for CEO 
compensation models. Earnings attributes have positive effects on compensation-ROA 
relationships. However, the four earnings attributes are not used simultaneously. Second, 
the results from the sensitivity tests also show that the most outstanding earnings attribute 
is predictability because it is included in all compensation models, except salary. Third, 
the results from the model selection support the conclusion that compensation 
committees use different types of earnings attributes to weight different types of 
compensation. Finally, based on the model selection results, none of the earnings 
attributes is an important factor in explaining change in salary. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SUMMARY 
7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
 This study explores how four accounting-based earnings attributes (persistence, 
accruals, predictability, and smoothness) affect the relationship between accounting rate 
of return and CEO compensation. It hypothesizes that in firms with good earnings 
attributes, more weight is placed on an accounting return (ROA) as a CEO performance 
measure. Specifically, the following questions are examined (1) whether the four 
accounting-based earnings attributes are used simultaneously in a compensation model, 
(2) whether firms’ corporate governance affects the use of earnings attributes in CEO 
compensation contracts, and (3) whether the relationships between CEO compensation 
and earnings attributes are affected by alternative measures of CEO compensation.  
This study uses multiple linear regressions to test the hypotheses. In addition, 
several measures of the earnings attributes are used: continuous value, rank, standardized 
value, index, and principal component score. The results suggest that the four earnings 
attributes are not used simultaneously for setting all types of CEO compensation. They 
also show that different groups of earnings attributes are used to set different types of 
compensation. 
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Results from testing earnings attributes individually determine that accruals, 
predictability, and smoothness have positive effects on the compensation- earnings 
relationship.  In other words, firms with high accruals quality, predictability, or 
smoothness place more weight on accounting earnings (ROA) as a CEO performance 
measure in bonus, cash, equity, and total compensation models. Based on the estimated 
coefficients, predictability is the most outstanding earnings attribute in CEO 
compensation models, except for salary. In terms of CEO salary, only persistence is a 
significant attribute for weighting ROA. Therefore, compensation committees use 
different earnings attributes to set different types of compensation. 
The results from testing earnings attributes simultaneously show that only 
predictability has a positive effect on the relationships between accounting rate of return 
and all types of CEO compensation, except for salary. In addition, smoothness has a 
positive effect on the relationship only in the equity and total compensation models. 
These findings support the conclusion that all four earnings attributes are not simply used 
simultaneously. Compensation committees may use just some earnings attributes or 
combine them in a certain way. 
Furthermore, the results from the individual earnings attributes test and high 
correlation coefficients suggest that the interaction terms of ROA and earnings attributes 
should be combined. Because how compensation committees combine earnings attributes 
is unknown, this study uses two methods to combine the four earnings attributes: Index 
and PCA. Index is the average rank of the four earnings attributes. PCA is a principal 
component score which is calculated from the first principal component. The results from 
both methods indicate that the combination of earnings attributes is a significant factor 
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for setting CEO compensation. This evidence implies that compensation committees do 
not simply use an individual earnings attribute, but instead combine earnings attributes. 
They increase the weight on ROA as a CEO performance measure in paying bonus, cash, 
equity, and total compensation when overall earnings attributes increase. 
 This study also tests the effect of corporate governance on the use of earnings 
attributes in CEO compensation. I hypothesize that compensation committees of firms 
with strong corporate governance use earnings attributes for setting CEO compensation. 
Corporate governance is classified into two aspects: external mechanisms (takeover 
protection) and an internal mechanism (board independence, CEO duality, board size, 
outside director effectiveness, outside director blockholder, and CEO shareholdings). The 
results show that neither individual corporate governance variables nor the combination 
of corporate governance variables affect the use of earnings attributes in CEO 
compensation models. One possible explanation is that firms with strong corporate 
governance may use subjective CEO performance measures (e.g., ROA). Therefore, 
compensation committees in such firms may not use earnings attributes for setting CEO 
compensation. 
 Sensitivity tests also confirm that earnings attributes are significant factors in 
CEO compensation models. Different types of compensation are explained by different 
types of earnings attributes. For example, predictability is the only earnings attribute that 
explains the bonus and cash models. Regarding equity compensation, persistence and 
predictability are significant variables. 
 In conclusion, the four earnings attributes are not used in compensation models 
simultaneously. The use of earnings attributes depends on the type of compensation. 
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Overall, predictability tends to increase the weight on ROA in CEO compensation, except 
for salary and corporate governance does not affect the use of earnings attributes in 
compensation models. 
7.2 Limitations and Future Research 
Although this study supports the finding that earnings attributes have positive 
effects on the use of ROA in CEO compensation contracts, it has some limitations. First, 
this study assumes that all sample firms evaluate CEO performance using objective 
performance measures such as ROA and stock returns. The study can be improved by 
creating a compensation model that includes an indicator variable for subjective and 
objective performance measures. Then, the study could test the interaction terms of the 
indicator variable, change in ROA, and earnings attributes. If the coefficient of this 
interaction term is significant, it implies that subjective and objective performance 
measures influence the use of earnings attributes. Second, 15 % of the sample in this 
study is wholesale and retail firms. The results may be dominated by this industry. Third, 
due to the limitation of data availability, this study uses data only from 2004 for testing 
the effect of corporate governance on CEO compensation. The conclusions may be more 
reliable if the sample covers several years. Finally, this study may have an endogeneity 
problem because it assumes that stock returns, accounting earnings, and earnings 
attributes determine CEO compensation. However, types of compensation or 
compensation mixes may change CEOs’ choices of accounting policy. This situation may 
affect accounting earnings and earnings attributes. For example, CEO compensation that 
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is dominated by equity compensation may motivate CEOs to choose accounting policies 
that will smooth earnings in order to increase stock prices.  
This study can be extended in several ways. First, future researchers could 
examine whether firms where there is a strong relationship between CEO compensation 
and earnings attributes perform better in other aspects (e.g., product innovation, firm 
growth, and customer satisfaction) than firms with a weak relationship between CEO 
compensation and earnings attributes. Second, future work could investigate whether the 
compensation committee’s characteristics affect the use of earnings attributes in CEO 
compensation contracts. Although this study considers board characteristics, the 
compensation committee’s characteristics (e.g., independence, experience, and 
educational background) are ignored. Third, future studies could explore the appropriate 
CEO compensation model for each type of compensation. Although, the objective of this 
study is not to select the most appropriate model for each type of CEO compensation, the 
sensitivity tests find that certain earnings attributes are significant factors in some types 
of CEO compensation. Thus, it would be interesting to explore the appropriate CEO 
compensation model for each type of compensation. Finally, several tests in this study 
show that predictability is an outstanding earnings attribute in CEO compensation 
contracts. Hence, a fruitful area for future research may be related to predictability and 
CEO compensation. For example, future researchers could examine whether firms whose 
predictability has a positive effect on CEO compensation and accounting earnings 
perform better than firms whose predictability has no effect on CEO compensation in 
several aspects (e.g., stock prices, product innovation, firm growth, and customer 
satisfaction).
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A 
COMPENSATION DEFINITIONS 
These compensation definitions are based on ExecuComp database. 
1. Total compensation (ExecuComp #TDC1) 
Total compensation consists of the following: salary, bonus, other annual, total 
value of restricted stock granted, total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes model), long-term incentive payouts, and all other total compensation. 
2. Salary  
Salary is the dollar value of the base salary earned by the named executive officer 
during the fiscal year. 
3. Bonus 
Bonus is the dollar value of a bonus earned by the named executive officer during 
the fiscal year.  
4. Other annual compensation 
Other annual compensation is an annual compensation that cannot be properly 
categorized as salary or bonus. This includes items such as: perquisites, other personal 
benefits, tax reimbursements, etc.
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5. Restricted stock  
This is the value of restricted stock granted during the year (determined as of the 
date of the grant). 
6. Long-term incentive payouts 
It is equal to the amount paid out to the executive under the company's long-term 
incentive plan. These plans measure company performance over a period of more than 
one year (generally three years). 
8. All other total compensation 
It is compensation that can not be classified as the above categories. It includes 
items such as debt forgiveness, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, etc. 
7. Options granted 
It is measured as the aggregate value of stock options granted to the executive 
during the year as valued using S&P's Black Scholes methodology.
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLES 
Change in Compensationi,t = firm i, year t-1 to year t change in CEO compensation 
measured in four types: salary, bonus, cash, equity, and 
total compensation. 
Change in Salaryi,t =  firm i, year t-1 to year t change in CEO salary  
 = the natural log of (salaryt/ salaryt-1) 
Change in Bonusi,t = firm i, year t-1 to year t change in CEO bonus  
 = the natural log of (bonust/ bonust-1) 
Change in Cashi,t = firm i, year t-1 to year t change in CEO cash 
compensation defined as the natural log of the sum of 
salary plus bonus 
 = the natural log of (casht/ casht-1) 
Change is Equityi,t = firm i, year t-1 to year t change in equity compensation 
defined as the natural log of the sum of value of stock 
options(using S&P’s Black Scholes methodology) and 
the value of restricted stock granted during the year 
(#BLK_VALUE + #RSTKGRNT)  
 = the natural log of (equityt/ equityt-1)
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Change in Totali,t = firm i, year t-1 to year t change in total compensation 
defined as the natural log of the sum of salary, bonus, 
other annual, total value of restricted stock granted, 
total value of stock options granted (using Black-
Scholes), long-term incentive payouts, and all other 
total compensation (#TDC 1); 
 = the natural log of (totalt/ totalt-1) 
Returni,t  =  firm i, year t  common stock return, calculated from 
monthly return; 
Chgroai,t  =  firm i, year t-1 to year t change in firm i’s return on 
assets (ROA). ROA is calculated by firm i’s operating 
income after depreciations in year t (#178), divided by 
the average total assets of year t (#6); 
Persisti,t  =  firm i, year t earnings persistence estimated as (φ1,j) 
from equation (5) using ROA; 
PersistZi,t  =  firm i, year t standardized value of Persist; 
rPersisti,t = firm i, year t ascending rank of Persist; 
Accruals
 i,t =  = firm i, year t earnings accruals estimated as 
)ˆ(
,tjνσ− from equation (6) rolling ten-year windows 
using ROA; 
AccrualsZ
 i,t =  = firm i, year t standardized value of Accruals; 
 
rAccruals
 i,t =  = firm i, year t ascending rank of Accruals; 
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Predict
 i,t  =  firm i, year t earnings predictability estimated as 
)~(
,tjνσ− from equation (5) rolling ten-year windows 
using ROA; 
PredictZ
 i,t  =  firm i, year t standardized value of Predict; 
rPredict
 i,t  =  firm i, year t ascending rank of Predict; 
Smooth
 i,t   = firm i, year t earnings smoothness estimated as equation 
(7) rolling ten-year windows; 
nSmooth
 i,t   = negative value of Smooth i,t; 
nSmoothZ
 i,t   = firm i, year t standardized value of nSmooth ; 
rnSmoothZ
 i,t   = firm i, year t ascending rank of nSmooth ; 
Indexi,t = firm i, year t the average rank of Persist, Accruals, 
Predict, and nSmooth; 
Prini,t = firm i, year t the linear combination of PersistZ, 
AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ by using principal 
component method; 
MBi,t = firm i, year t the ratio of market value to book value of 
assets measured at the beginning of the period. The 
market value of assets equals the market value of equity 
plus the book value of total liabilities. The ratio is 
market value of assets [(#6 – #60) + (#199 x #25)]/ 
book value of assets (#6); 
Sharei,t = firm i, year t the percentage of shares owned by the 
CEO; 
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LnAssetsi,t  =  firm i, year t the natural logarithm of average total 
assets (#6); 
ChgroaPersisti,t  =  firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and Persist; 
ChgroaPersistZi,t  =  firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
PersistZ; 
ChgroarPersisti,t = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
rPersist; 
ChgroaAccruals
 i,t =  = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
Accruals; 
ChgroaAccrualsZ
 i,t =  = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
AccrualsZ; 
ChgroarAccruals
 i,t =  = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
rAccruals; 
ChgroaPredict
 i,t  =  firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
Predict; 
ChgroaPredictZ
 i,t  =  firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
PredictZ; 
ChgroarPredict
 i,t  =  firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
rPredict; 
ChgroaSmooth
 i,t   = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
Smooth; 
ChgroanSmooth
 i,t   = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
nSmooth; 
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ChgroanSmoothZ
 i,t   = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
nSmoothZ; 
ChgroarnSmooth
 i,t   = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and 
rnSmooth; 
ChgroaIndexi,t = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and Index; 
ChgroaPrini,t = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and Prin; 
ChgroaShare
 i,t  = firm i, year t the interaction term of Chgroa and Share; 
ReturnShare
 i,t  = firm i, year t the interaction term of Return and Share; 
EG = 24- Gompers Index; 
rEG = ascending rank of 24- Gompers Index; 
Nodual = an indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is “not” 
chairman of the board, and zero otherwise;  
Share = the percentage of common equity owned by the CEO 
rShare = ascending rank of  the percentage of common equity 
owned by the CEO; 
Size = an indicator variable equal to one if firms have 7-12 
board of directors members, and zero otherwise; 
Resize = 1/total number of directors on the board; 
rResize = ascending rank of 1/total number of directors on the 
board; 
Ind = the percentage of outside directors on the board. 
rInd = ascending rank of percentage of outside directors on the 
board; 
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Pnotold = the percentage of the outside directors who are younger 
than 70 years old; 
rPnotold = ascending rank of the percentage of the outside 
directors who are younger than 70 years old; 
Pnotbusy
 i = firm i, the percentage of outside directors who sit less 
three boards; 
rPnotbusy
 i = firm i, the ascending rank of the percentage of outside 
directors who sit on less three boards; 
CIndexi = firm i, the average ascending rank of EG, Share, Resize, 
Ind, Pnotold, and Pnotbusy;  
Corp
 i = firm i, the linear combination of EGZ, ShareZ, ResizeZ, 
and PnotbusyZ by using principal component method; 
ChgroaPrinCIndexi, = firm i, the interaction term of Chgroa, Prin, and 
CIndex; 
ChgroaPrinCorp
 i = firm i, the interaction term of Chgroa, Prin and Corp; 
 
Gj  = group of industry j for firm i  
G1 = Agriculture and food group which is firm in two-digit 
SIC equal to 1-9, 20, and 21; 
G2 = Mining and construction group which is firm in two-
digit SIC equal to 10-19; 
G3 = Manufacturing industry group which is firm in two-
digit SIC equal to 22-25; 
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G4 = Paper and printing industry group which is firm in two-
digit SIC equal to 26-27; 
G5 = Chemical industry group which is firm in two-digit SIC 
equal to 28; 
G6 = Material industry group which is firm in two-digit SIC 
equal to 30-34; 
G7 = Machinery industry group which is firm in two-digit 
SIC equal to 35; 
G8 = Electrical equipment group which is firm in two-digit 
SIC equal to 36; 
G9 = Transportation equipment group which is firm in two-
digit SIC equal to 37 and 39; 
G10 = Instruments industry group which is firm in two-digit 
SIC equal to 38; 
G11 = Transportation and communications group which is 
firm in two-digit SIC equal to 40-48; 
G12 = Utility industry group which is firm in two-digit SIC 
equal to 49; 
G13 = Wholesale and retail trade industry group which is firm 
in two-digit SIC equal to 50-59; 
G14 = Advertising and computer service industry group which 
is firm in two-digit SIC equal to 73; 
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G15 = Services industry group which is firm in two-digit SIC 
equal to 70-89 except 73; 
Dt = Indicators for year t; 
D98 = Indicators for year 1998; 
D99 = Indicators for year 1999; 
D00 = Indicators for year 2000; 
D01 = Indicators for year 2001; 
D02 = Indicators for year 2002; 
D03 = Indicators for year 2003; 
D04 = Indicators for year 2004; 
D05 = Indicators for year 2005; 
εi,t  =  error term;
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Table 1 Sample: Firm-Year Observations 
Panel A Firm-Year Observation by Industry 
Two-Digits 
SIC  Code 
No. of 
Obs. 
Two-
Digits 
SIC  
Code 
No. of 
Obs. 
 
Two-
Digits 
SIC  Code 
No. of 
Obs. 
Two-
Digits 
SIC  Code 
No. of 
Obs. 
1 7 25 68  39 45 55 39 
7 1 26 139  40 29 56 137 
10 25 27 158  41 1 57 53 
12 5 28 543  42 72 58 162 
13 226 29 77  44 35 59 107 
14 21 30 60  45 50 70 10 
15 26 31 35  47 24 72 35 
16 34 32 47  48 101 73 487 
17 11 33 166  49 493 75 16 
20 194 34 128  50 206 78 13 
21 12 35 392  51 79 79 44 
22 51 36 504  52 22 80 100 
23 88 37 240  53 95 82 18 
24 37 38 363  54 32 83 5 
    
 
  87 57 
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Table 1 Sample: Firm-Year Observations 
Panel B Firm-Year Observation by Group 
Group Industry Two-Digits 
SIC  Code 
No. of Obs. Percent 
1 Agriculture and food 1-9, 20, and 21 214 3.44 
2 Mining and construction industry 10-19 348 5.59 
3 Manufacturing industry 22-25 244 3.92 
4 Paper and printing industry 26-27 374 6.01 
5 Chemical industry 28 543 8.72 
6 Material industry 30-34 436 7.00 
7 Machinery industry  35 392 6.30 
8 Electrical equipment 36 504 8.10 
9 Transportation equipment 37 and 39 285 4.58 
10 Instruments industry 38 363 5.83 
11 Transportation and communications 40-48 312 5.01 
12 Utility industry 49 493 7.92 
13 Wholesale and retail trade industry 50-59 932 14.97 
14 Service industry 73 487 7.82 
15 Advertising and computer service industry 70-89 except 73 298 4.79 
 Total  6225 100 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation, earnings attributes and control variables 
Panel A Mean and Median for pooled data and 1998-2005 
 Panel Data 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
Salary 6225 700.377 650.000 665 626.548 587.500 676 651.965 615.000 748 659.701 600.092 725 688.664 632.885 
Bonus 6225 785.404 446.270 665 552.336 366.124 676 664.961 407.678 748 705.461 425.228 725 579.444 296.287 
Cash 6225 1485.780 1092.044 665 1178.880 950.231 676 1316.930 1000.506 748 1365.160 1032.415 725 1268.110 900.000 
Res. Stock 6225 505.039 0.000 665 259.388 0.000 676 212.859 0.000 748 323.896 0.000 725 372.324 0.000 
Options 6185 2112.900 760.786 662 1471.950 570.344 673 2093.400 710.557 747 3145.200 784.656 719 2739.200 911.669 
Equity 6185 2616.660 1039.589 662 1732.520 667.000 673 2307.200 884.688 747 3469.530 946.168 719 3109.970 1075.844 
Total 6185 4567.150 2606.479 662 3287.160 1965.035 673 4037.850 2317.904 747 5330.360 2493.169 719 4724.200 2387.278 
Chgsalary 6181 0.060 0.049 660 0.073 0.061 673 0.033 0.041 743 0.073 0.057 720 0.070 0.060 
Chgbonus 4445 0.114 0.103 511 -0.002 0.048 488 0.154 0.114 553 0.120 0.105 462 -0.022 0.028 
Chgcash 6195 0.072 0.065 662 0.013 0.037 674 0.070 0.056 745 0.087 0.079 721 -0.037 0.000 
Chgequity 4471 0.073 0.074 458 0.235 0.204 476 0.290 0.255 530 0.088 0.109 539 0.118 0.132 
Chgtotal 6141 0.066 0.067 658 0.091 0.092 670 0.146 0.118 743 0.132 0.096 713 0.000 0.023 
Share 6225 2.278 0.090 665 2.345 0.010 676 2.436 0.010 748 2.888 0.095 725 2.375 0.080 
Return 6225 0.140 0.082 665 0.009 -0.016 676 0.114 -0.031 748 0.181 0.075 725 0.124 0.080 
ROA 6225 0.103 0.096 665 0.113 0.111 676 0.112 0.104 748 0.121 0.110 725 0.091 0.088 
Chgroa 6225 -0.003 -0.001 665 -0.009 -0.003 676 -0.003 -0.002 748 -0.002 -0.002 725 -0.026 -0.017 
LnAssets 6225 7.405 7.254 665 7.261 7.147 676 7.411 7.256 748 7.330 7.172 725 7.389 7.232 
MB 6225 2.004 1.554 665 2.087 1.722 676 2.036 1.516 748 2.290 1.515 725 2.069 1.465 
ChgroaShare 6225 -0.012 0.000 665 -0.016 0.000 676 -0.011 0.000 748 -0.017 0.000 725 -0.075 0.000 
Return*Share 6225 0.292 0.002 665 -0.049 0.000 676 0.045 -0.001 748 0.337 0.002 725 0.543 0.001 
Persist 6225 0.519 0.552 665 0.498 0.538 676 0.498 0.521 748 0.506 0.539 725 0.526 0.559 
Accrual 6225 -0.014 -0.011 665 -0.012 -0.010 676 -0.012 -0.010 748 -0.013 -0.010 725 -0.014 -0.011 
Predict 6225 -0.039 -0.028 665 -0.033 -0.026 676 -0.032 -0.025 748 -0.038 -0.028 725 -0.039 -0.029 
Smooth 6225 1.082 0.646 665 0.961 0.609 676 0.936 0.591 748 1.001 0.640 725 1.016 0.670 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation, earnings attributes and control variables 
Panel A Mean and Median for pooled data and 1998-2005 (Cont.) 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
Salary 794 700.368 650.000 858 719.376 675.000 889 756.309 700.000 870 763.274 723.614 
Bonus 794 702.057 381.011 858 786.579 462.900 889 1041.860 592.620 870 1110.360 651.864 
Cash 794 1402.430 1063.270 858 1505.950 1106.277 889 1798.170 1286.311 870 1873.630 1360.278 
Res. Stock 794 420.024 0.000 858 530.779 0.000 889 743.379 0.000 870 994.828 0.000 
Options 786 2127.080 904.719 853 1755.590 708.770 882 1892.330 862.732 863 1770.110 683.326 
Equity 786 2542.190 1062.546 853 2285.350 1049.625 882 2627.400 1292.625 863 2771.260 1310.906 
Total 786 4331.720 2669.906 853 4246.730 2509.770 882 4919.750 3175.792 863 5341.100 3247.187 
Chgsalary 789 0.054 0.040 850 0.062 0.043 883 0.055 0.042 863 0.062 0.043 
Chgbonus 503 0.184 0.140 601 0.111 0.077 655 0.237 0.201 672 0.092 0.095 
Chgcash 792 0.127 0.088 853 0.087 0.064 884 0.143 0.116 864 0.062 0.065 
Chgequity 577 -0.077 -0.032 618 -0.093 -0.056 635 0.144 0.139 638 -0.033 -0.018 
Chgtotal 779 0.007 0.032 848 -0.012 0.008 876 0.143 0.145 854 0.037 0.046 
Share 794 2.196 0.075 858 2.112 0.140 889 2.163 0.120 870 1.857 0.160 
Return 794 -0.104 -0.090 858 0.441 0.318 889 0.182 0.161 870 0.122 0.074 
ROA 794 0.088 0.082 858 0.089 0.084 889 0.101 0.093 870 0.109 0.101 
Chgroa 794 -0.005 0.000 858 0.002 0.000 889 0.008 0.006 870 0.002 0.003 
LnAssets 794 7.395 7.238 858 7.384 7.213 889 7.483 7.288 870 7.543 7.394 
MB 794 1.965 1.534 858 1.679 1.397 889 1.957 1.627 870 2.017 1.657 
ChgroaShare 794 -0.003 0.000 858 0.000 0.000 889 0.012 0.000 870 0.004 0.000 
ReturnShare 794 -0.098 -0.002 858 0.866 0.014 889 0.404 0.003 870 0.170 0.001 
Persist 794 0.527 0.552 858 0.534 0.560 889 0.516 0.561 870 0.538 0.573 
Accrual 794 -0.014 -0.011 858 -0.015 -0.012 889 -0.015 -0.011 870 -0.015 -0.012 
Predict 794 -0.040 -0.029 858 -0.042 -0.031 889 -0.042 -0.031 870 -0.042 -0.030 
Smooth 794 1.051 0.644 858 1.152 0.646 889 1.235 0.646 870 1.214 0.711 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation, earnings attributes and control variables 
Panel B Mean and Median for pooled data and 1998-2005 (Cont.) 
 
 Panel Data 1998 1999 2000 2001 
  
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
No. 
Obs. Mean Median 
Salary 6225 700.377 650.000 665 626.548 587.500 676 651.965 615.000 748 659.701 600.092 725 688.664 632.885 
Bonus 6225 785.404 446.270 665 552.336 366.124 676 664.961 407.678 748 705.461 425.228 725 579.444 296.287 
Cash 6225 1485.780 1092.044 665 1178.880 950.231 676 1316.930 1000.506 748 1365.160 1032.415 725 1268.110 900.000 
Res. Stock 6225 505.039 0.000 665 259.388 0.000 676 212.859 0.000 748 323.896 0.000 725 372.324 0.000 
Options 6185 2112.900 760.786 662 1471.950 570.344 673 2093.400 710.557 747 3145.200 784.656 719 2739.200 911.669 
Equity 6185 2616.660 1039.589 662 1732.520 667.000 673 2307.200 884.688 747 3469.530 946.168 719 3109.970 1075.844 
Total 6185 4567.150 2606.479 662 3287.160 1965.035 673 4037.850 2317.904 747 5330.360 2493.169 719 4724.200 2387.278 
 
 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation 
Panel C Mean and Median for the year 1998-2005 adjusted by inflation rate and has the same buying power as 2005 
 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Salary 750.7 703.92 764.28 720.95 748.2 680.59 759.44 697.92 760.32 705.64 763.56 716.45 781.93 723.72 763.274 723.614 
Bonus 661.79 438.67 779.51 477.91 800.1 482.27 638.99 326.74 762.16 413.63 834.89 491.33 1077.16 612.7 1110.36 651.864 
Cash 1412.49 1138.53 1543.8 1172.87 1548.29 1170.92 1398.43 992.49 1522.48 1154.29 1598.43 1174.22 1859.09 1329.89 1873.63 1360.278 
Res. Stock 310.79 0 249.53 0 367.35 0 410.59 0 455.98 0 563.38 0 768.56 0 994.828 0 
Options 1763.69 683.36 2454.03 832.96 3567.12 889.91 3020.7 1005.36 2309.16 982.17 1863.41 752.3 1956.44 891.96 1770.11 683.326 
Equity 2075.84 799.17 2704.66 1037.09 3934.95 1073.09 3429.57 1186.4 2759.81 1153.51 2425.7 1114.09 2716.42 1336.42 2771.26 1310.906 
Total 3938.54 2354.43 4733.45 2717.2 6045.41 2827.62 5209.69 2632.61 4702.53 2898.46 4507.53 2663.9 5086.43 3283.39 5341.1 3247.187 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation, earnings attributes and control variables 
Panel D Percentile, Quartile, Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for Pooled Data from 1998-2005 
Variable 
No. of 
Obs. Min 
10 
percentile 
25 
percentile Mean Median 
75 
percentile 
90 
percentile Max Std. Dev. 
Salary 6225 0 343.846 460.385 700.377 650.000 885.375 1081.138 4973.070 353.758 
Bonus 6225 0 0.000 114.000 785.404 446.270 1000.000 1862.500 31000.000 1319.510 
Cash 6225 0 436.500 670.016 1485.780 1092.044 1844.069 2878.333 32016.670 1528.220 
Res. Stock 6225 0 0.000 0.000 505.039 0.000 123.000 1270.210 47880.000 1856.620 
Options 6185 0 0.000 18.314 2112.900 760.786 2291.313 5293.842 114653.800 4642.470 
Equity 6185 0 0.000 211.125 2616.660 1039.589 2910.953 6757.998 114653.800 5188.930 
Total 6185 0 709.513 1256.651 4567.150 2606.479 5336.863 10327.480 117669.120 6338.520 
Chgsalary 6181 -1.397 0.000 0.000 0.060 0.049 0.095 0.168 1.542 0.116 
Chgbonus 4445 -2.824 -0.583 -0.163 0.114 0.103 0.405 0.792 2.386 0.574 
Chgcash 6195 -1.673 -0.347 -0.077 0.072 0.065 0.238 0.487 2.043 0.361 
Chgequity 4471 -2.637 -0.790 -0.310 0.073 0.074 0.461 0.929 2.920 0.695 
Chgtotal 6141 -2.240 -0.593 -0.203 0.066 0.067 0.356 0.701 3.327 0.560 
Share 6225 0.003 0.010 0.010 2.278 0.090 1.220 6.720 64.200 5.986 
Return 6225 -0.933 -0.349 -0.146 0.140 0.082 0.328 0.648 4.546 0.474 
ROA 6225 -1.188 0.020 0.057 0.103 0.096 0.147 0.204 0.866 0.090 
Chgroa 6225 -0.474 -0.049 -0.020 -0.003 -0.001 0.016 0.039 0.338 0.048 
LnAssets 6225 3.166 5.631 6.318 7.405 7.254 8.346 9.557 13.077 1.495 
MB 6225 0.404 1.028 1.197 2.004 1.554 2.250 3.472 23.077 1.418 
ChgroaShare 6225 -4.710 -0.048 -0.002 -0.012 0.000 0.001 0.035 6.494 0.255 
ReturnShare 6225 -18.372 -0.262 -0.003 0.292 0.002 0.061 0.876 40.940 2.322 
Persist 6225 -0.381 0.108 0.325 0.519 0.552 0.735 0.872 1.516 0.299 
Predict 6225 -0.216 -0.081 -0.049 -0.039 -0.028 -0.017 -0.011 -0.004 0.031 
Accrual 6225 -0.070 -0.027 -0.018 -0.014 -0.011 -0.007 -0.005 -0.001 0.010 
Smooth 6225 0.013 0.125 0.289 1.082 0.646 1.288 2.332 14.979 1.428 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics for compensation, earnings attributes and control variables 
Panel E Percentile, Quartile, Mean, Median and Standard Deviation for Corporate Governance Variables in 2004 
Variables N Minimum 
10 
percentile 
25 
percentile Mean Median 
75 
percentile 
90 
percentile Std Maximum 
No. of directors 440 5.00 7.00 8.00 9.61 9.00 11.00 12.00 16.00 2.16 
No. of independent directors 440 2.00 4.00 5.00 7.03 7.00 9.00 10.00 14.00 2.15 
No. of not busy directors 440 2.00 4.00 5.00 6.63 6.50 8.00 9.00 13.00 2.05 
No. of not old directors 440 1.00 4.00 5.00 6.34 6.00 8.00 9.00 13.00 2.28 
No. of directors owning 5% shares 440 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Dummy No Duality CEO 404 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.71 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.46 
Share 495 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.04 0.01 0.71 2.20 31.89 2.86 
EG 457 6.00 11.00 12.00 14.18 14.00 16.00 17.00 21.00 2.54 
Percentage of independent director 440 0.29 0.56 0.64 0.73 0.75 0.83 0.89 0.93 0.13 
Dummy Size 7-12 440 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.85 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.36 
Resize 440 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.20 0.03 
Percentage of independent directors younger than 70 
years  440 0.25 0.71 0.81 0.89 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.14 
Percentage of not busy independent directors  440 0.50 0.80 0.90 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.10 
First Principal Component Score of 4 corp. gov. var. 434 -3.64 -1.40 -0.84 0.00 -0.12 0.76 1.58 4.60 1.20 
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Table 3 Correlations  
Panel A Correlation between Compensation and Firms Characteristics 
 Salary 
 
Bonus 
 
Cash 
 
Total 
 Res. 
 Stock 
 
Options 
 
Equity 
 
Salary 1  0.503 *** 0.665 *** 0.517 *** 0.291 *** 0.275 *** 0.351 *** 
Bonus 0.558 *** 1  0.980 *** 0.538 *** 0.238 *** 0.241 *** 0.301 *** 
Cash 0.813 *** 0.919 *** 1  0.584 *** 0.273 *** 0.271 *** 0.341 *** 
Total 0.714 *** 0.670 *** 0.783 *** 1  0.469 *** 0.856 *** 0.934 *** 
Res. Stock 0.225 *** 0.217 *** 0.247 *** 0.313 *** 1  0.111 *** 0.458 *** 
Options 0.401 *** 0.324 *** 0.401 *** 0.754 *** 0.055 *** 1  0.934 *** 
Equity 0.487 *** 0.412 *** 0.499 *** 0.858 *** 0.355 *** 0.902 *** 1  
Share -0.276 *** -0.207 *** -0.259 *** -0.286 *** -0.131 *** -0.228 *** -0.257 *** 
Return 0.034 *** 0.266 *** 0.197 *** 0.102 *** 0.072 *** 0.007  0.043 *** 
ROA 0.095 *** 0.321 *** 0.268 *** 0.201 *** 0.019  0.128 *** 0.141 *** 
Chgroa 0.027 ** 0.300 *** 0.215 *** 0.107 *** 0.064 *** 0.017  0.043 *** 
LnAssets 0.724 *** 0.489 *** 0.654 *** 0.653 *** 0.232 *** 0.399 *** 0.484 *** 
MB 0.023 * 0.153 *** 0.118 *** 0.236 *** -0.058 *** 0.279 *** 0.259 *** 
 
 
 Share  Return  ROA  Chgroa  LnAssets  MB  
Salary -0.119 *** -0.024 * 0.098 *** 0.026 ** 0.680 *** -0.007  
Bonus -0.060 *** 0.095 *** 0.171 *** 0.137 *** 0.411 *** 0.048 *** 
Cash -0.079 *** 0.077 *** 0.170 *** 0.124 *** 0.512 *** 0.039 *** 
Total -0.119 *** 0.054 *** 0.148 *** 0.054 *** 0.492 *** 0.266 *** 
Res. Stock -0.063 *** 0.024 * 0.081 *** 0.060 *** 0.249 *** 0.037 *** 
Options -0.093 *** 0.030 ** 0.095 *** -0.003  0.312 *** 0.335 *** 
Equity -0.105 *** 0.035 *** 0.114 *** 0.019  0.369 *** 0.313 *** 
Share 1  -0.010  0.042 *** -0.014  -0.186 *** 0.012  
Return 0.010  1  0.122 *** 0.312 *** -0.038 *** -0.060 *** 
ROA 0.026 ** 0.184 *** 1  0.238 *** 0.032 ** 0.457 *** 
Chgroa -0.027 ** 0.334 *** 0.224 *** 1  0.034 *** -0.006  
LnAssets -0.430 *** 0.017  -0.013  0.019  1  -0.039 ** 
MB 0.012  -0.096 *** 0.627 *** 0.006  -0.046 *** 1  
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel A Correlation between Compensation and Firms Characteristics (Cont.) 
 
 Chgsalary  Chgbonus  Chgcash  Chgequity  Chgtotal  Share  
Chgsalary 1  0.068 *** 0.260 *** 0.016  0.064 *** -0.046 *** 
Chgbonus 0.057 *** 1  0.913 *** 0.066 *** 0.287 *** -0.021  
Chgcash 0.209 *** 0.955 *** 1  0.051 *** 0.329 *** -0.029 ** 
Chgequity 0.054 *** 0.082 *** 0.070 *** 1  0.811 *** -0.013  
Chgtotal 0.082 *** 0.340 *** 0.372 *** 0.812 *** 1  0.000  
Share -0.114 *** -0.043 *** -0.042 *** -0.031 ** -0.034 *** 1  
Return 0.033 *** 0.284 *** 0.326 *** 0.105 *** 0.200 *** 0.010  
ROA 0.130 *** 0.063 *** 0.110 *** 0.107 *** 0.104 *** 0.025 ** 
Chgroa 0.012  0.385 *** 0.422 *** 0.128 *** 0.242 *** -0.027 ** 
LnAssets 0.029 ** 0.046 *** 0.065 *** 0.022  0.054 *** -0.430 *** 
MB 0.100 *** -0.049 *** -0.030 ** 0.016  -0.008  0.011  
 
 Return  ROA  Chgroa  LnAssets  MB  
Chgsalary 0.048 *** 0.071 *** 0.031 ** 0.007  0.063 *** 
Chgbonus 0.275 *** 0.060 *** 0.351 *** 0.044 *** -0.027 * 
Chgcash 0.284 *** 0.080 *** 0.371 *** 0.041 *** -0.027 ** 
Chgequity 0.107 *** 0.092 *** 0.112 *** 0.020  0.025 * 
Chgtotal 0.179 *** 0.081 *** 0.190 *** 0.044 *** 0.008  
Share -0.009  0.042 *** -0.014  -0.186 *** 0.011  
Return 1  0.121 *** 0.311 *** -0.038 *** -0.060 *** 
ROA 0.184 *** 1  0.238 *** 0.031 ** 0.456 *** 
Chgroa 0.333 *** 0.223 *** 1  0.034 *** -0.005  
LnAssets 0.017  -0.013  0.019  1  -0.039 *** 
MB -0.096 *** 0.627 *** 0.005  -0.046 *** 1  
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel B Correlation between Earnings Attributes  
 
  Accrual   Smooth   Persist   Predict   PersistZ   Accrualsz   PredictZ   
Accrual 1   -0.170 *** 0.015   0.548 *** 0.015   1.000 *** 0.548 *** 
Smooth -0.246 *** 1   0.005   -0.239 *** 0.005   -0.170 *** -0.239 *** 
Persist -0.002   0.078 *** 1   0.101 *** 1.000 *** 0.015   0.101 *** 
Predict 0.564 *** -0.392 *** 0.088 *** 1   0.101 *** 0.548 *** 1.000 *** 
PersistZ -0.002   0.078 *** 1.000 *** 0.088 *** 1   0.015   0.101 *** 
Accrualsz 1.000 *** -0.246 *** -0.002   0.564 *** -0.002   1   0.548 *** 
PredictZ 0.564 *** -0.392 *** 0.088 *** 1.000 *** 0.088 *** 0.564 *** 1   
rPersist -0.013   0.080 *** 0.987 *** 0.074 *** 0.987 *** -0.013  0.074 *** 
rAccrual 0.960 *** -0.232 *** 0.010   0.532 *** 0.010  0.960 *** 0.532 *** 
rPredict 0.531 *** -0.378 *** 0.101 *** 0.959 *** 0.101 *** 0.531 *** 0.959 *** 
rSmooth -0.253 ***  0.990 *** 0.083 *** -0.403 *** 0.083 *** -0.253 *** -0.403 *** 
rnSmooth 0.223 *** -0.974 *** -0.065 *** 0.362 *** -0.065 *** 0.223 *** 0.362 *** 
Indexn 0.654 *** -0.572 *** 0.379 *** 0.744 *** 0.379 *** 0.654 *** 0.744 *** 
nSmoothz 0.246 *** -1.000 *** -0.078 *** 0.392 *** -0.078 *** 0.246 *** 0.392 *** 
Prin 0.805 *** -0.550 *** 0.155 *** 0.851 *** 0.155 *** 0.805 *** 0.851 *** 
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel B Correlation between Earnings Attributes (Cont.) 
 
 rPersist   rAccrual   rPredict   rSmooth   rnSmooth   Indexn   nSmoothz   Prin   
Accrual 0.006   0.857 *** 0.514 *** -0.244 *** 0.217 *** 0.613 *** 0.170 *** 0.819 *** 
Smooth 0.011   -0.148 *** -0.211 *** 0.725 *** -0.699 *** -0.403 *** -1.000 *** -0.504 *** 
Persist 0.957 *** 0.010   0.096 *** 0.079 *** -0.066 *** 0.383 *** -0.005   0.142 *** 
Predict 0.090 *** 0.474 *** 0.835 *** -0.384 *** 0.345 *** 0.670 *** 0.239 *** 0.857 *** 
PersistZ 0.957 *** 0.010  0.096 *** 0.079 *** -0.066 *** 0.383 *** -0.005   0.142 *** 
Accrualsz 0.006   0.857 *** 0.514 *** -0.244 *** 0.217 *** 0.613 *** 0.170 *** 0.819 *** 
PredictZ 0.090 *** 0.473 *** 0.835 *** -0.384 *** 0.345 *** 0.670 *** 0.239 *** 0.857 *** 
rPersist 1   0.035 *** 0.128 *** 0.103 *** -0.041 *** 0.432 *** -0.011   0.127 *** 
rAccrual 0.030 ** 1   0.575 *** -0.208 *** 0.271 *** 0.723 *** 0.149 *** 0.705 *** 
rPredict 0.121 *** 0.573 *** 1   -0.352 *** 0.414 *** 0.814 *** 0.211 *** 0.748 *** 
rSmooth 0.101 *** -0.211 *** -0.360 *** 1   -0.938 *** -0.536 *** -0.725 *** -0.526 *** 
rnSmooth -0.041 *** 0.264 *** 0.406 *** -0.942 *** 1   0.632 *** 0.699 *** 0.485 *** 
Indexn 0.408 *** 0.719 *** 0.813 *** -0.535 *** 0.621 *** 1   0.403 *** 0.794 *** 
nSmoothz -0.080 *** 0.232 *** 0.378 *** -0.990 *** 0.974 *** 0.572 *** 1   0.504 *** 
Prin 0.139 *** 0.768 *** 0.814 *** -0.552 *** 0.520 *** 0.864 *** 0.550 *** 1   
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel C Correlation between Interaction Terms of Change in ROA Earnings Attributes 
 
  Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   Chgroa   
  PersistZ   Accrualsz   PredictZ   SmoothZ   rpersist   rPredict   rAccrual   rSmooth   
ChgroaPersistZ 1.000   0.161 *** 0.347 *** -0.078 *** 0.283 *** -0.115 *** -0.241 *** -0.298 *** 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.007   1.000   0.591 *** -0.240 *** -0.367 *** -0.066 *** 0.111 *** -0.498 *** 
ChgroaPredictZ 0.082  *** 0.472  *** 1.000   -0.308 *** -0.503 *** -0.076 *** -0.369 *** -0.758 *** 
ChgroaSmoothZ 0.041  *** -0.194  *** -0.231  *** 1.000   0.178 *** 0.012   0.087 *** 0.466 *** 
ChgroarPersist 0.285  *** 0.017   -0.046  *** -0.232  *** 1.000   0.625 *** 0.625 *** 0.750 *** 
ChgroarPredict 0.038  *** 0.196  *** 0.250  *** -0.345  *** 0.885 ***  1.000   0.751 *** 0.547 *** 
ChgroarAccrual 0.013   0.320  *** 0.093  *** -0.309  *** 0.889  *** 0.937  *** 1.000   0.681 *** 
ChgroarSmooth 0.033  ** -0.025  ** -0.149  *** -0.077  *** 0.923  *** 0.864  *** 0.889  *** 1.000   
ChgroarnSmooth -0.006   0.079  *** 0.016   -0.525  *** 0.892  *** 0.914  *** 0.911  *** 0.849 ***  
indexn -0.008   -0.014   -0.006   0.003   -0.002   -0.004   -0.006   0.007   
Chgroaindexn 0.081  *** 0.124  *** 0.025  ** -0.350  *** 0.950  *** 0.955  *** 0.960  *** 0.920  *** 
Prin 0.005   -0.043  *** -0.013   0.010   -0.026  ** -0.037  *** -0.041  *** -0.020   
ChgroaPrin 0.133  *** 0.750  *** 0.796  *** -0.402  *** -0.035  *** 0.198  *** 0.170  *** -0.178  *** 
Chgroansmoothz -0.041  *** 0.194  *** 0.231  *** -1.000  *** 0.232  *** 0.345  *** 0.309  *** 0.077  *** 
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel C Correlation between Interaction Terms of Change in ROA Earnings Attributes (Cont.) 
 
  Chgroa   Indexn   Chgroa   Prin   Chgroa   Chgroa   
  rnSmooth       Indexn       Prin   nsmoothz   
ChgroaPersistZ -0.275 *** -0.039 *** -0.081 *** -0.021 * 0.353 *** 0.078 *** 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.293 *** -0.065 *** -0.199 *** -0.105 *** 0.823 *** 0.240 *** 
ChgroaPredictZ -0.445 *** -0.039 *** -0.437 *** -0.058 *** 0.919 *** 0.308 *** 
ChgroaSmoothZ -0.207 *** 0.000   0.024 * -0.020   -0.477 *** -1.000 *** 
ChgroarPersist 0.661 *** 0.016   0.857 *** 0.010   -0.466 *** -0.178 *** 
ChgroarPredict 0.736 *** -0.001   0.860 *** -0.036 *** -0.082 *** -0.012   
ChgroarAccrual 0.715 *** -0.005   0.878 *** -0.040 *** -0.204 *** -0.087 *** 
ChgroarSmooth 0.576 *** 0.034 *** 0.745 *** 0.017   -0.764 *** -0.466 *** 
ChgroarnSmooth 1.000   0.023 * 0.894 *** 0.010   -0.364 *** 0.207 *** 
indexn -0.001   1.000   0.011   0.794 *** -0.053 *** 0.000   
Chgroaindexn 0.962  *** 0.001   1.000   -0.012   -0.351 *** -0.024 * 
Prin -0.027  ** 0.864 ***  -0.030 **  1.000   -0.076 *** 0.020   
ChgroaPrin 0.067  *** -0.008   0.048  *** -0.022  * 1.000   0.477 *** 
Chgroansmoothz 0.525  *** -0.003   0.350  *** -0.010   0.402 ***  1.000   
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel D Correlation between Corporate Governance Variables 
 
 Share 
 
No.Dir 
 No. of 
ind  
 
Not busy 
 Not 
old 
 No 
Dual 
 
EG 
 
Share 1  -0.080 * -0.172 *** -0.167 *** -0.175 *** 0.063  0.124 *** 
No.Dir -0.356 *** 1  0.816 *** 0.740 *** 0.744 *** 0.063  -0.239 *** 
No. of ind  -0.390 *** 0.811 *** 1  0.936 *** 0.924 *** 0.211 *** -0.279 *** 
Not busy -0.344 *** 0.740 *** 0.934 *** 1  0.891 *** 0.192 *** -0.248 *** 
Not old -0.376 *** 0.733 *** 0.923 *** 0.883 *** 1  0.206 *** -0.239 *** 
No Dual 0.013  0.088 * 0.227 *** 0.207 *** 0.214 *** 1  -0.130 *** 
EG 0.161 *** -0.269 *** -0.311 *** -0.283 *** -0.277 *** -0.128 ** 1  
Ind -0.229 *** 0.172 *** 0.684 *** 0.666 *** 0.653 *** 0.280 *** -0.188 *** 
Size 7-12 0.100 ** -0.159 ** -0.106 ** -0.069  -0.115 ** 0.102 ** -0.037  
Pnot old -0.132 *** 0.088 * 0.145 *** 0.163 *** 0.475 *** 0.044  -0.036  
Pnot busy 0.185 *** -0.261 *** -0.248 *** 0.067  -0.208 *** -0.051  0.103 ** 
Resize 0.356 *** -1.000 *** -0.811 *** -0.740 *** -0.733 *** -0.088 * 0.269 *** 
Cindex 0.308 *** -0.437 *** -0.125 ** 0.022  0.018  0.410 *** 0.418 *** 
Corp1 0.451 *** -0.734 *** -0.679 *** -0.513 *** -0.611 *** -0.112 ** 0.701 *** 
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 3 Correlation  
Panel D Correlation between Corporate Governance Variables (Cont.) 
 
 
 Ind 
 
Size 7-12 
 
Pnot old 
 Pnot 
busy 
 
Resize 
 
Cindex 
 
Corp1 
 
Share -0.180 *** 0.025  -0.078  0.026  0.079 * 0.384 *** 0.410 *** 
No.Dir 0.166 *** -0.237 *** 0.123 *** -0.214 *** -0.958 *** -0.412 *** -0.701 *** 
Ind  0.691 *** -0.144 *** 0.183 *** -0.185 *** -0.793 *** -0.114 ** -0.652 *** 
Not busy 0.674 *** -0.102 ** 0.214 *** 0.161 *** -0.727 *** 0.046  -0.481 *** 
Not old 0.649 *** -0.162 *** 0.522 *** -0.115 ** -0.722 *** 0.063  -0.572 *** 
No Dual 0.268 *** 0.102 ** 0.091 * -0.065  -0.092 * 0.413 *** -0.114 ** 
EG -0.194 *** -0.030  -0.040  0.080 * 0.268 *** 0.420 *** 0.694 *** 
Ind 1  0.074  0.154 *** -0.066  -0.191 *** 0.303 *** -0.260 *** 
Size 7-12 0.066  1  -0.086 * 0.060  -0.006  0.060  0.008  
Pnot old 0.116 ** -0.103 ** 1  0.056  -0.125 ** 0.399 *** -0.088 * 
Pnot busy -0.094 ** 0.088 * -0.034  1  0.207 *** 0.454 *** 0.497 *** 
Resize -0.172 *** 0.159 *** -0.088 * 0.261 *** 1  0.417 *** 0.734 *** 
Cindex 0.342 *** 0.039  0.307 *** 0.415 *** 0.437 *** 1  0.677 *** 
Corp1 -0.248 *** 0.042  -0.087 * 0.520 *** 0.734 *** 0.648 *** 1  
 
Note:  
1. The Pearson correlation coefficients are presented in the upper half and the Spearman-rank correlation coefficients are presented in the lower half. 
2. Statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 4 Regression: Continuous Value of Earnings Attributes 
Panel A Each Earnings Attribute 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.061 20.13 0.000   0.066 4.06 0.000   0.061 7.12 0.000   0.097 4.55 0.000   0.067 4.72 0.000   
Chgroa -0.024 -0.50 0.615   4.045 13.94 0.000 *** 2.365 17.45 0.000 *** 1.148 3.63 0.000 *** 1.796 7.96 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.05 0.002 *** 0.248 13.51 0.000 *** 0.142 15.23 0.000 *** 0.117 5.08 0.000 *** 0.156 10.08 0.000 *** 
Persist -0.003 -0.70 0.485   0.000 0.02 0.987   0.000 -0.03 0.973   -0.070 -1.98 0.048 ## -0.033 -1.40 0.162   
ChgroaPersist 0.177 1.97 0.049 ** -0.004 -0.01 0.994   0.006 0.02 0.981   0.306 0.50 0.618   -0.116 -0.27 0.784   
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.157       0.168       0.019       0.052       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.058 22.38 0.000   0.096 6.95 0.000   0.072 9.80 0.000   0.121 6.71 0.000   0.099 8.13 0.000   
Chgroa -0.003 -0.05 0.962   5.149 13.93 0.000 *** 3.364 19.20 0.000 *** 1.908 4.39 0.000 *** 2.555 8.68 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.17 0.002 *** 0.248 13.50 0.000 *** 0.140 15.13 0.000 *** 0.121 5.25 0.000 *** 0.157 10.19 0.000 *** 
Accruals -0.063 -0.42 0.678   2.293 2.75 0.006 ### 0.779 1.83 0.067 # 4.463 4.21 0.000 ### 3.531 4.98 0.000 ### 
ChgroaAccruals -2.424 -0.92 0.355   57.317 3.55 0.000 *** 49.854 6.73 0.000 *** 35.675 1.88 0.061 ** 41.727 3.35 0.001 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.161       0.174       0.022       0.057       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.061 25.47 0.000   0.094 7.54 0.000   0.078 11.66 0.000   0.127 7.70 0.000   0.101 8.99 0.000   
Chgroa 0.105 1.48 0.138 * 7.735 19.40 0.000 *** 4.972 25.35 0.000 *** 2.523 5.20 0.000 *** 3.577 10.85 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.14 0.002 *** 0.243 13.32 0.000 *** 0.133 14.44 0.000 *** 0.121 5.26 0.000 *** 0.153 9.94 0.000 *** 
Predict 0.060 1.27 0.205   0.721 2.77 0.006 ### 0.323 2.44 0.015 ## 1.697 5.21 0.000 ### 1.239 5.55 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPredict 0.763 0.98 0.328   46.686 10.52 0.000 *** 32.594 15.02 0.000 *** 16.038 3.05 0.002 *** 23.039 6.35 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.179       0.198       0.025       0.062       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 30.31 0.000   0.073 6.93 0.000   0.065 11.97 0.000   0.081 6.05 0.000   0.070 7.69 0.000   
Chgroa 0.069 1.55 0.122 * 4.670 17.79 0.000 *** 2.692 21.22 0.000 *** 1.785 5.83 0.000 *** 2.265 10.73 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.18 0.002 *** 0.250 13.60 0.000 *** 0.142 15.31 0.000 *** 0.120 5.19 0.000 *** 0.156 10.13 0.000 *** 
Smooth 0.000 0.31 0.758   -0.006 -1.05 0.294   -0.004 -1.32 0.186   -0.018 -2.57 0.010 ### -0.017 -3.54 0.000 ### 
ChgroaSmooth -0.018 -0.79 0.428   -0.476 -3.50 0.000 ### -0.233 -3.70 0.000 ### -0.362 -2.43 0.015 ## -0.362 -3.45 0.001 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.160       0.170       0.021       0.055       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Persist it +β7Chgroait*Persist it +εit  
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it +β4Accruals it +β8Chgroa it*Accruals it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β5Predict it +β9Chgroait*Predict it +εit  
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β6Smooth it + β10Chgroait*Smooth it +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 4 Regression: Continuous Value of Earnings Attributes 
Panel B Four Earnings Attributes 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.062 15.87 0.000   0.111 5.42 0.000   0.083 7.65 0.000   0.199 7.23 0.000   0.144 7.91 0.000   
Chgroa -0.004 -0.05 0.964   8.050 15.66 0.000 *** 5.344 21.53 0.000 *** 2.884 4.67 0.000 *** 4.089 9.76 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.11 0.002 *** 0.244 13.36 0.000 *** 0.133 14.45 0.000 *** 0.119 5.17 0.000 *** 0.153 9.90 0.000 *** 
Persist -0.005 -0.95 0.341   -0.007 -0.26 0.796   -0.002 -0.16 0.872   -0.093 -2.61 0.009 ### -0.042 -1.79 0.073 # 
Accruals -0.221 -1.23 0.218   1.771 1.80 0.072 # 0.307 0.61 0.540   1.737 1.37 0.170   1.812 2.15 0.031 ## 
Predict 0.103 1.77 0.077 # 0.352 1.11 0.266   0.255 1.57 0.116   1.389 3.47 0.001 ### 0.842 3.09 0.002 ### 
Smooth 0.001 0.60 0.547   -0.003 -0.52 0.604   -0.002 -0.83 0.404   -0.010 -1.39 0.164   -0.011 -2.20 0.028 ## 
ChgroaPersist 0.156 1.70 0.088 ** -1.129 -1.95 0.051 -0.648 -2.54 0.011 -0.113 -0.18 0.856   -0.574 -1.34 0.180 
ChgroaAccruals -3.866 -1.33 0.183 -35.014 -1.89 0.058 3.877 0.48 0.632   12.880 0.62 0.536   9.013 0.66 0.510   
ChgroaPredict 0.850 0.96 0.339   51.916 9.86 0.000 *** 32.999 13.36 0.000 *** 12.254 2.06 0.040 ** 20.951 5.09 0.000 *** 
ChgroaSmooth -0.016 -0.71 0.477   -0.136 -0.96 0.336   -0.008 -0.12 0.906   -0.274 -1.79 0.074 # -0.205 -1.90 0.058 # 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.180       0.198       0.027       0.064       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Persist it +β4Accrualsit +β5Predict it +β6Smooth it + 
β7Chgroait*Persist it +β8Chgroa it*Accrualsit +β9Chgroait*Predict it +β10Chgroait*Smooth it +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 5 Regression: Rank of Earnings Attributes 
Panel A Each Earnings Attribute 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.061 20.62 0.000   0.065 4.05 0.000   0.059 7.05 0.000   0.117 5.62 0.000   0.074 5.27 0.000   
Chgroa -0.017 -0.33 0.738   4.152 13.48 0.000 *** 2.361 16.14 0.000 *** 1.163 3.37 0.001 *** 1.807 7.41 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.07 0.002 *** 0.249 13.52 0.000 *** 0.142 15.24 0.000 *** 0.117 5.06 0.000 *** 0.156 10.09 0.000 *** 
rPersist 0.000 -0.87 0.384   0.000 0.11 0.914   0.000 0.20 0.842   0.000 -3.17 0.002 ### 0.000 -1.96 0.049 ## 
ChgroarPersist 0.000 1.56 0.119 * 0.000 -0.45 0.650   0.000 0.06 0.955   0.000 0.38 0.701   0.000 -0.29 0.772   
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.157       0.168       0.020       0.052       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.058 19.60 0.000   0.016 0.98 0.329   0.044 5.22 0.000   0.036 1.74 0.082   0.011 0.81 0.419   
Chgroa 0.086 1.74 0.082 ** 3.447 11.47 0.000 *** 1.739 12.37 0.000 *** 0.701 2.03 0.043 ** 1.115 4.77 0.000 *** 
Return 0.011 3.20 0.001 *** 0.247 13.47 0.000 *** 0.140 15.05 0.000 *** 0.118 5.11 0.000 *** 0.154 10.00 0.000 *** 
rAccruals 0.000 0.26 0.794   0.000 3.53 0.000 ### 0.000 2.35 0.019 ## 0.000 1.32 0.187   0.000 3.27 0.001 ### 
ChgroarAccruals 0.000 -1.12 0.264   0.002 2.51 0.012 *** 0.002 5.83 0.000 *** 0.002 2.06 0.040 ** 0.002 3.46 0.001 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.161       0.173       0.019       0.055       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.055 18.64 0.000   0.021 1.31 0.191   0.044 5.36 0.000   0.028 1.32 0.186   0.007 0.53 0.595   
Chgroa 0.020 0.46 0.645   2.132 8.30 0.000 *** 1.048 8.67 0.000 *** 0.597 2.03 0.042 ** 0.864 4.23 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.11 0.002 *** 0.239 13.18 0.000 *** 0.130 14.18 0.000 *** 0.114 4.91 0.000 *** 0.149 9.66 0.000 *** 
rPredict 0.000 1.41 0.160   0.000 3.33 0.001 ### 0.000 3.12 0.002 ### 0.000 2.00 0.045 ## 0.000 3.91 0.000 ### 
ChgroarPredict 0.000 0.80 0.426   0.012 11.21 0.000 *** 0.009 16.42 0.000 *** 0.005 3.37 0.001 *** 0.006 6.41 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.182       0.203       0.021       0.060       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 20.05 0.000 ` 0.048 2.99 0.003 ` 0.050 5.96 0.000 ` 0.051 2.49 0.013 ` 0.031 2.26 0.024 ` 
Chgroa 0.035 0.62 0.538   2.774 7.98 0.000 *** 1.627 10.18 0.000 *** 0.417 1.07 0.285   0.890 3.34 0.001 *** 
Return 0.010 3.15 0.002 *** 0.248 13.49 0.000 *** 0.141 15.15 0.000 *** 0.119 5.16 0.000 *** 0.155 10.02 0.000 *** 
rnSmooth 0.000 -0.09 0.925   0.000 1.30 0.195   0.000 1.64 0.101   0.000 0.60 0.546   0.000 1.67 0.095 # 
ChgroarnSmooth 0.000 0.23 0.821   0.004 4.42 0.000 ### 0.003 5.68 0.000 ### 0.003 2.65 0.008 ### 0.003 3.97 0.000 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.161       0.173       0.019       0.054       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3rPersist it +β4Chgroait*rPersist it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it +β3rAccruals it +β4Chgroa it*rAccruals it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3rPredict it +β4Chgroait*rPredict it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3rSmooth it + β4Chgroait*rnSmooth it +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 5 Regression: Rank of Earnings Attributes 
Panel B Four Earnings Attributes 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.061 13.94 0.000   0.013 0.57 0.567   0.041 3.41 0.001   0.089 2.94 0.003   0.027 1.33 0.183   
Chgroa 0.018 0.24 0.811   3.358 7.65 0.000 *** 1.670 8.06 0.000 *** 0.226 0.45 0.654   0.817 2.33 0.020 ** 
Return 0.010 3.10 0.002 *** 0.240 13.24 0.000 *** 0.130 14.20 0.000 *** 0.113 4.88 0.000 *** 0.149 9.66 0.000 *** 
rPersist 0.000 -1.21 0.226   0.000 -0.39 0.695   0.000 -0.15 0.878   0.000 -3.59 0.000 ### 0.000 -2.45 0.014 ## 
rAccruals 0.000 -0.59 0.555   0.000 2.55 0.011 ## 0.000 1.04 0.297   0.000 -0.05 0.964   0.000 1.19 0.233   
rPredict 0.000 1.73 0.084 # 0.000 1.23 0.219   0.000 1.81 0.071 # 0.000 2.18 0.029 ## 0.000 2.74 0.006 ### 
rnSmooth 0.000 -0.85 0.393   0.000 -0.26 0.793   0.000 0.07 0.946   0.000 -0.61 0.543   0.000 -0.34 0.735   
ChgroarPersist 0.000 1.28 0.202   -0.003 -3.11 0.002 -0.001 -3.32 0.001 0.000 -0.39 0.697   -0.001 -1.47 0.142 
ChgroarAccruals 0.000 -1.54 0.123 -0.004 -3.57 0.000 -0.001 -2.17 0.030 0.001 0.50 0.614   0.000 0.46 0.643   
ChgroarPredict 0.000 1.11 0.268   0.015 11.15 0.000 *** 0.010 15.13 0.000 *** 0.004 2.04 0.041 ** 0.005 4.68 0.000 *** 
ChgroarnSmooth 0.000 -0.02 0.986   0.000 -0.11 0.911   -0.001 -1.31 0.190   0.002 1.36 0.175 0.001 1.27 0.205   
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.186       0.205       0.023       0.061       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3rPersist it +β4rAccruals it +β5rPredict it +β6rSmooth it  
  + β7Chgroa it *rPersist it +β8Chgroa it *rAccruals it +β9Chgroa it *rPredict it +β10Chgroa it *rnSmooth it +εit 
 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Individual Earnings Attributes      
Panel A Individual Earnings Attributes without Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.74 0.000   0.066 7.75 0.000   0.061 13.69 0.000   0.061 5.59 0.000   0.050 6.82 0.000   
Chgroa 0.068 1.96 0.050 ** 4.043 19.15 0.000 *** 2.368 24.05 0.000 *** 1.307 5.37 0.000 *** 1.735 10.60 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.05 0.002 *** 0.248 13.51 0.000 *** 0.142 15.23 0.000 *** 0.117 5.08 0.000 *** 0.156 10.08 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.70 0.485   0.000 0.02 0.987   0.000 -0.03 0.973   -0.021 -1.98 0.048 ## -0.010 -1.40 0.162   
ChgroaPersistz 0.053 1.97 0.049 ** -0.001 -0.01 0.994   0.002 0.02 0.981   0.092 0.50 0.618   -0.035 -0.27 0.784   
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.157       0.168       0.019       0.052       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.66 0.000   0.064 7.52 0.000   0.061 13.81 0.000   0.059 5.42 0.000   0.050 6.81 0.000   
Chgroa 0.031 0.84 0.403   4.355 20.33 0.000 *** 2.674 25.87 0.000 *** 1.414 5.67 0.000 *** 1.977 11.44 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.17 0.002 *** 0.248 13.50 0.000 *** 0.140 15.13 0.000 *** 0.121 5.25 0.000 *** 0.157 10.19 0.000 *** 
Accrualsz -0.001 -0.42 0.678   0.023 2.75 0.006 ### 0.008 1.83 0.067 # 0.044 4.21 0.000 ### 0.035 4.98 0.000 ### 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.024 -0.92 0.355   0.566 3.55 0.000 *** 0.492 6.73 0.000 *** 0.352 1.88 0.061 ** 0.412 3.35 0.001 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.161       0.174       0.022       0.057       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.61 0.000   0.066 7.82 0.000   0.066 15.02 0.000   0.061 5.62 0.000   0.053 7.23 0.000   
Chgroa 0.075 1.64 0.102 * 5.923 22.68 0.000 *** 3.706 29.04 0.000 *** 1.900 5.98 0.000 *** 2.682 12.47 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.14 0.002 *** 0.243 13.32 0.000 *** 0.133 14.44 0.000 *** 0.121 5.26 0.000 *** 0.153 9.94 0.000 *** 
Predictz 0.002 1.27 0.205   0.022 2.77 0.006 ### 0.010 2.44 0.015 ## 0.053 5.21 0.000 ### 0.039 5.55 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPredictz 0.024 0.98 0.328   1.454 10.52 0.000 *** 1.015 15.02 0.000 *** 0.500 3.05 0.002 *** 0.718 6.35 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.179       0.198       0.025       0.062       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.67 0.000   0.066 7.73 0.000   0.061 13.83 0.000   0.062 5.67 0.000   0.051 6.96 0.000   
Chgroa 0.050 1.51 0.132 * 4.155 21.17 0.000 *** 2.439 25.85 0.000 *** 1.393 6.09 0.000 *** 1.873 11.93 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.18 0.002 *** 0.250 13.60 0.000 *** 0.142 15.31 0.000 *** 0.120 5.19 0.000 *** 0.156 10.13 0.000 *** 
nSmoothz 0.000 -0.31 0.758   0.009 1.05 0.294   0.006 1.32 0.186   0.026 2.57 0.010 ## 0.025 3.54 0.000 ### 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.025 0.79 0.428   0.680 3.50 0.000 ### 0.333 3.70 0.000 ### 0.517 2.43 0.015 ## 0.518 3.45 0.001 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.160       0.170       0.021       0.055       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PersistZ it + β4Chgroait*PersistZ it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3AccrulsZ it + β4Chgroait*AccrulsZ it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PredictZit + β4Chgroait*PredictZ it +εit 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3nSmoothZ it + β4Chgroait*nSmoothZ it +εit 
 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
124 
 
Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Earnings Attributes      
Panel B Four Earnings Attributes without Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.68 0.000   0.066 7.78 0.000   0.065 14.88 0.000   0.062 5.65 0.000   0.053 7.19 0.000   
Chgroa 0.080 1.72 0.086 ** 5.786 21.61 0.000 *** 3.665 28.32 0.000 *** 1.875 5.80 0.000 *** 2.631 12.06 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.11 0.002 *** 0.244 13.36 0.000 *** 0.133 14.45 0.000 *** 0.119 5.17 0.000 *** 0.153 9.90 0.000 *** 
PersistZ -0.001 -0.95 0.341   -0.002 -0.26 0.796   -0.001 -0.16 0.872   -0.028 -2.61 0.009 ### -0.013 -1.79 0.073 # 
AccrualsZ -0.002 -1.23 0.218   0.017 1.80 0.072 # 0.003 0.61 0.540   0.017 1.37 0.170   0.018 2.15 0.031 ## 
PredictZ 0.003 1.77 0.077 # 0.011 1.11 0.266   0.008 1.57 0.116   0.043 3.47 0.001 ### 0.026 3.09 0.002 ### 
nSmoothZ -0.001 -0.60 0.547   0.005 0.52 0.604   0.004 0.83 0.404   0.014 1.39 0.164 * 0.016 2.20 0.028 ** 
ChgroaPersistZ 0.047 1.70 0.088 ** -0.338 -1.95 0.051 -0.194 -2.54 0.011 -0.034 -0.18 0.856   -0.172 -1.34 0.180 
ChgroaAccrualsZ -0.038 -1.33 0.183 -0.346 -1.89 0.058 0.038 0.48 0.632   0.127 0.62 0.536   0.089 0.66 0.510   
ChgroaPredictZ 0.026 0.96 0.339   1.617 9.86 0.000 *** 1.028 13.36 0.000 *** 0.382 2.06 0.040 ** 0.653 5.09 0.000 *** 
ChgroanSmoothZ 0.023 0.71 0.477   0.194 0.96 0.336   0.011 0.12 0.906   0.391 1.79 0.074 # 0.293 1.90 0.058 # 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.180       0.198       0.027       0.064       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PersistZ it +β4AccrualsZ it +β5PredictZ it +β6nSmoothZ it + 
β7Chgroa it *PersistZ it +β8Chgroa it *AccrualsZ it +β9Chgroa it *PredictZ it +β10Chgroa it *nSmoothZ it +εit 
 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Individual Earnings Attributes      
Panel C PersistZ 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.064 5.91 0.000   -0.095 -1.65 0.098   0.002 0.06 0.956   -0.014 -0.18 0.861   -0.021 -0.41 0.685   
Chgroa 0.097 1.67 0.095 ** 5.038 14.44 0.000 *** 2.749 16.78 0.000 *** 2.231 5.57 0.000 *** 2.330 8.54 0.000 *** 
Return 0.007 1.33 0.182 * 0.309 10.46 0.000 *** 0.181 11.93 0.000 *** 0.049 1.29 0.198 * 0.154 6.12 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.70 0.481   0.007 0.92 0.359   0.004 0.93 0.352   -0.012 -1.13 0.258   -0.002 -0.34 0.735   
ChgroaPersistz 0.051 1.87 0.061 ** 0.116 0.67 0.502   0.026 0.34 0.731   0.153 0.84 0.399   0.025 0.20 0.845   
ChgroaMB -0.012 -0.71 0.480   -0.510 -5.56 0.000 *** -0.232 -4.71 0.000 *** -0.358 -3.13 0.002 *** -0.307 -3.75 0.000 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.90 0.370   -0.009 -0.95 0.344   -0.005 -0.91 0.362   0.044 3.61 0.000 *** 0.016 1.79 0.074 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.015 2.25 0.025 ## 0.177 3.75 0.000 ### 0.021 1.08 0.279   0.130 1.87 0.062 # 0.037 1.19 0.235   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.43 0.153   -0.007 -1.61 0.108   -0.004 -2.20 0.028 ## -0.001 -0.13 0.900   -0.001 -0.45 0.651   
lnasset 0.000 0.32 0.752   0.015 2.72 0.007 *** 0.007 2.25 0.024 ** -0.001 -0.13 0.900   0.009 1.91 0.057 ** 
G1 0.000 -0.01 0.990   0.038 0.71 0.481   0.023 0.79 0.432   -0.023 -0.30 0.762   -0.007 -0.15 0.881   
G2 -0.009 -1.01 0.313   0.019 0.39 0.697   0.006 0.24 0.808   -0.008 -0.12 0.905   -0.014 -0.33 0.742   
G3 -0.008 -0.76 0.449   -0.007 -0.13 0.894   -0.018 -0.63 0.526   -0.067 -0.90 0.367   -0.063 -1.33 0.185   
G4 -0.016 -1.78 0.076 # 0.009 0.18 0.861   -0.011 -0.44 0.660   -0.011 -0.17 0.863   -0.008 -0.18 0.854   
G5 -0.003 -0.40 0.690   0.044 1.00 0.317   -0.014 -0.61 0.545   -0.072 -1.20 0.231   -0.053 -1.34 0.179   
G6 -0.015 -1.74 0.082 # -0.012 -0.26 0.797   -0.018 -0.71 0.477   -0.046 -0.73 0.466   -0.047 -1.14 0.253   
G7 -0.008 -0.85 0.397   0.000 0.01 0.994   -0.016 -0.64 0.520   -0.005 -0.08 0.936   -0.038 -0.90 0.369   
G8 -0.007 -0.83 0.409   0.031 0.67 0.503   -0.020 -0.81 0.416   -0.112 -1.81 0.070 # -0.081 -2.01 0.045 ## 
G9 0.001 0.08 0.933   -0.061 -1.23 0.219   -0.030 -1.10 0.272   0.023 0.34 0.730   -0.027 -0.60 0.550   
G10 0.000 0.03 0.974   0.004 0.09 0.927   0.007 0.26 0.798   -0.062 -0.95 0.344   -0.067 -1.56 0.118   
G11 -0.014 -1.51 0.131   -0.014 -0.28 0.779   -0.038 -1.41 0.158   0.037 0.54 0.591   -0.011 -0.24 0.814   
G12 0.002 0.28 0.780   0.079 1.75 0.081 # 0.017 0.70 0.486   0.113 1.76 0.078 # 0.044 1.07 0.284   
G13 -0.003 -0.33 0.738   -0.064 -1.55 0.121   -0.033 -1.49 0.137   -0.052 -0.90 0.369   -0.050 -1.37 0.170   
G14 -0.015 -1.71 0.087 # -0.040 -0.87 0.386   -0.041 -1.69 0.090 # -0.095 -1.50 0.135   -0.087 -2.15 0.032 ## 
D98 0.012 2.03 0.042 ## -0.014 -0.46 0.642   -0.003 -0.18 0.857   0.295 7.09 0.000 ### 0.091 3.23 0.001 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.75 0.000 ### 0.091 2.92 0.003 ### 0.021 1.26 0.209   0.319 7.78 0.000 ### 0.115 4.12 0.000 ### 
D00 0.012 2.01 0.044 ## 0.018 0.62 0.537   0.026 1.62 0.106   0.109 2.75 0.006 ### 0.089 3.27 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.90 0.057 # -0.019 -0.60 0.549   -0.034 -2.03 0.042 ## 0.201 5.00 0.000 ### 0.014 0.50 0.616   
D02 -0.005 -0.90 0.371   0.187 6.05 0.000 ### 0.118 7.30 0.000 ### 0.002 0.04 0.967   0.023 0.86 0.392   
D03 -0.001 -0.26 0.793   -0.043 -1.46 0.145   -0.028 -1.72 0.085 # -0.094 -2.42 0.015 ## -0.103 -3.86 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.38 0.167   0.116 4.08 0.000 ### 0.059 3.80 0.000 ### 0.166 4.40 0.000 ### 0.086 3.31 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.186       0.189       0.065       0.071       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PersistZ it + β4Chgroa it *PersistZ it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA*CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry Group 1-15, and Year 98-
05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Individual Earnings Attributes      
Panel D AccrualsZ 
  Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.062 5.58 0.000   -0.077 -1.30 0.193   0.000 0.00 0.998   0.017 0.22 0.828   0.003 0.06 0.954   
Chgroa 0.053 0.94 0.345   5.011 15.41 0.000 *** 2.910 18.42 0.000 *** 2.210 5.83 0.000 *** 2.463 9.33 0.000 *** 
Return 0.008 1.51 0.131 * 0.306 10.39 0.000 *** 0.179 11.83 0.000 *** 0.051 1.34 0.179 * 0.154 6.11 0.000 *** 
AccrualsZ -0.001 -0.84 0.400   0.013 1.45 0.147   0.002 0.53 0.597   0.024 2.08 0.037 ## 0.020 2.54 0.011 ## 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.026 -0.99 0.324   0.334 2.05 0.041 ** 0.426 5.81 0.000 *** 0.366 1.93 0.053 ** 0.345 2.80 0.005 *** 
ChgroaMB -0.011 -0.63 0.530   -0.453 -4.85 0.000 *** -0.188 -3.81 0.000 *** -0.309 -2.65 0.008 *** -0.278 -3.39 0.001 *** 
ReturnMB 0.001 0.78 0.433   -0.008 -0.80 0.422   -0.004 -0.79 0.427   0.045 3.63 0.000 *** 0.016 1.82 0.068 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.017 2.49 0.013 ## 0.181 3.82 0.000 ### 0.018 0.95 0.340   0.142 2.05 0.040 ## 0.036 1.14 0.253   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.41 0.158   -0.007 -1.65 0.099 # -0.004 -2.14 0.033 ## -0.001 -0.18 0.859   -0.002 -0.48 0.630   
lnasset 0.001 0.51 0.613   0.013 2.29 0.022 ** 0.007 2.18 0.030 ** -0.005 -0.71 0.475   0.006 1.19 0.233   
G1 0.001 0.07 0.948   0.031 0.57 0.571   0.024 0.82 0.413   -0.028 -0.38 0.706   -0.013 -0.26 0.798   
G2 -0.008 -0.89 0.372   0.004 0.08 0.935   0.001 0.04 0.965   -0.008 -0.12 0.901   -0.019 -0.44 0.660   
G3 -0.007 -0.70 0.484   -0.013 -0.25 0.801   -0.018 -0.64 0.523   -0.068 -0.92 0.359   -0.066 -1.39 0.165   
G4 -0.016 -1.71 0.088 # 0.003 0.05 0.956   -0.011 -0.44 0.661   -0.008 -0.12 0.903   -0.007 -0.17 0.863   
G5 -0.004 -0.43 0.669   0.044 0.99 0.321   -0.013 -0.55 0.582   -0.067 -1.12 0.262   -0.049 -1.23 0.220   
G6 -0.015 -1.75 0.079 # -0.015 -0.32 0.747   -0.016 -0.64 0.523   -0.048 -0.76 0.447   -0.048 -1.16 0.247   
G7 -0.008 -0.88 0.380   0.001 0.02 0.982   -0.015 -0.61 0.542   0.005 0.08 0.940   -0.030 -0.72 0.473   
G8 -0.007 -0.80 0.423   0.030 0.64 0.522   -0.020 -0.83 0.406   -0.101 -1.63 0.104   -0.074 -1.83 0.067 # 
G9 0.001 0.06 0.951   -0.059 -1.20 0.230   -0.028 -1.04 0.298   0.033 0.48 0.629   -0.021 -0.46 0.647   
G10 0.000 0.04 0.965   0.005 0.10 0.923   0.007 0.26 0.791   -0.055 -0.83 0.405   -0.062 -1.45 0.146   
G11 -0.014 -1.45 0.147   -0.021 -0.41 0.678   -0.038 -1.41 0.157   0.031 0.44 0.657   -0.017 -0.38 0.708   
G12 0.004 0.44 0.661   0.067 1.47 0.141   0.015 0.62 0.533   0.105 1.63 0.102   0.035 0.86 0.391   
G13 -0.002 -0.30 0.762   -0.068 -1.64 0.101   -0.031 -1.43 0.152   -0.057 -0.99 0.324   -0.053 -1.45 0.148   
G14 -0.015 -1.74 0.082 # -0.036 -0.78 0.434   -0.040 -1.65 0.099 # -0.083 -1.30 0.194   -0.078 -1.93 0.053 # 
D98 0.013 2.11 0.035 ## -0.015 -0.50 0.615   0.000 0.00 0.997   0.294 7.08 0.000 ### 0.090 3.20 0.001 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.71 0.000 ### 0.088 2.83 0.005 ### 0.023 1.35 0.176   0.316 7.70 0.000 ### 0.113 4.04 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.96 0.050 # 0.015 0.51 0.608   0.026 1.62 0.105   0.106 2.68 0.007 ### 0.087 3.20 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.84 0.066 # -0.018 -0.56 0.577   -0.029 -1.77 0.077 # 0.203 5.07 0.000 ### 0.017 0.60 0.550   
D02 -0.005 -0.87 0.382   0.188 6.09 0.000 ### 0.120 7.45 0.000 ### 0.004 0.10 0.920   0.024 0.89 0.373   
D03 -0.002 -0.33 0.741   -0.043 -1.45 0.146   -0.026 -1.62 0.106   -0.095 -2.45 0.014 ## -0.103 -3.86 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.39 0.164   0.115 4.04 0.000 ### 0.060 3.85 0.000 ### 0.167 4.42 0.000 ### 0.086 3.32 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.187       0.193       0.066       0.073       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3AccrualsZ it + β4Chgroa it *AccrualsZ it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Individual Earnings Attributes      
Panel E PredictZ 
  Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.066 5.88 0.000   -0.082 -1.41 0.160   0.001 0.03 0.975   0.074 0.89 0.374   0.006 0.11 0.911   
Chgroa 0.088 1.43 0.153 * 6.085 17.55 0.000 *** 3.740 21.96 0.000 *** 2.659 6.37 0.000 *** 3.004 10.44 0.000 *** 
Return 0.008 1.43 0.153 * 0.295 10.08 0.000 *** 0.166 11.08 0.000 *** 0.044 1.17 0.244   0.145 5.76 0.000 *** 
PredictZ 0.001 0.76 0.447   0.017 1.89 0.059 # 0.006 1.21 0.225   1.120 2.99 0.003 ### 0.024 3.03 0.002 ### 
ChgroaPredictz 0.023 0.91 0.362   1.235 8.64 0.000 *** 0.934 13.54 0.000 *** 0.491 2.98 0.003 *** 0.635 5.50 0.000 *** 
ChgroaMB -0.006 -0.34 0.732   -0.301 -3.25 0.001 *** -0.109 -2.22 0.026 ** -0.290 -2.51 0.012 *** -0.227 -2.76 0.006 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.84 0.401   -0.005 -0.52 0.604   -0.003 -0.51 0.613   0.046 3.77 0.000 *** 0.017 1.98 0.048 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.016 2.37 0.018 ## 0.138 2.94 0.003 ### -0.004 -0.23 0.818   0.118 1.70 0.088 # 0.022 0.71 0.480   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.43 0.152   -0.007 -1.72 0.085 # -0.004 -1.99 0.047 ## -0.002 -0.23 0.819   -0.002 -0.46 0.646   
lnasset 0.000 0.07 0.941   0.013 2.20 0.028 ** 0.007 2.14 0.032 ** -0.008 -1.02 0.308   0.005 1.00 0.320   
G1 0.000 -0.01 0.994   0.032 0.59 0.554   0.021 0.71 0.477   -0.029 -0.39 0.696   -0.012 -0.25 0.802   
G2 -0.008 -0.85 0.397   0.025 0.53 0.594   0.007 0.28 0.777   0.025 0.37 0.709   0.004 0.10 0.921   
G3 -0.007 -0.73 0.463   -0.009 -0.17 0.861   -0.018 -0.65 0.516   -0.064 -0.87 0.386   -0.063 -1.33 0.184   
G4 -0.015 -1.70 0.090 # 0.006 0.12 0.906   -0.013 -0.50 0.619   -0.001 -0.01 0.992   -0.003 -0.07 0.944   
G5 -0.003 -0.35 0.727   0.035 0.80 0.423   -0.019 -0.81 0.419   -0.062 -1.02 0.307   -0.048 -1.20 0.232   
G6 -0.015 -1.75 0.080 # -0.010 -0.23 0.820   -0.014 -0.58 0.565   -0.045 -0.71 0.480   -0.043 -1.05 0.292   
G7 -0.007 -0.76 0.448   0.004 0.09 0.928   -0.017 -0.66 0.507   0.014 0.21 0.833   -0.026 -0.63 0.531   
G8 -0.005 -0.63 0.529   0.037 0.79 0.430   -0.019 -0.80 0.425   -0.076 -1.21 0.226   -0.060 -1.47 0.142   
G9 0.001 0.11 0.909   -0.062 -1.26 0.209   -0.030 -1.11 0.266   0.029 0.42 0.672   -0.024 -0.52 0.603   
G10 0.001 0.11 0.916   0.005 0.11 0.914   0.007 0.29 0.772   -0.052 -0.78 0.434   -0.061 -1.42 0.156   
G11 -0.014 -1.52 0.130   -0.021 -0.42 0.672   -0.043 -1.65 0.100   0.038 0.55 0.582   -0.013 -0.29 0.771   
G12 0.003 0.31 0.760   0.069 1.53 0.126   0.012 0.49 0.625   0.106 1.67 0.096 # 0.037 0.90 0.367   
G13 -0.003 -0.36 0.723   -0.072 -1.76 0.079 # -0.034 -1.56 0.119   -0.057 -0.99 0.320   -0.053 -1.44 0.149   
G14 -0.014 -1.57 0.117   -0.029 -0.63 0.529   -0.035 -1.45 0.148   -0.072 -1.12 0.261   -0.068 -1.68 0.093 # 
D98 0.013 2.08 0.038 ## -0.005 -0.17 0.867   0.006 0.35 0.729   0.292 7.02 0.000 ### 0.092 3.28 0.001 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.76 0.000 ### 0.096 3.11 0.002 ### 0.027 1.65 0.098 # 0.313 7.61 0.000 ### 0.114 4.08 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.94 0.052 # 0.027 0.90 0.366   0.034 2.12 0.034 ## 0.107 2.70 0.007 ### 0.092 3.39 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.92 0.055 # 0.000 0.00 1.000   -0.018 -1.08 0.278   0.207 5.15 0.000 ### 0.024 0.85 0.397   
D02 -0.005 -0.87 0.383   0.190 6.19 0.000 ### 0.117 7.34 0.000 ### 0.000 0.01 0.996   0.021 0.79 0.430   
D03 -0.002 -0.27 0.789   -0.027 -0.91 0.363   -0.015 -0.92 0.358   -0.090 -2.33 0.020 ## -0.095 -3.55 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.37 0.170   0.122 4.32 0.000 ### 0.061 4.00 0.000 ### 0.166 4.41 0.000 ### 0.088 3.40 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.200       0.212       0.068       0.077       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PredictsZ it + β4Chgroa it *PredictsZ it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Individual Earnings Attributes      
Panel F SmoothZ 
  Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
  Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.064 5.87 0.000   -0.095 -1.66 0.097   0.003 0.10 0.919   -0.011 -0.14 0.885   -0.018 -0.36 0.721   
Chgroa 0.069 1.24 0.216   5.044 15.54 0.000 *** 2.810 17.92 0.000 *** 2.259 5.94 0.000 *** 2.449 9.37 0.000 *** 
Return 0.008 1.49 0.135 * 0.309 10.51 0.000 *** 0.181 11.95 0.000 *** 0.053 1.42 0.156 * 0.155 6.17 0.000 *** 
nSmoothZ -0.001 -0.74 0.459   0.013 1.45 0.148   0.005 1.23 0.220   0.016 1.56 0.119   0.019 2.64 0.008 ### 
ChgroanSmoothZ 0.021 0.65 0.514   0.606 3.15 0.002 ### 0.312 3.50 0.000 ### 0.471 2.26 0.024 ## 0.493 3.31 0.001 ### 
ChgroaMB -0.009 -0.52 0.600   -0.494 -5.47 0.000 *** -0.233 -4.77 0.000 *** -0.356 -3.13 0.002 *** -0.313 -3.86 0.000 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.82 0.410   -0.009 -0.93 0.351   -0.005 -0.91 0.364   0.043 3.52 0.000 *** 0.015 1.72 0.086 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.016 2.40 0.016 ## 0.172 3.64 0.000 ### 0.018 0.98 0.327   0.130 1.87 0.062 # 0.035 1.12 0.263   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.41 0.159   -0.007 -1.64 0.101   -0.004 -2.18 0.029 ## -0.001 -0.20 0.845   -0.002 -0.47 0.637   
lnasset 0.000 0.30 0.761   0.016 2.79 0.005 *** 0.007 2.27 0.023 ** -0.002 -0.22 0.828   0.009 1.88 0.060 ** 
G1 0.001 0.05 0.962   0.034 0.63 0.528   0.021 0.73 0.468   -0.022 -0.30 0.768   -0.011 -0.23 0.821   
G2 -0.009 -0.96 0.338   0.019 0.41 0.683   0.006 0.23 0.817   0.009 0.13 0.897   -0.007 -0.16 0.873   
G3 -0.007 -0.72 0.474   -0.011 -0.21 0.830   -0.020 -0.69 0.489   -0.064 -0.86 0.388   -0.065 -1.37 0.170   
G4 -0.016 -1.73 0.084 # 0.006 0.13 0.900   -0.013 -0.50 0.619   -0.003 -0.04 0.967   -0.005 -0.13 0.899   
G5 -0.004 -0.43 0.667   0.044 1.00 0.315   -0.014 -0.58 0.560   -0.067 -1.11 0.267   -0.050 -1.25 0.211   
G6 -0.016 -1.78 0.074 # -0.009 -0.20 0.843   -0.016 -0.66 0.509   -0.042 -0.66 0.508   -0.043 -1.05 0.292   
G7 -0.008 -0.87 0.385   0.003 0.06 0.954   -0.016 -0.62 0.533   0.003 0.05 0.960   -0.032 -0.76 0.446   
G8 -0.007 -0.79 0.428   0.030 0.65 0.516   -0.019 -0.80 0.424   -0.103 -1.66 0.097 # -0.075 -1.87 0.061 # 
G9 0.001 0.12 0.904   -0.063 -1.28 0.202   -0.031 -1.13 0.259   0.024 0.36 0.720   -0.029 -0.63 0.528   
G10 0.000 0.05 0.958   0.005 0.10 0.924   0.007 0.26 0.793   -0.058 -0.87 0.382   -0.065 -1.52 0.129   
G11 -0.014 -1.50 0.134   -0.016 -0.33 0.740   -0.039 -1.44 0.149   0.038 0.56 0.577   -0.013 -0.29 0.773   
G12 0.004 0.40 0.686   0.071 1.57 0.116   0.014 0.55 0.580   0.113 1.77 0.076 # 0.039 0.94 0.347   
G13 -0.002 -0.30 0.762   -0.067 -1.64 0.102   -0.033 -1.52 0.128   -0.053 -0.93 0.355   -0.054 -1.47 0.141   
G14 -0.015 -1.70 0.090 # -0.038 -0.84 0.403   -0.039 -1.60 0.111   -0.089 -1.40 0.162   -0.081 -2.00 0.045 ## 
D98 0.013 2.13 0.033 ## -0.017 -0.57 0.571   -0.005 -0.27 0.790   0.294 7.07 0.000 ### 0.088 3.14 0.002 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.72 0.000 ### 0.088 2.84 0.005 ### 0.019 1.15 0.249   0.316 7.71 0.000 ### 0.112 4.00 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.95 0.051 # 0.014 0.46 0.648   0.024 1.49 0.137   0.106 2.66 0.008 ### 0.085 3.14 0.002 ### 
D01 0.011 1.90 0.058 # -0.020 -0.62 0.536   -0.035 -2.07 0.038 ## 0.200 4.97 0.000 ### 0.012 0.45 0.656   
D02 -0.005 -0.84 0.398   0.185 6.01 0.000 ### 0.116 7.19 0.000 ### -0.001 -0.04 0.971   0.019 0.70 0.481   
D03 -0.002 -0.31 0.759   -0.043 -1.47 0.142   -0.027 -1.70 0.089 # -0.095 -2.45 0.015 ## -0.103 -3.87 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.39 0.164   0.116 4.06 0.000 ### 0.059 3.78 0.000 ### 0.166 4.41 0.000 ### 0.086 3.32 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.188       0.190       0.066       0.074       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3nSmoothZ it + β4Chgroa it * nSmoothZ it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variable jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 6 Regression: Z-Scores of Earnings Attributes      
Panel G Four Earnings Attributes with Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.065 5.75 0.000   -0.081 -1.37 0.171   -0.002 -0.07 0.947   0.039 0.48 0.629   0.012 0.22 0.824   
Chgroa 0.108 1.71 0.087 ** 6.019 16.58 0.000 *** 3.665 20.96 0.000 *** 2.669 6.21 0.000 *** 2.971 10.07 0.000 *** 
Return 0.007 1.30 0.192 * 0.299 10.22 0.000 *** 0.168 11.21 0.000 *** 0.041 1.09 0.275   0.146 5.79 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.86 0.388   0.005 0.64 0.525   0.003 0.76 0.448   -0.017 -1.55 0.120   -0.005 -0.66 0.512   
Accrualz -0.002 -1.21 0.227   0.008 0.83 0.406   0.000 -0.08 0.935   0.009 0.71 0.477   0.011 1.23 0.220   
Predictz 0.003 1.31 0.192   0.009 0.87 0.382   0.005 0.92 0.358   0.030 2.30 0.022 ## 0.017 1.84 0.066 # 
nSmoothz -0.001 -0.88 0.378   0.010 1.10 0.273   0.004 0.99 0.321   0.011 1.04 0.296   0.015 2.04 0.041 ## 
ChgroaPersistz 0.046 1.65 0.100 * -0.238 -1.35 0.177 -0.167 -2.16 0.031 0.029 0.16 0.877   -0.101 -0.78 0.438   
ChgroaAccrualz -0.039 -1.38 0.169 -0.394 -2.14 0.032 0.033 0.41 0.678   0.157 0.76 0.446   0.071 0.53 0.599   
ChgroaPredictz 0.026 0.91 0.361   1.390 8.32 0.000 *** 0.946 12.11 0.000 *** 0.364 1.96 0.050 ** 0.565 4.35 0.000 *** 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.020 0.62 0.534   0.229 1.14 0.253   0.017 0.19 0.852   0.339 1.57 0.116   0.303 1.97 0.049 ## 
ChgroaMB -0.012 -0.67 0.501   -0.314 -3.26 0.001 *** -0.093 -1.86 0.063 ** -0.291 -2.45 0.014 *** -0.227 -2.71 0.007 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.94 0.345   -0.007 -0.70 0.481   -0.003 -0.63 0.529   0.047 3.81 0.000 *** 0.017 1.91 0.056 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.015 2.16 0.031 ## 0.132 2.80 0.005 ### 0.000 -0.01 0.993   0.119 1.70 0.090 # 0.024 0.77 0.442   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.43 0.153   -0.007 -1.74 0.081 # -0.004 -1.98 0.048 ## -0.002 -0.22 0.824   -0.002 -0.46 0.644   
lnasset 0.000 0.20 0.845   0.013 2.22 0.027 ** 0.007 2.19 0.028 ** -0.008 -1.05 0.294   0.005 0.94 0.350   
G1 0.000 0.02 0.983   0.025 0.47 0.639   0.021 0.74 0.461   -0.036 -0.48 0.630   -0.019 -0.38 0.705   
G2 -0.007 -0.77 0.442   0.024 0.49 0.622   0.010 0.36 0.716   0.011 0.17 0.864   -0.004 -0.08 0.937   
G3 -0.007 -0.71 0.475   -0.012 -0.24 0.812   -0.018 -0.63 0.532   -0.071 -0.96 0.335   -0.067 -1.43 0.154   
G4 -0.016 -1.75 0.079 # 0.005 0.10 0.922   -0.010 -0.40 0.688   -0.009 -0.14 0.890   -0.006 -0.14 0.892   
G5 -0.003 -0.41 0.684   0.032 0.74 0.459   -0.018 -0.77 0.442   -0.058 -0.96 0.338   -0.045 -1.13 0.257   
G6 -0.015 -1.73 0.083 # -0.011 -0.25 0.803   -0.014 -0.56 0.577   -0.042 -0.66 0.507   -0.042 -1.03 0.305   
G7 -0.008 -0.85 0.396   0.005 0.11 0.912   -0.015 -0.60 0.548   0.015 0.24 0.812   -0.023 -0.54 0.590   
G8 -0.006 -0.69 0.488   0.035 0.75 0.450   -0.017 -0.71 0.476   -0.079 -1.26 0.208   -0.060 -1.47 0.142   
G9 0.001 0.07 0.948   -0.063 -1.28 0.200   -0.030 -1.11 0.265   0.028 0.42 0.677   -0.024 -0.53 0.596   
G10 0.000 0.02 0.984   0.007 0.15 0.879   0.009 0.35 0.725   -0.051 -0.77 0.439   -0.059 -1.38 0.169   
G11 -0.014 -1.42 0.155   -0.027 -0.55 0.583   -0.044 -1.64 0.100   0.035 0.51 0.611   -0.018 -0.41 0.684   
G12 0.003 0.36 0.718   0.063 1.37 0.169   0.013 0.53 0.595   0.092 1.44 0.151   0.026 0.63 0.526   
G13 -0.002 -0.29 0.775   -0.078 -1.90 0.058 # -0.034 -1.58 0.115   -0.060 -1.03 0.301   -0.057 -1.54 0.123   
G14 -0.014 -1.62 0.106   -0.030 -0.66 0.512   -0.034 -1.40 0.161   -0.069 -1.07 0.283   -0.065 -1.59 0.111   
D98 0.012 2.01 0.044 ## -0.007 -0.23 0.822   0.007 0.43 0.667   0.287 6.88 0.000 ### 0.089 3.16 0.002 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.74 0.000 ### 0.094 3.05 0.002 ### 0.028 1.65 0.098 # 0.308 7.48 0.000 ### 0.110 3.93 0.000 ### 
D00 0.012 2.03 0.042 ## 0.025 0.85 0.397   0.032 2.01 0.045 ## 0.103 2.59 0.010 ## 0.087 3.19 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.91 0.057 # 0.001 0.02 0.986   -0.018 -1.10 0.272   0.205 5.10 0.000 ### 0.021 0.77 0.443   
D02 -0.005 -0.92 0.359   0.188 6.14 0.000 ### 0.117 7.35 0.000 ### -0.002 -0.06 0.956   0.019 0.69 0.489   
D03 -0.001 -0.21 0.835   -0.028 -0.95 0.343   -0.015 -0.97 0.332   -0.091 -2.33 0.020 ## -0.097 -3.62 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.38 0.167   0.122 4.32 0.000 ### 0.062 4.01 0.000 ### 0.165 4.38 0.000 ### 0.087 3.37 0.001 ### 
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Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.201       0.212       0.068       0.078       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3PersistZ it +β4AccrualsZ it +β5PredictZ it +β6nSmoothZ it + 
β7Chgroa it *PersistZ it +β8Chgroa it *AccrualsZ it +β9Chgroa it *PredictZ it +β10Chgroa it *nSmoothZ it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%.
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Table 7 Regression: The Index of Earnings Attributes 
Panel A Index of Earnings Attributes with Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   
Intercept 0.066 5.78 0.000   -0.140 -2.34 0.019   -0.009 -0.27 0.785   -0.051 -0.63 0.528   -0.055 -1.04 0.301   
Chgroa 0.026 0.31 0.757   3.102 6.15 0.000 *** 1.189 5.06 0.000 *** 0.806 1.41 0.159 * 1.008 2.57 0.010 *** 
Return 0.008 1.43 0.154 * 0.302 10.26 0.000 *** 0.172 11.36 0.000 *** 0.046 1.22 0.224   0.148 5.88 0.000 *** 
Index 0.000 -0.52 0.604   0.000 2.54 0.011 ## 0.000 1.34 0.181   0.000 1.72 0.086 # 0.000 2.32 0.021 ## 
ChgroaIndex 0.000 0.59 0.552   0.002 4.85 0.000 *** 0.002 8.69 0.000 *** 0.001 3.09 0.002 *** 0.001 4.45 0.000 *** 
ChgroaMB -0.008 -0.45 0.653   -0.449 -4.94 0.000 *** -0.196 -4.02 0.000 *** -0.314 -2.75 0.006 *** -0.282 -3.47 0.001 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.83 0.404   -0.007 -0.73 0.466   -0.003 -0.60 0.549   0.045 3.65 0.000 *** 0.016 1.89 0.059 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.016 2.38 0.017 ## 0.166 3.53 0.000 ### 0.005 0.26 0.798   0.126 1.82 0.070 # 0.025 0.79 0.427   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.40 0.162   -0.007 -1.73 0.084 # -0.004 -2.24 0.025 ## -0.002 -0.24 0.814   -0.002 -0.54 0.587   
lnasset 0.000 0.43 0.665   0.012 2.04 0.042 ** 0.006 1.87 0.062 ** -0.005 -0.63 0.528   0.006 1.22 0.223   
G1 0.001 0.06 0.956   0.026 0.49 0.626   0.020 0.68 0.499   -0.029 -0.38 0.702   -0.014 -0.28 0.778   
G2 -0.009 -1.01 0.310   0.021 0.44 0.659   0.001 0.04 0.971   0.009 0.13 0.895   -0.007 -0.16 0.870   
G3 -0.007 -0.72 0.469   -0.013 -0.25 0.801   -0.020 -0.72 0.474   -0.064 -0.88 0.381   -0.064 -1.35 0.176   
G4 -0.016 -1.75 0.080 # 0.012 0.25 0.801   -0.013 -0.52 0.606   0.000 0.00 0.998   -0.002 -0.04 0.966   
G5 -0.004 -0.44 0.661   0.047 1.06 0.287   -0.015 -0.65 0.517   -0.067 -1.11 0.269   -0.049 -1.23 0.220   
G6 -0.016 -1.78 0.075 # -0.011 -0.24 0.811   -0.017 -0.69 0.491   -0.043 -0.68 0.498   -0.044 -1.07 0.284   
G7 -0.008 -0.89 0.374   0.005 0.11 0.910   -0.018 -0.72 0.473   0.004 0.07 0.947   -0.031 -0.74 0.461   
G8 -0.007 -0.84 0.398   0.038 0.82 0.410   -0.022 -0.92 0.359   -0.096 -1.54 0.123   -0.071 -1.74 0.081 # 
G9 0.001 0.08 0.934   -0.058 -1.17 0.242   -0.029 -1.07 0.285   0.030 0.44 0.663   -0.022 -0.49 0.622   
G10 0.000 0.03 0.979   0.004 0.09 0.926   0.004 0.14 0.889   -0.056 -0.85 0.393   -0.064 -1.49 0.137   
G11 -0.014 -1.50 0.134   -0.024 -0.48 0.631   -0.043 -1.63 0.104   0.035 0.51 0.611   -0.017 -0.39 0.700   
G12 0.004 0.42 0.677   0.062 1.37 0.172   0.011 0.46 0.646   0.105 1.64 0.101   0.034 0.82 0.412   
G13 -0.002 -0.30 0.761   -0.074 -1.80 0.072 # -0.034 -1.58 0.114   -0.057 -0.99 0.322   -0.055 -1.50 0.133   
G14 -0.015 -1.74 0.083 # -0.032 -0.69 0.491   -0.040 -1.67 0.095 # -0.084 -1.32 0.188   -0.079 -1.94 0.053 # 
D98 0.012 1.96 0.050 # 0.005 0.17 0.862   0.001 0.06 0.952   0.311 7.34 0.000 ### 0.105 3.65 0.000 ### 
D99 -0.029 -4.74 0.000 ### 0.113 3.59 0.000 ### 0.029 1.69 0.091 # 0.336 8.06 0.000 ### 0.132 4.63 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.88 0.060 # 0.035 1.17 0.242   0.035 2.13 0.034 ## 0.123 3.06 0.002 ### 0.102 3.73 0.000 ### 
D01 0.011 1.80 0.071 # 0.001 0.04 0.967   -0.024 -1.42 0.155   0.217 5.34 0.000 ### 0.030 1.06 0.291   
D02 -0.005 -0.90 0.368   0.194 6.29 0.000 ### 0.119 7.38 0.000 ### 0.007 0.17 0.864   0.027 1.00 0.317   
D03 -0.002 -0.29 0.774   -0.035 -1.18 0.237   -0.020 -1.25 0.212   -0.090 -2.31 0.021 ## -0.097 -3.63 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.38 0.168   0.113 3.96 0.000 ### 0.058 3.71 0.000 ### 0.163 4.32 0.000 ### 0.084 3.22 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.013       0.191       0.199       0.067       0.075       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3IndexZ it + β4Chgroa it * Index it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 7 Regression: The Index of Earnings Attributes 
Panel B Index of Earnings Attributes without Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.058 13.88 0.000   -0.003 -0.12 0.903   0.032 2.71 0.007   0.054 1.87 0.061   0.003 0.17 0.862   
Chgroa 0.006 0.08 0.935   1.831 4.47 0.000 *** 0.683 3.50 0.000 *** -0.030 -0.06 0.949   0.323 0.99 0.321   
Return 0.010 3.11 0.002 *** 0.245 13.37 0.000 *** 0.136 14.70 0.000 *** 0.115 4.97 0.000 *** 0.152 9.81 0.000 *** 
Index 0.000 0.24 0.809   0.000 3.25 0.001 ### 0.000 2.86 0.004 ### 0.000 0.30 0.765   0.000 2.68 0.007 ### 
ChgroaIndex 0.000 0.64 0.520   0.002 6.14 0.000 *** 0.002 9.74 0.000 *** 0.001 3.17 0.002 *** 0.001 4.93 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.166       0.181       0.020       0.056       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3IndexZ it + β4Chgroa it * Index it +εit 
 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 8 Regression: The Principal Component Analysis Combination of Earnings Attributes 
Panel A PCA with Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   
Intercept 0.063 5.64 0.000   -0.070 -1.20 0.231   0.004 0.13 0.894   0.033 0.42 0.675   0.016 0.30 0.761   
Chgroa 0.072 1.20 0.232   5.664 16.72 0.000 *** 3.505 20.87 0.000 *** 2.642 6.52 0.000 *** 2.939 10.40 0.000 *** 
Return 0.008 1.47 0.143 * 0.299 10.20 0.000 *** 0.171 11.39 0.000 *** 0.045 1.20 0.229   0.148 5.88 0.000 *** 
Prin 0.000 -0.33 0.738   0.018 2.45 0.014 ## 0.006 1.52 0.128   0.028 3.08 0.002 ### 0.024 3.82 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPrin 0.007 0.32 0.746   0.812 6.69 0.000 *** 0.669 11.46 0.000 *** 0.484 3.36 0.001 *** 0.533 5.43 0.000 *** 
ChgroaMB -0.008 -0.45 0.654   -0.348 -3.75 0.000 *** -0.141 -2.87 0.004 *** -0.283 -2.44 0.015 *** -0.242 -2.96 0.003 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.81 0.417   -0.005 -0.56 0.578   -0.003 -0.59 0.558   0.046 3.72 0.000 *** 0.017 1.92 0.055 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.016 2.41 0.016 ## 0.158 3.35 0.001 ### 0.002 0.08 0.933   0.128 1.85 0.064 # 0.025 0.78 0.433   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.40 0.161   -0.008 -1.75 0.080 # -0.004 -2.06 0.040 ## -0.002 -0.24 0.814   -0.002 -0.50 0.618   
lnasset 0.000 0.40 0.689   0.012 2.01 0.045 ** 0.006 1.97 0.049 ** -0.008 -1.04 0.300   0.004 0.78 0.437   
G1 0.000 0.05 0.963   0.029 0.54 0.591   0.022 0.76 0.448   -0.032 -0.43 0.670   -0.016 -0.33 0.744   
G2 -0.009 -0.97 0.334   0.019 0.40 0.690   0.006 0.23 0.818   0.014 0.21 0.831   -0.002 -0.05 0.961   
G3 -0.007 -0.72 0.474   -0.013 -0.25 0.800   -0.019 -0.66 0.508   -0.067 -0.91 0.364   -0.066 -1.39 0.163   
G4 -0.016 -1.72 0.086 # 0.007 0.15 0.884   -0.011 -0.43 0.667   -0.001 -0.02 0.982   -0.003 -0.06 0.951   
G5 -0.004 -0.42 0.675   0.043 0.98 0.327   -0.015 -0.62 0.538   -0.060 -0.99 0.320   -0.044 -1.10 0.273   
G6 -0.015 -1.76 0.079 # -0.010 -0.23 0.820   -0.013 -0.54 0.588   -0.042 -0.66 0.506   -0.043 -1.04 0.298   
G7 -0.008 -0.86 0.392   0.008 0.17 0.866   -0.014 -0.57 0.570   0.016 0.26 0.798   -0.022 -0.51 0.610   
G8 -0.007 -0.80 0.425   0.036 0.77 0.441   -0.018 -0.75 0.454   -0.082 -1.31 0.191   -0.059 -1.46 0.143   
G9 0.001 0.10 0.923   -0.058 -1.18 0.239   -0.028 -1.02 0.307   0.033 0.48 0.629   -0.020 -0.45 0.651   
G10 0.001 0.06 0.955   0.006 0.12 0.901   0.008 0.30 0.767   -0.049 -0.75 0.452   -0.059 -1.37 0.171   
G11 -0.014 -1.50 0.135   -0.023 -0.46 0.644   -0.042 -1.57 0.116   0.034 0.49 0.623   -0.018 -0.39 0.694   
G12 0.003 0.39 0.697   0.065 1.42 0.156   0.012 0.50 0.616   0.100 1.56 0.118   0.030 0.74 0.459   
G13 -0.002 -0.31 0.754   -0.072 -1.77 0.077 # -0.033 -1.51 0.131   -0.060 -1.04 0.299   -0.056 -1.52 0.129   
G14 -0.015 -1.71 0.088 # -0.027 -0.60 0.552   -0.035 -1.44 0.150   -0.071 -1.12 0.265   -0.066 -1.63 0.103   
D98 0.013 2.14 0.033 ## -0.012 -0.38 0.707   0.003 0.17 0.864   0.292 7.01 0.000 ### 0.090 3.17 0.002 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.69 0.000 ### 0.091 2.93 0.003 ### 0.025 1.50 0.133   0.312 7.61 0.000 ### 0.111 3.98 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.96 0.050 # 0.019 0.62 0.533   0.030 1.85 0.064 # 0.106 2.66 0.008 ### 0.088 3.25 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.90 0.057 # -0.008 -0.26 0.792   -0.022 -1.32 0.188   0.206 5.14 0.000 ### 0.021 0.77 0.442   
D02 -0.005 -0.85 0.395   0.189 6.15 0.000 ### 0.118 7.39 0.000 ### 0.000 0.01 0.995   0.021 0.78 0.437   
D03 -0.002 -0.30 0.764   -0.035 -1.18 0.240   -0.019 -1.19 0.233   -0.091 -2.36 0.018 ## -0.098 -3.67 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.38 0.167   0.118 4.17 0.000 ### 0.061 3.97 0.000 ### 0.167 4.42 0.000 ### 0.088 3.39 0.001 ### 
Adj.R Square 0.012       0.195       0.206       0.068       0.077       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it*Prin it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variablesjit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 8 Regression: The Principal Component Analysis Combination of Earnings Attributes 
Panel B PCA without Control Variables  
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.62 0.000   0.064 7.58 0.000   0.064 14.59 0.000   0.061 5.62 0.000   0.052 7.13 0.000   
Chgroa 0.058 1.32 0.186 * 5.376 21.69 0.000 *** 3.397 27.81 0.000 *** 1.908 6.31 0.000 *** 2.568 12.49 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.14 0.002 *** 0.246 13.44 0.000 *** 0.136 14.78 0.000 *** 0.120 5.22 0.000 *** 0.155 10.04 0.000 *** 
Prin 0.000 0.33 0.744   0.021 3.35 0.001 ### 0.009 2.73 0.006 ### 0.043 5.42 0.000 ### 0.034 6.35 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPrin 0.009 0.45 0.653   1.001 8.49 0.000 *** 0.737 12.79 0.000 *** 0.488 3.41 0.001 *** 0.599 6.20 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.172       0.190       0.026       0.063       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroait + β2Returnit + β3Prinit + β4Chgroait*Prin it +εit 
 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 9 Regression: The Principal Component Analysis Combination of Accruals, Predictability and Smoothness 
Panel A PCA with Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   Coef. t P>t   
Intercept 0.063 5.66 0.000   -0.071 -1.21 0.227   0.003 0.10 0.922   0.036 0.46 0.649   0.017 0.32 0.749   
Chgroa 0.068 1.13 0.256   5.609 16.68 0.000 *** 3.470 20.84 0.000 *** 2.606 6.49 0.000 *** 2.909 10.38 0.000 *** 
Return 0.008 1.48 0.139 * 0.299 10.20 0.000 *** 0.172 11.43 0.000 *** 0.045 1.20 0.230   0.148 5.88 0.000 *** 
Prin 0.000 -0.26 0.794   0.017 2.37 0.018 ## 0.005 1.43 0.152   0.030 3.24 0.001 ### 0.024 3.89 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPrin 0.003 0.16 0.873   0.827 6.73 0.000 *** 0.680 11.56 0.000 *** 0.486 3.34 0.001 *** 0.542 5.48 0.000 *** 
ChgroaMB -0.008 -0.47 0.636   -0.336 -3.60 0.000 *** -0.133 -2.72 0.007 *** -0.278 -2.39 0.017 *** -0.236 -2.87 0.004 *** 
ReturnMB 0.002 0.81 0.420   -0.005 -0.56 0.577   -0.003 -0.61 0.543   0.046 3.73 0.000 *** 0.017 1.92 0.055 ** 
ChgroaShare 0.016 2.43 0.015 ## 0.158 3.36 0.001 ### 0.003 0.17 0.869   0.129 1.87 0.062 # 0.026 0.83 0.409   
ReturnShare -0.001 -1.41 0.159   -0.008 -1.74 0.081 # -0.004 -2.04 0.041 ## -0.002 -0.24 0.814   -0.002 -0.49 0.622   
lnasset 0.000 0.37 0.708   0.012 2.03 0.042 ** 0.006 2.01 0.044 ** -0.008 -1.08 0.282   0.004 0.77 0.443   
G1 0.000 0.04 0.966   0.029 0.54 0.593   0.022 0.77 0.443   -0.033 -0.45 0.655   -0.017 -0.34 0.733   
G2 -0.009 -0.96 0.337   0.016 0.35 0.728   0.005 0.20 0.841   0.012 0.18 0.856   -0.004 -0.09 0.927   
G3 -0.007 -0.72 0.473   -0.014 -0.26 0.795   -0.019 -0.66 0.509   -0.068 -0.92 0.356   -0.066 -1.41 0.160   
G4 -0.016 -1.72 0.086 # 0.006 0.13 0.899   -0.011 -0.43 0.665   -0.003 -0.05 0.964   -0.004 -0.08 0.933   
G5 -0.003 -0.41 0.681   0.042 0.97 0.334   -0.015 -0.62 0.534   -0.059 -0.98 0.326   -0.043 -1.09 0.276   
G6 -0.015 -1.76 0.078 # -0.011 -0.23 0.816   -0.013 -0.55 0.583   -0.043 -0.67 0.502   -0.043 -1.04 0.297   
G7 -0.008 -0.85 0.396   0.008 0.16 0.871   -0.014 -0.58 0.564   0.017 0.26 0.791   -0.021 -0.51 0.613   
G8 -0.007 -0.79 0.432   0.035 0.76 0.447   -0.018 -0.75 0.454   -0.081 -1.30 0.195   -0.059 -1.46 0.145   
G9 0.001 0.10 0.923   -0.058 -1.18 0.237   -0.028 -1.02 0.307   0.033 0.48 0.632   -0.021 -0.46 0.649   
G10 0.001 0.06 0.951   0.006 0.13 0.899   0.008 0.30 0.761   -0.049 -0.75 0.456   -0.058 -1.36 0.173   
G11 -0.014 -1.50 0.135   -0.023 -0.46 0.643   -0.042 -1.57 0.117   0.033 0.48 0.631   -0.018 -0.40 0.692   
G12 0.003 0.38 0.701   0.064 1.40 0.161   0.012 0.51 0.613   0.097 1.52 0.128   0.029 0.70 0.484   
G13 -0.002 -0.32 0.750   -0.072 -1.76 0.079 # -0.033 -1.50 0.134   -0.061 -1.05 0.293   -0.056 -1.52 0.129   
G14 -0.015 -1.70 0.089 # -0.027 -0.60 0.549   -0.035 -1.43 0.152   -0.070 -1.10 0.272   -0.065 -1.61 0.107   
D98 0.013 2.12 0.034 ## -0.011 -0.37 0.713   0.003 0.21 0.836   0.291 6.99 0.000 ### 0.089 3.17 0.002 ### 
D99 -0.028 -4.70 0.000 ### 0.091 2.92 0.003 ### 0.025 1.50 0.133   0.311 7.58 0.000 ### 0.111 3.96 0.000 ### 
D00 0.011 1.95 0.051 # 0.018 0.59 0.552   0.029 1.81 0.071 # 0.104 2.63 0.009 ### 0.087 3.21 0.001 ### 
D01 0.011 1.89 0.059 # -0.008 -0.26 0.791   -0.022 -1.32 0.189   0.206 5.14 0.000 ### 0.021 0.76 0.445   
D02 -0.005 -0.85 0.394   0.189 6.16 0.000 ### 0.119 7.41 0.000 ### 0.000 0.00 0.997   0.021 0.78 0.438   
D03 -0.002 -0.31 0.757   -0.035 -1.18 0.237   -0.019 -1.21 0.228   -0.092 -2.36 0.018 ## -0.098 -3.68 0.000 ### 
D04 -0.008 -1.39 0.166   0.118 4.17 0.000 ### 0.061 3.96 0.000 ### 0.166 4.42 0.000 ### 0.088 3.38 0.001 ### 
Adj.R 
Square 0.012       0.195       0.206       0.069       0.078       
No. Obs 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 9 Regression: The Principal Component Analysis Combination of Accruals, Predictability and Smoothness 
Panel B PCA without Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.62 0.000   0.064 7.57 0.000   0.064 14.55 0.000   0.061 5.61 0.000   0.052 7.11 0.000   
Chgroa 0.053 1.22 0.224   5.349 21.84 0.000 *** 3.381 27.98 0.000 *** 1.884 6.31 0.000 *** 2.556 12.56 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.15 0.002 *** 0.245 13.43 0.000 *** 0.136 14.81 0.000 *** 0.120 5.22 0.000 *** 0.155 10.04 0.000 *** 
Prin 0.000 0.39 0.695   0.021 3.35 0.001 ### 0.009 2.74 0.006 ### 0.045 5.64 0.000 ### 0.035 6.52 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPrin 0.006 0.28 0.780   1.019 8.57 0.000 *** 0.749 12.91 0.000 *** 0.491 3.40 0.001 *** 0.611 6.27 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.173       0.190       0.027       0.063       
No. of Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel A Original Model 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.056 13.43 0.000   0.113 4.26 0.000   0.091 7.31 0.000   0.065 2.16 0.031   0.082 4.19 0.000   
Chgroa -0.206 -1.66 0.098 ** 5.319 6.71 0.000 *** 2.438 6.53 0.000 *** 0.774 0.86 0.390   2.043 3.50 0.001 *** 
Return 0.030 2.42 0.016 *** 0.361 4.55 0.000 *** 0.180 4.81 0.000 *** 0.291 3.23 0.001 *** 0.217 3.72 0.000 *** 
Prin -0.006 -2.05 0.041 ## 0.010 0.52 0.605   0.003 0.36 0.716   -0.004 -0.16 0.870   0.008 0.52 0.601   
ChgroaPrin -0.070 -0.97 0.333   1.350 2.93 0.003 *** 0.535 2.47 0.014 *** -0.341 -0.65 0.514   0.163 0.48 0.631   
Adj R-Squared 0.013       0.184       0.189       0.032       0.088       
No. of Obs. 495       495       495       495       495       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +εit 
 
Panel B EG Index 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.049 2.55 0.011   0.201 1.53 0.126   0.121 1.94 0.052   0.035 0.24 0.813   0.156 1.63 0.105   
Chgroa -0.311 -2.51 0.012 *** 5.003 5.96 0.000 *** 2.333 5.87 0.000 *** 0.374 0.39 0.694   1.830 2.98 0.003 *** 
Return 0.035 2.81 0.005 *** 0.329 3.89 0.000 *** 0.180 4.51 0.000 *** 0.316 3.31 0.001 *** 0.223 3.61 0.000 *** 
Prin -0.004 -1.16 0.247   0.010 0.48 0.633   0.005 0.46 0.644   -0.010 -0.41 0.680   0.002 0.10 0.921   
ChgroaPrin 0.014 0.03 0.978   0.439 0.13 0.895   1.126 0.71 0.476   0.434 0.11 0.909   0.408 0.17 0.867   
EG 0.000 0.23 0.819   -0.006 -0.64 0.521   -0.002 -0.50 0.619   0.003 0.25 0.801   -0.005 -0.78 0.434   
ChgroaPrinEG -0.008 -0.27 0.791   0.041 0.20 0.843   -0.042 -0.43 0.670   -0.046 -0.20 0.844   -0.014 -0.09 0.926   
Adj R-Squared 0.012       0.157       0.175       0.025       0.076       
No. of Obs. 457       457       457       457       457       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5EG it +β6Chgroa it * EG it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel C Rank EG Index 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.054 7.41 0.000   0.156 3.18 0.002   0.105 4.50 0.000   0.078 1.39 0.165   0.122 3.40 0.001   
Chgroa -0.307 -2.49 0.013 *** 4.988 5.96 0.000 *** 2.333 5.88 0.000 *** 0.390 0.41 0.681   1.830 2.98 0.003 *** 
Return 0.035 2.79 0.006 *** 0.329 3.90 0.000 *** 0.180 4.51 0.000 *** 0.314 3.29 0.001 *** 0.222 3.60 0.000 *** 
Prin -0.004 -1.17 0.241   0.009 0.41 0.679   0.004 0.41 0.686   -0.011 -0.47 0.642   0.000 0.00 0.999   
ChgroaPrin -0.115 -0.60 0.549   1.034 0.79 0.429   0.776 1.26 0.210   -0.124 -0.08 0.933   0.309 0.32 0.747   
rEG 0.000 -0.03 0.980   0.000 -0.92 0.359   0.000 -0.73 0.467   0.000 -0.12 0.902   0.000 -1.33 0.185  * 
ChgroaPrinrEG 0.000 0.00 1.000   0.000 0.04 0.965   -0.001 -0.55 0.582   -0.001 -0.13 0.898   0.000 -0.14 0.885   
Adj R-Squared 0.012       0.158       0.175       0.025       0.078       
No. of Obs. 457       457       457       457       457       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5rEG it +β6Chgroa it * rEG it +εit 
 
Panel D CEO no Duality (Dummy Variable) 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.065 10.00 0.000   0.101 2.20 0.028   0.075 3.41 0.001   0.095 1.79 0.075   0.080 2.34 0.020   
Chgroa -0.275 -2.05 0.041 ** 4.941 5.24 0.000 *** 2.311 5.14 0.000 *** 1.737 1.59 0.113 * 2.407 3.43 0.001 *** 
Return 0.024 1.79 0.075 ** 0.345 3.66 0.000 *** 0.188 4.19 0.000 *** 0.181 1.66 0.097 ** 0.197 2.82 0.005 *** 
Prin -0.003 -0.99 0.324   0.006 0.29 0.771   0.003 0.26 0.794   -0.001 -0.05 0.963   0.011 0.66 0.509   
ChgroaPrin -0.096 -0.92 0.360   0.811 1.10 0.270   0.399 1.14 0.256   0.289 0.34 0.734   0.479 0.88 0.382   
Nodual -0.015 -1.98 0.049 ** 0.032 0.61 0.540   0.027 1.06 0.288   -0.004 -0.06 0.949   0.010 0.25 0.804   
ChgroaPrinno dual -0.165 -1.23 0.218   0.622 0.66 0.509   0.081 0.18 0.856   0.454 0.42 0.678   0.092 0.13 0.896   
Adj R-Squared 0.016       0.164       0.178       0.012       0.079       
No. of Obs. 404       404       404       404       404       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Nodual it +β6Chgroa it * Nodual it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel E CEO Shares
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.053 12.52 0.000   0.116 4.25 0.000   0.090 6.98 0.000   0.061 1.97 0.050   0.079 3.91 0.000   
Chgroa -0.197 -1.59 0.114 * 5.342 6.70 0.000 *** 2.448 6.52 0.000 *** 0.897 0.99 0.321   2.099 3.58 0.000 *** 
Return 0.027 2.21 0.028 ** 0.365 4.57 0.000 *** 0.178 4.75 0.000 *** 0.286 3.17 0.002 *** 0.214 3.64 0.000 *** 
Prin -0.006 -2.11 0.036 ## 0.010 0.52 0.600   0.003 0.35 0.725   -0.004 -0.19 0.853   0.007 0.50 0.616   
ChgroaPrin -0.054 -0.69 0.488   1.429 2.84 0.005 *** 0.557 2.35 0.019 *** -0.016 -0.03 0.978   0.305 0.82 0.410   
Share 0.003 2.49 0.013 -0.003 -0.45 0.652   0.002 0.49 0.628   0.006 0.74 0.460   0.004 0.79 0.428   
ChgroaPrinShare -0.030 -0.71 0.475   -0.096 -0.35 0.725   -0.035 -0.27 0.784   -0.457 -1.49 0.138 -0.205 -1.02 0.307   
Adj R-Squared 0.021       0.182       0.186       0.033       0.087       
No. of Obs. 495       495       495       495       495       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Share it +β6Chgroa it * Share it +εit 
 
Panel F Rank CEO Shares 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.054 7.18 0.000   0.134 2.81 0.005   0.085 3.77 0.000   -0.007 -0.10 0.895   0.006 0.18 0.861   
Chgroa -0.180 -1.40 0.167 * 5.355 6.45 0.000 *** 2.397 6.13 0.000 *** 0.905 0.96 0.336   2.117 3.49 0.001 *** 
Return 0.028 2.22 0.027 ** 0.365 4.49 0.000 *** 0.180 4.72 0.000 *** 0.267 2.90 0.004 *** 0.195 3.29 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.006 -1.90 0.053 # 0.009 0.45 0.652   0.004 0.39 0.699   0.002 0.08 0.940   0.013 0.89 0.375   
ChgroaPrin 0.039 0.21 0.837   1.613 1.33 0.185 * 0.316 0.55 0.568   -0.074 -0.10 0.957   0.150 0.17 0.866   
rShare 0.000 0.38 0.701   0.000 -0.50 0.609   0.000 0.34 0.731   0.000 1.63 0.104   0.000 2.63 0.009 
ChgroaPrinrShare 0.000 -0.60 0.534   -0.001 -0.20 0.818   0.001 0.41 0.681   -0.001 -0.20 0.824   0.000 -0.12 0.996   
Adj R-Squared 0.010       0.182       0.186       0.034       0.097       
No. of Obs. 495       495       495       495       495       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Share it +β6Chgroa it * Share it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel G Board Size (Dummy Variable =1 if 7-12 members, 0 otherwise) 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.060 6.51 0.000   0.127 2.04 0.042   0.093 3.15 0.002   -0.051 -0.71 0.475   0.037 0.79 0.430   
Chgroa -0.358 -2.76 0.006 *** 4.947 5.64 0.000 *** 2.301 5.53 0.000 *** 1.400 1.39 0.167 * 2.193 3.35 0.001 *** 
Return 0.035 2.60 0.010 *** 0.339 3.78 0.000 *** 0.190 4.45 0.000 *** 0.209 2.02 0.044 ** 0.216 3.22 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -1.02 0.310   0.008 0.40 0.692   0.004 0.44 0.663   -0.005 -0.20 0.840   0.012 0.76 0.450   
ChgroaPrin -0.111 -0.73 0.466   1.417 1.37 0.170 * 0.577 1.18 0.239   0.367 0.31 0.758   0.775 1.01 0.314   
Size -0.007 -0.78 0.438   -0.004 -0.06 0.955   -0.002 -0.06 0.955   0.151 2.01 0.045 0.044 0.90 0.368   
ChgroaPrinSize -0.094 -0.60 0.552   -0.377 -0.35 0.725   -0.204 -0.40 0.688   -0.168 -0.14 0.892   -0.453 -0.57 0.571   
Adj R-Squared 0.013       0.160       0.179       0.022       0.081       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Size it +β6Chgroa it * Size it +εit 
 
Panel H Board Numbers of Directors Members (1/No. of Directors) 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.036 2.20 0.028   0.177 1.62 0.107   0.079 1.53 0.127   0.019 0.15 0.884   0.047 0.57 0.569   
Chgroa -0.354 -2.69 0.007 *** 4.837 5.44 0.000 *** 2.254 5.34 0.000 *** 1.493 1.45 0.148 * 2.262 3.41 0.001 *** 
Return 0.033 2.44 0.015 *** 0.347 3.84 0.000 *** 0.190 4.43 0.000 *** 0.211 2.01 0.045 ** 0.215 3.19 0.002 *** 
Prin -0.002 -0.51 0.614   0.006 0.27 0.785   0.006 0.59 0.555   0.002 0.07 0.946   0.015 0.93 0.354   
ChgroaPrin -0.116 -0.32 0.752   2.514 1.01 0.311   1.168 0.99 0.321   -2.839 -0.99 0.323   -1.261 -0.68 0.496   
Resize 0.161 1.12 0.263   -0.509 -0.52 0.601   0.100 0.22 0.828   0.534 0.47 0.635   0.242 0.33 0.739   
ChgroaPrinResize -0.513 -0.18 0.854   -11.013 -0.59 0.558   -5.801 -0.65 0.515   24.661 1.13 0.257   13.297 0.95 0.344   
Adj R-Squared 0.015       0.161       0.180       0.015       0.079       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Resize it +β6Chgroa it * Resize it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel I Rank Board Numbers of Directors Members (1/No. of Directors) 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.048 6.41 0.000   0.151 2.98 0.003   0.094 3.92 0.000   0.051 0.86 0.388   0.064 1.70 0.089   
Chgroa -0.356 -2.68 0.008 *** 4.803 5.34 0.000 *** 2.258 5.29 0.000 *** 1.438 1.38 0.169 * 2.209 3.28 0.001 *** 
Return 0.033 2.46 0.014 *** 0.349 3.86 0.000 *** 0.191 4.46 0.000 *** 0.212 2.03 0.043 ** 0.217 3.22 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.002 -0.63 0.527   0.004 0.19 0.847   0.004 0.42 0.678   0.004 0.14 0.887   0.016 0.95 0.341   
ChgroaPrin -0.126 -0.51 0.613   1.937 1.15 0.251   0.696 0.87 0.385   -0.704 -0.36 0.719   0.037 0.03 0.976   
rResize 0.000 0.87 0.386   0.000 -0.67 0.503   0.000 -0.16 0.876   0.000 0.50 0.620   0.000 0.24 0.809   
ChgroaPrinrResize 0.000 -0.25 0.803   -0.003 -0.53 0.595   -0.001 -0.38 0.707   0.003 0.57 0.572   0.001 0.35 0.729   
Adj R-Squared 0.014       0.161       0.179       0.013       0.078       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5rResize it +β6Chgroa it * rResize it +εit 
 
Panel J Percentage of Independent Directors 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.071 5.98 0.000   0.090 1.12 0.264   0.098 2.58 0.010   0.036 0.39 0.695   0.053 0.89 0.374   
Chgroa -0.338 -2.59 0.010 *** 5.084 5.76 0.000 *** 2.356 5.62 0.000 *** 0.979 0.96 0.338   2.000 3.03 0.003 *** 
Return 0.033 2.49 0.013 *** 0.339 3.78 0.000 *** 0.189 4.43 0.000 *** 0.228 2.20 0.029 ** 0.224 3.34 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.002 -0.51 0.614   0.010 0.47 0.635   0.007 0.64 0.521   -0.009 -0.37 0.715   0.010 0.64 0.522   
ChgroaPrin -0.315 -0.81 0.420   -2.185 -0.83 0.408   -0.681 -0.54 0.587   5.946 1.95 0.052 ** 3.233 1.64 0.102 * 
Ind -0.003 -1.60 0.111  * 0.004 0.40 0.691   -0.001 -0.23 0.815   0.006 0.49 0.622   0.003 0.37 0.711   
ChgroaPrinInd 0.197 0.36 0.722   4.787 1.28 0.202   1.603 0.90 0.368   -8.237 -1.90 0.058 -4.082 -1.46 0.145 
Adj R-Squared 0.018       0.163       0.181       0.021       0.082       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Ind it +β6Chgroa it * Ind it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel K Rank Percentage of Independent Directors 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.062 8.86 0.000   0.140 2.96 0.003   0.105 4.69 0.000   -0.002 -0.03 0.974   0.046 1.30 0.195   
Chgroa -0.350 -2.69 0.008 *** 5.067 5.74 0.000 *** 2.328 5.56 0.000 *** 1.028 1.01 0.313   2.030 3.08 0.002 *** 
Return 0.035 2.65 0.008 *** 0.340 3.79 0.000 *** 0.191 4.49 0.000 *** 0.215 2.08 0.038 ** 0.219 3.27 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -0.92 0.360   0.012 0.56 0.578   0.006 0.57 0.568   -0.006 -0.24 0.808   0.012 0.78 0.434   
ChgroaPrin -0.177 -1.38 0.170 * 0.523 0.60 0.549   0.311 0.75 0.452   1.328 1.32 0.187 * 0.963 1.48 0.140 * 
rInd 0.000 -1.51 0.133   0.000 -0.50 0.619   0.000 -0.80 0.424   0.000 1.82 0.069 # 0.000 0.98 0.328   
ChgroaPrinrInd 0.000 -0.05 0.957   0.004 0.94 0.346   0.001 0.38 0.707   -0.006 -1.44 0.150 -0.003 -1.12 0.262   
Adj R-Squared 0.017       0.162       0.181       0.025       0.083       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5rInd it +β6Chgroa it * rInd it +εit 
 
Panel L Percentage of Independent Directors Who Are Younger Than 70 Years Old 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.048 2.20 0.028   0.101 0.68 0.494   0.072 1.02 0.307   0.215 1.26 0.208   0.188 1.71 0.088   
Chgroa -0.354 -2.73 0.007 *** 4.974 5.68 0.000 *** 2.311 5.56 0.000 *** 1.254 1.24 0.217   2.129 3.26 0.001 *** 
Return 0.035 2.59 0.010 *** 0.333 3.71 0.000 *** 0.188 4.41 0.000 *** 0.214 2.06 0.040 ** 0.215 3.20 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -1.01 0.314   0.012 0.57 0.572   0.006 0.57 0.569   0.001 0.04 0.969   0.016 1.02 0.307   
ChgroaPrin -0.247 -0.72 0.472   3.716 1.60 0.110 * 1.251 1.14 0.257   1.436 0.53 0.594   1.463 0.84 0.399   
Pnotold 0.006 0.24 0.807   0.023 0.14 0.888   0.021 0.28 0.781   -0.157 -0.84 0.402   -0.130 -1.08 0.282   
ChgroaPrinPnotold 0.069 0.18 0.858   -2.997 -1.15 0.250   -0.959 -0.78 0.437   -1.350 -0.45 0.654   -1.225 -0.63 0.529   
Adj R-Squared 0.012       0.162       0.180       0.014       0.081       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Pnotold it +β6Chgroa it * Pnotold it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel M Rank of Percentage of Independent Directors Who Are Younger Than 70 Years Old 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.053 7.08 0.000   0.136 2.67 0.008   0.093 3.85 0.000   0.107 1.81 0.071   0.105 2.76 0.006   
Chgroa -0.354 -2.73 0.007 *** 4.914 5.62 0.000 *** 2.291 5.52 0.000 *** 1.243 1.23 0.221   2.114 3.24 0.001 *** 
Return 0.034 2.59 0.010 *** 0.334 3.72 0.000 *** 0.188 4.42 0.000 *** 0.215 2.07 0.039 ** 0.216 3.22 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -1.01 0.315   0.012 0.55 0.582   0.006 0.57 0.572   0.001 0.02 0.983   0.015 0.98 0.326   
ChgroaPrin -0.219 -1.69 0.092 ** 1.928 2.21 0.028 ** 0.674 1.62 0.105 * 0.819 0.81 0.420   0.757 1.16 0.247   
rPnotold 0.000 -0.01 0.995   0.000 -0.33 0.739   0.000 -0.11 0.912   0.000 -0.66 0.509   0.000 -1.04 0.297   
ChgroaPrinrPnotold 0.000 0.30 0.763   -0.004 -1.25 0.211   -0.001 -0.84 0.404   -0.003 -0.70 0.484   -0.002 -0.71 0.481   
Adj R-Squared 0.012       0.163       0.180       0.013       0.081       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5rPnotold it +β6Chgroa it * rPnotold it +εit 
 
Panel N Percentage of Independent Directors Who Sit Less Than Three Boards 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.013 0.41 0.684   -0.120 -0.54 0.590   -0.062 -0.59 0.555   -0.134 -0.52 0.603   -0.087 -0.52 0.601   
Chgroa -0.342 -2.63 0.009 *** 4.889 5.56 0.000 *** 2.281 5.47 0.000 *** 1.205 1.18 0.238   2.043 3.11 0.002 *** 
Return 0.034 2.55 0.011 *** 0.340 3.80 0.000 *** 0.190 4.47 0.000 *** 0.221 2.13 0.034 ** 0.222 3.32 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -0.82 0.414   0.011 0.50 0.616   0.006 0.59 0.554   -0.001 -0.02 0.983   0.014 0.89 0.375   
ChgroaPrin 0.520 0.57 0.572   -2.011 -0.32 0.747   -0.620 -0.21 0.834   -4.194 -0.58 0.562   -5.795 -1.25 0.213   
Pnotbusy 0.042 1.21 0.226   0.257 1.10 0.272   0.162 1.47 0.143   0.222 0.82 0.412   0.169 0.97 0.331   
ChgroaPrinPnotbusy -0.730 -0.77 0.440   3.241 0.51 0.613   1.075 0.35 0.723   4.664 0.63 0.530   6.444 1.35 0.178 * 
Adj R-Squared 0.016       0.162       0.183       0.014       0.084       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Pnotbusy it +β6Chgroa it * Pnotbusy it +εit 
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Table 10 Regression: Corporate Governance  
Panel O Rank Percentage of Independent Directors Who Sit Less Than Three Boards 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.044 5.33 0.000   0.062 1.10 0.272   0.054 2.01 0.045   0.037 0.57 0.569   0.036 0.87 0.386   
Chgroa -0.340 -2.60 0.010 *** 4.887 5.54 0.000 *** 2.275 5.44 0.000 *** 1.141 1.12 0.265   2.006 3.05 0.002 *** 
Return 0.034 2.54 0.011 *** 0.340 3.80 0.000 *** 0.190 4.47 0.000 *** 0.223 2.15 0.032 ** 0.223 3.33 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.002 -0.78 0.437   0.011 0.54 0.588   0.006 0.64 0.526   -0.001 -0.05 0.956   0.014 0.88 0.379   
ChgroaPrin -0.053 -0.28 0.777   0.680 0.54 0.593   0.242 0.40 0.687   -0.902 -0.61 0.540   -0.810 -0.86 0.393   
rPnotbusy 0.000 1.22 0.225   0.000 1.25 0.213   0.000 1.62 0.105   0.000 0.69 0.489   0.000 1.02 0.308   
ChgroaPrinrPnotbusy -0.001 -0.81 0.418   0.002 0.39 0.695   0.001 0.33 0.744   0.005 0.93 0.352   0.005 1.49 0.137 * 
Adj R-Squared 0.017       0.163       0.184       0.014       0.084       
No. of Obs. 440       440       440       440       440       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5rPnotbusy it +β6Chgroa it * rPnotbusy it +εit 
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Table11 Regression: Index of Six Corporate Governance Variables  
Panel A Averaged Rank of Corporate Governance Variables with Control Variables 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.087 2.52 0.012   0.027 0.12 0.908   0.032 0.28 0.777   0.556 2.10 0.037   0.492 2.86 0.004   
Chgroa -0.561 -2.38 0.018 *** 6.559 4.12 0.000 *** 2.578 3.39 0.001 *** 1.811 1.00 0.316   3.380 2.89 0.004 *** 
Return -0.018 -0.69 0.491   0.459 2.64 0.009 *** 0.178 2.14 0.033 ** 0.558 2.83 0.005 *** 0.376 2.94 0.003 *** 
Prin -0.005 -1.31 0.189   0.026 1.05 0.294   0.011 0.89 0.374   0.034 1.19 0.236   0.034 1.87 0.062 # 
ChgroaPrin 0.526 1.18 0.237   0.514 0.17 0.864   0.763 0.53 0.595   0.161 0.05 0.962   -0.372 -0.17 0.866   
Cindex 0.000 -0.52 0.600   0.000 -0.34 0.737   0.000 0.09 0.928   0.000 0.86 0.392   0.000 0.06 0.952   
ChgroaPrinCindex -0.003 -1.59 0.113 0.001 0.05 0.959   -0.002 -0.35 0.730   -0.001 -0.05 0.957   0.002 0.22 0.825   
ChgroaMB 0.130 1.46 0.146 * -1.090 -1.81 0.071 ** -0.240 -0.83 0.405   -0.632 -0.92 0.356   -0.848 -1.91 0.056 ** 
ReturnMB 0.018 1.83 0.068 ** -0.036 -0.54 0.590   0.011 0.35 0.726   -0.121 -1.62 0.106 * -0.062 -1.27 0.204   
ChgroaShare -0.089 -1.34 0.182   0.623 1.39 0.166   0.201 0.94 0.349   0.497 0.98 0.330   0.504 1.53 0.127   
ReturnShare 0.008 2.54 0.012 ## -0.021 -0.98 0.329   -0.005 -0.47 0.635   -0.042 -1.71 0.088 # -0.025 -1.58 0.116   
lnasset -0.001 -0.35 0.725   0.013 0.74 0.462   0.008 0.92 0.357   -0.044 -2.18 0.030 ** -0.034 -2.62 0.009 *** 
G1 -0.013 -0.53 0.597   -0.086 -0.50 0.617   -0.059 -0.72 0.474   -0.237 -1.22 0.222   -0.161 -1.28 0.202   
G2 -0.004 -0.18 0.859   0.110 0.74 0.461   0.044 0.62 0.536   -0.364 -2.15 0.033 ## -0.194 -1.76 0.079 # 
G3 0.004 0.17 0.868   -0.039 -0.24 0.813   -0.012 -0.15 0.882   -0.197 -1.04 0.297   -0.154 -1.26 0.209   
G4 -0.013 -0.61 0.542   0.222 1.52 0.129   0.080 1.14 0.255   -0.333 -2.01 0.045 ## -0.157 -1.46 0.144   
G5 -0.017 -0.85 0.397   0.090 0.67 0.500   0.017 0.27 0.787   -0.218 -1.44 0.151   -0.138 -1.41 0.160   
G6 -0.016 -0.70 0.485   -0.037 -0.24 0.810   -0.031 -0.43 0.670   -0.197 -1.13 0.258   -0.129 -1.15 0.252   
G7 -0.010 -0.46 0.648   0.024 0.17 0.869   -0.012 -0.17 0.869   -0.133 -0.80 0.421   -0.017 -0.16 0.873   
G8 -0.028 -1.29 0.198   0.097 0.66 0.510   0.023 0.33 0.743   -0.243 -1.47 0.144   -0.138 -1.28 0.202   
G9 -0.034 -1.50 0.134   -0.068 -0.45 0.652   -0.034 -0.47 0.639   -0.160 -0.94 0.350   -0.143 -1.29 0.199   
G10 -0.009 -0.42 0.677   0.118 0.81 0.418   0.021 0.31 0.758   -0.400 -2.42 0.016 ## -0.258 -2.41 0.016 ## 
G11 -0.021 -0.91 0.365   -0.112 -0.71 0.476   -0.075 -1.00 0.319   -0.268 -1.51 0.131   -0.188 -1.63 0.103   
G12 -0.020 -0.95 0.343   -0.044 -0.30 0.763   -0.033 -0.47 0.638   -0.338 -2.05 0.041 ## -0.179 -1.67 0.095 # 
G13 -0.011 -0.57 0.570   -0.100 -0.77 0.441   -0.055 -0.89 0.375   -0.352 -2.39 0.017 ## -0.239 -2.50 0.013 ## 
G14 -0.036 -1.73 0.085 # 0.034 0.24 0.811   -0.026 -0.39 0.694   -0.116 -0.72 0.469   -0.124 -1.20 0.230   
Adj.R Square 0.020       0.172       0.177       0.042       0.105       
No. Obs 434       434       434       434       434       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5CIndex it + β6Chgroa it * Prin it *CIndex it + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
153 
 
Table11 Regression: Index of Six Corporate Governance Variables 
Panel B Averaged Rank of Corporate Governance Variables without Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.051 3.36 0.001   0.205 1.99 0.047   0.103 2.11 0.036   -0.110 -0.94 0.350   0.005 0.07 0.943   
Chgroa -0.374 -2.84 0.005 *** 4.950 5.58 0.000 *** 2.313 5.49 0.000 *** 0.881 0.87 0.385   1.927 2.92 0.004 *** 
Return 0.033 2.45 0.015 *** 0.351 3.82 0.000 *** 0.190 4.36 0.000 *** 0.246 2.34 0.020 ** 0.238 3.48 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.003 -0.93 0.353   0.007 0.31 0.755   0.006 0.54 0.587   0.003 0.14 0.892   0.014 0.85 0.398   
ChgroaPrin 0.232 0.56 0.578   1.419 0.50 0.615   0.818 0.61 0.540   1.772 0.55 0.582   0.926 0.44 0.658   
CIndex 0.000 0.15 0.879   0.000 -0.87 0.387   0.000 -0.28 0.782   0.001 1.65 0.100   0.000 0.92 0.358   
ChgroaPrinCIndex -0.002 -1.04 0.301   -0.001 -0.13 0.899   -0.002 -0.32 0.748   -0.006 -0.47 0.636   -0.002 -0.24 0.807   
Adj R-Squared 0.014       0.165       0.183       0.020       0.079       
No. of Obs. 434       434       434       434       434       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5CIndex it + β6Chgroa it * Prin it *CIndex it +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 12 Regression: PCA of Four Corporate Governance Variables 
Panel A PCA with Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.071 2.62 0.009   -0.063 -0.34 0.731   0.008 0.09 0.931   0.687 3.33 0.001   0.511 3.82 0.000   
Chgroa -0.465 -2.04 0.042 ** 6.508 4.25 0.000 *** 2.626 3.60 0.000 *** 1.833 1.06 0.292   3.321 2.95 0.003 *** 
Return -0.018 -0.71 0.476   0.476 2.74 0.006 *** 0.186 2.24 0.025 ** 0.552 2.80 0.005 *** 0.373 2.92 0.004 *** 
Prin -0.004 -1.05 0.295   0.030 1.21 0.229   0.013 1.08 0.279   0.032 1.12 0.265   0.033 1.81 0.072 # 
ChgroaPrin -0.087 -0.77 0.439   0.815 1.08 0.283   0.453 1.25 0.211   -0.465 -0.54 0.589   -0.119 -0.21 0.831   
Corp 0.002 0.58 0.564   0.013 0.56 0.577   0.011 1.04 0.297   0.012 0.46 0.643   -0.004 -0.22 0.829   
ChgroaPrinCorp -0.091 -1.10 0.273   -0.157 -0.28 0.780   -0.198 -0.74 0.458   0.536 0.84 0.399   0.268 0.65 0.515   
ChgroaMB 0.085 0.98 0.327   -1.093 -1.87 0.063 ** -0.287 -1.03 0.305   -0.599 -0.90 0.368   -0.796 -1.85 0.066 ** 
ReturnMB 0.019 1.94 0.053 ** -0.041 -0.63 0.531   0.010 0.32 0.752   -0.116 -1.57 0.117 * -0.061 -1.28 0.201   
ChgroaShare -0.094 -1.42 0.156   0.621 1.39 0.165   0.206 0.97 0.334   0.523 1.03 0.303   0.503 1.53 0.126   
ReturnShare 0.008 2.28 0.023 ## -0.024 -1.08 0.281   -0.007 -0.66 0.512   -0.046 -1.79 0.075 # -0.025 -1.51 0.131   
lnasset 0.000 -0.03 0.978   0.019 1.04 0.297   0.011 1.27 0.207   -0.047 -2.31 0.021 ** -0.036 -2.70 0.007 *** 
G1 -0.013 -0.50 0.617   -0.081 -0.47 0.636   -0.056 -0.69 0.491   -0.232 -1.19 0.234   -0.160 -1.27 0.205   
G2 -0.004 -0.19 0.848   0.113 0.76 0.450   0.043 0.60 0.547   -0.371 -2.19 0.029 ## -0.193 -1.76 0.080 # 
G3 0.004 0.18 0.861   -0.031 -0.19 0.852   -0.008 -0.10 0.919   -0.202 -1.07 0.284   -0.156 -1.27 0.203   
G4 -0.011 -0.52 0.604   0.236 1.61 0.108   0.089 1.26 0.207   -0.337 -2.02 0.044 ## -0.162 -1.50 0.135   
G5 -0.015 -0.75 0.454   0.101 0.75 0.452   0.024 0.37 0.711   -0.220 -1.45 0.147   -0.141 -1.43 0.153   
G6 -0.015 -0.64 0.524   -0.027 -0.17 0.863   -0.025 -0.35 0.729   -0.199 -1.14 0.255   -0.132 -1.17 0.244   
G7 -0.010 -0.44 0.658   0.028 0.19 0.847   -0.008 -0.12 0.906   -0.124 -0.75 0.456   -0.017 -0.15 0.877   
G8 -0.027 -1.22 0.222   0.105 0.72 0.475   0.026 0.38 0.706   -0.253 -1.52 0.128   -0.140 -1.30 0.193   
G9 -0.032 -1.42 0.157   -0.067 -0.44 0.660   -0.033 -0.45 0.652   -0.143 -0.83 0.407   -0.139 -1.25 0.212   
G10 -0.008 -0.38 0.707   0.123 0.84 0.399   0.024 0.34 0.733   -0.395 -2.39 0.017 ## -0.257 -2.40 0.017 ## 
G11 -0.019 -0.82 0.414   -0.102 -0.65 0.514   -0.072 -0.97 0.334   -0.277 -1.57 0.117   -0.188 -1.65 0.100   
G12 -0.019 -0.87 0.384   -0.037 -0.25 0.800   -0.028 -0.41 0.682   -0.341 -2.07 0.039 ## -0.181 -1.69 0.091 # 
G13 -0.010 -0.53 0.596   -0.093 -0.72 0.472   -0.052 -0.84 0.401   -0.354 -2.40 0.017 ## -0.240 -2.51 0.012 ## 
G14 -0.035 -1.66 0.097 # 0.041 0.29 0.769   -0.022 -0.33 0.740   -0.118 -0.74 0.462   -0.126 -1.22 0.225   
Adj.R Square 0.018       0.173       0.180       0.042       0.106       
No. Obs 434       434       434       434       434       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Corp it + β6Chgroa it * Prin it * Corpit + Σ25j=1 γ j Control variables jit +εit 
Where control variables are the followings: Market-to-Book ratio, Change in ROA CEO shares, Return*CEO shares, Ln Assets, Industry group 1-15, and year 98-05. 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant greater than zero and statistical significant less than zero for chgMB indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10% and  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 12 Regression: PCA of Four Corporate Governance Variables 
Panel B PCA without Control Variables 
 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.053 12.78 0.000   0.120 4.26 0.000   0.089 6.71 0.000   0.077 2.39 0.017   0.074 3.53 0.000   
Chgroa -0.377 -2.86 0.004 *** 4.991 5.59 0.000 *** 2.297 5.43 0.000 *** 0.947 0.93 0.355   1.983 2.99 0.003 *** 
Return 0.033 2.45 0.015 *** 0.346 3.76 0.000 *** 0.190 4.35 0.000 *** 0.253 2.40 0.017 *** 0.239 3.51 0.001 *** 
Prin -0.002 -0.50 0.614   0.010 0.45 0.651   0.008 0.74 0.460   -0.002 -0.09 0.929   0.011 0.65 0.517   
ChgroaPrin -0.130 -1.19 0.236   1.057 1.42 0.155 * 0.524 1.49 0.137 * -0.046 -0.05 0.957   0.172 0.31 0.755   
Corp 0.004 1.53 0.126   -0.007 -0.33 0.739   0.003 0.35 0.725   0.020 0.89 0.372   0.005 0.31 0.755   
ChgroaPrinCorp -0.065 -0.82 0.411   0.021 0.04 0.969   -0.141 -0.55 0.583   0.371 0.60 0.549   0.290 0.72 0.470   
Adj R-Squared 0.019       0.164       0.183       0.015       0.078       
No. of Obs. 434       434       434       434       434       
 
Change in Compensation it =  α + β1Chgroa it + β2Return it + β3Prin it + β4Chgroa it * Prin it +β5Corp it + β6Chgroa it * Prin it * Corpit +εit 
Note: 
1. Using one-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ***, **, and * for 1%, 5%, and 10%.  
2. Using two-tailed test, statistical significant difference from zero indicated by ###, ##, and # for 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 13 Regression: Three Earnings Attributes 
Panel A: AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ 
Change in Salary Change in Bonus Change in Cash Change in Equity Change in Total 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.63 0.000   0.066 7.80 0.000   0.065 15.01 0.000   0.061 5.63 0.000   0.053 7.25 0.000   
Chgroa 0.070 1.52 0.127 * 5.894 22.49 0.000 *** 3.712 28.98 0.000 *** 1.902 5.97 0.000 *** 2.683 12.43 0.000 *** 
Return 0.011 3.18 0.001 *** 0.244 13.37 0.000 *** 0.132 14.40 0.000 *** 0.122 5.26 0.000 *** 0.153 9.93 0.000 *** 
Accrualsz -0.002 -1.21 0.226   0.018 1.89 0.059 # 0.003 0.66 0.511   0.019 1.55 0.122   0.019 2.26 0.024 ## 
Predictz 0.003 1.71 0.088 # 0.010 1.05 0.295   0.008 1.51 0.130   0.039 3.15 0.002 ### 0.024 2.89 0.004 ### 
nSmoothz -0.001 -0.56 0.574   0.005 0.54 0.589   0.004 0.83 0.408   0.014 1.39 0.166   0.016 2.23 0.026 ## 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.041 -1.43 0.152 -0.318 -1.75 0.081 0.053 0.66 0.507   0.146 0.71 0.475   0.107 0.79 0.429   
ChgroaPredictz 0.036 1.32 0.188 * 1.567 9.67 0.000 *** 0.991 13.11 0.000 *** 0.380 2.09 0.037 ** 0.624 4.95 0.000 *** 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.021 0.65 0.518   0.157 0.78 0.435   0.017 0.18 0.854   0.374 1.71 0.087 # 0.293 1.90 0.057 # 
Adj R-Squared 0.002         0.18     0.197       0.026       0.063       
No.Obs. 6181         4445     6195       4471       6141       
 
Panel B: PersistZ, PredictZ, and nSmoothZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.66 0.000   0.066 7.78 0.000   0.065 14.90 0.000   0.062 5.70 0.000   0.053 7.21 0.000   
Chgroa 0.084 1.82 0.069 ** 5.808 21.70 0.000 *** 3.661 28.40 0.000 *** 1.870 5.80 0.000 *** 2.626 12.09 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.11 0.002 *** 0.242 13.28 0.000 *** 0.133 14.46 0.000 *** 0.119 5.17 0.000 *** 0.153 9.89 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.85 0.394   -0.002 -0.29 0.772   -0.001 -0.21 0.837   -0.029 -2.73 0.006 ### -0.014 -1.92 0.055 # 
Predictz 0.002 1.40 0.161   0.022 2.58 0.010 ## 0.009 2.20 0.028 ## 0.052 4.95 0.000 ### 0.036 4.93 0.000 ### 
nSmoothz -0.001 -0.66 0.509   0.005 0.63 0.527   0.004 0.87 0.387   0.015 1.45 0.147   0.016 2.30 0.021 ## 
ChgroaPersistz 0.050 1.83 0.068 ** -0.326 -1.89 0.059 -0.197 -2.59 0.010 -0.046 -0.25 0.805   -0.182 -1.42 0.155 
ChgroaPredictz 0.012 0.48 0.634   1.466 10.09 0.000 *** 1.042 14.76 0.000 *** 0.427 2.49 0.013 *** 0.684 5.80 0.000 *** 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.020 0.62 0.533   0.156 0.78 0.437   0.014 0.15 0.882   0.395 1.81 0.070 # 0.297 1.93 0.054 # 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.179       0.198       0.027       0.063       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Table 13 Regression: Three Earnings Attributes 
Panel C: PersistZ, AccrualsZ, and nSmoothZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.73 0.000   0.064 7.51 0.000   0.061 13.86 0.000   0.061 5.59 0.000   0.051 6.89 0.000   
Chgroa 0.056 1.45 0.147 * 4.364 19.06 0.000 *** 2.706 24.80 0.000 *** 1.519 5.69 0.000 *** 2.018 11.09 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.10 0.002 *** 0.250 13.57 0.000 *** 0.141 15.14 0.000 *** 0.119 5.15 0.000 *** 0.156 10.13 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.75 0.455   0.001 0.12 0.905   0.001 0.13 0.896   -0.022 -2.13 0.033 ## -0.010 -1.41 0.158   
Accrualsz -0.001 -0.36 0.717   0.021 2.56 0.011 ## 0.007 1.55 0.121   0.040 3.82 0.000 ### 0.031 4.40 0.000 ### 
nSmoothz 0.000 -0.29 0.774   0.006 0.69 0.490   0.005 1.15 0.248   0.020 1.99 0.046 ## 0.020 2.81 0.005 ### 
ChgroaPersistz 0.053 1.96 0.050 ** -0.064 -0.37 0.711   -0.002 -0.02 0.983   0.059 0.32 0.746   -0.044 -0.35 0.729   
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.029 -1.11 0.267   0.471 2.89 0.004 *** 0.460 6.19 0.000 *** 0.270 1.42 0.156 * 0.342 2.75 0.006 *** 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.031 0.96 0.338   0.574 2.87 0.004 ### 0.239 2.62 0.009 ### 0.488 2.27 0.023 ## 0.451 2.96 0.003 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.162       0.175       0.024       0.059       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Panel D: PersistZ, AccrualsZ, and PredictZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.69 0.000   0.066 7.79 0.000   0.065 14.88 0.000   0.061 5.59 0.000   0.052 7.14 0.000   
Chgroa 0.081 1.74 0.082 ** 5.809 21.81 0.000 *** 3.664 28.32 0.000 *** 1.879 5.82 0.000 *** 2.635 12.08 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.07 0.002 *** 0.244 13.37 0.000 *** 0.133 14.50 0.000 *** 0.119 5.15 0.000 *** 0.153 9.91 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.93 0.354   -0.002 -0.25 0.799   -0.001 -0.18 0.856   -0.027 -2.55 0.011 ## -0.013 -1.82 0.069 # 
Accrualsz -0.002 -1.27 0.205   0.018 1.83 0.067 # 0.003 0.65 0.513   0.018 1.42 0.157   0.019 2.24 0.025 ## 
Predictz 0.003 1.72 0.085 # 0.012 1.24 0.214   0.009 1.76 0.079 # 0.047 3.84 0.000 ### 0.030 3.63 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPersistz 0.046 1.69 0.092 ** -0.323 -1.87 0.062 -0.194 -2.54 0.011 -0.027 -0.15 0.884   -0.176 -1.38 0.169 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.037 -1.28 0.200   -0.329 -1.81 0.070 0.039 0.49 0.622   0.153 0.75 0.456   0.111 0.83 0.408   
ChgroaPredictz 0.030 1.10 0.271   1.648 10.23 0.000 *** 1.031 13.63 0.000 *** 0.444 2.43 0.015 *** 0.701 5.56 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.180       0.198       0.026       0.063       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Table 14 Regression: Two Earnings Attributes 
Panel A: PersistZ and AccrualsZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.73 0.000   0.064 7.52 0.000   0.061 13.78 0.000   0.060 5.47 0.000   0.050 6.79 0.000   
Chgroa 0.053 1.37 0.171 * 4.357 19.02 0.000 *** 2.675 24.62 0.000 *** 1.446 5.44 0.000 *** 1.955 10.78 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.07 0.002 *** 0.248 13.50 0.000 *** 0.140 15.11 0.000 *** 0.118 5.14 0.000 *** 0.157 10.14 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.73 0.468   0.001 0.18 0.861   0.001 0.17 0.863   -0.021 -1.98 0.048 ## -0.010 -1.35 0.176   
Accrualsz -0.001 -0.40 0.690   0.023 2.75 0.006 ### 0.008 1.83 0.067 # 0.044 4.24 0.000 ### 0.035 4.99 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPersistz 0.053 1.97 0.049 ** 0.001 0.00 0.997   0.001 0.02 0.986   0.087 0.47 0.636   -0.035 -0.28 0.779   
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.025 -0.96 0.336   0.567 3.55 0.000 *** 0.493 6.73 0.000 *** 0.335 1.78 0.075 ** 0.406 3.31 0.001 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.161       0.174       0.023       0.057       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Panel B: PersistZ and PredictZ 
 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.66 0.000   0.066 7.79 0.000   0.065 14.89 0.000   0.061 5.63 0.000   0.053 7.17 0.000   
Chgroa 0.085 1.84 0.066 ** 5.826 21.87 0.000 *** 3.660 28.40 0.000 *** 1.871 5.81 0.000 *** 2.627 12.09 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.07 0.002 *** 0.242 13.30 0.000 *** 0.133 14.50 0.000 *** 0.119 5.16 0.000 *** 0.153 9.91 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.83 0.409   -0.002 -0.29 0.770   -0.001 -0.23 0.819   -0.028 -2.68 0.007 ### -0.014 -1.96 0.051 # 
Predictz 0.002 1.31 0.191   0.023 2.81 0.005 ### 0.010 2.50 0.013 ## 0.056 5.51 0.000 ### 0.040 5.74 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPersistz 0.049 1.81 0.071 ** -0.315 -1.83 0.067 -0.198 -2.60 0.009 -0.041 -0.22 0.827   -0.188 -1.47 0.141 
ChgroaPredictz 0.016 0.63 0.527   1.497 10.68 0.000 *** 1.046 15.25 0.000 *** 0.499 2.99 0.003 *** 0.742 6.47 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.179       0.198       0.026       0.062       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Table 14 Regression: Two Earnings Attributes 
Panel C: PersistZ and nSmoothZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.74 0.000   0.066 7.72 0.000   0.061 13.80 0.000   0.062 5.72 0.000   0.051 6.94 0.000   
Chgroa 0.073 2.06 0.039 ** 4.117 19.45 0.000 *** 2.438 24.37 0.000 *** 1.423 5.76 0.000 *** 1.851 11.13 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.07 0.002 *** 0.250 13.59 0.000 *** 0.142 15.28 0.000 *** 0.117 5.08 0.000 *** 0.156 10.08 0.000 *** 
Persistz -0.001 -0.71 0.477   0.000 -0.02 0.983   0.000 -0.08 0.939   -0.023 -2.14 0.032 ## -0.010 -1.45 0.147   
nSmoothz 0.000 -0.33 0.741   0.009 1.04 0.296   0.006 1.32 0.186   0.026 2.62 0.009 ### 0.025 3.54 0.000 ### 
ChgroaPersistz 0.053 1.96 0.049 ** -0.081 -0.47 0.640   -0.002 -0.03 0.977   0.059 0.32 0.748   -0.045 -0.35 0.723   
ChgroanSmoothz 0.025 0.78 0.433   0.692 3.53 0.000 ### 0.333 3.70 0.000 ### 0.526 2.47 0.014 ## 0.521 3.47 0.001 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.160       0.170       0.021       0.055       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Panel D: AccrualsZ and PredictZ 
 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.64 0.000   0.066 7.81 0.000   0.065 15.00 0.000   0.061 5.56 0.000   0.053 7.20 0.000   
Chgroa 0.071 1.55 0.121 * 5.909 22.63 0.000 *** 3.711 28.99 0.000 *** 1.904 5.97 0.000 *** 2.688 12.45 0.000 *** 
Return 0.010 3.14 0.002 *** 0.244 13.39 0.000 *** 0.133 14.44 0.000 *** 0.121 5.25 0.000 *** 0.154 9.94 0.000 *** 
Accrualsz -0.002 -1.25 0.213   0.019 1.92 0.055 # 0.003 0.70 0.485   0.020 1.59 0.112   0.019 2.35 0.019 ## 
Predictz 0.003 1.66 0.096 # 0.011 1.18 0.240   0.008 1.70 0.089 # 0.043 3.52 0.000 ### 0.028 3.43 0.001 ### 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.039 -1.39 0.166 -0.305 -1.68 0.092 0.054 0.68 0.494   0.170 0.83 0.405   0.129 0.96 0.336   
ChgroaPredictz 0.039 1.45 0.147 * 1.594 10.05 0.000 *** 0.995 13.38 0.000 *** 0.441 2.46 0.014 *** 0.671 5.42 0.000 *** 
Adj R-Squared 0.003       0.180       0.197       0.025       0.062       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Table 14 Regression: Two Earnings Attributes 
Panel E: AccrualsZ and nSmoothZ 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.67 0.000   0.064 7.52 0.000   0.061 13.88 0.000   0.060 5.54 0.000   0.051 6.91 0.000   
Chgroa 0.034 0.93 0.355   4.392 20.48 0.000 *** 2.706 26.04 0.000 *** 1.499 5.97 0.000 *** 2.043 11.77 0.000 *** 
Return 0.011 3.20 0.001 *** 0.250 13.58 0.000 *** 0.141 15.15 0.000 *** 0.121 5.26 0.000 *** 0.157 10.18 0.000 *** 
Accrualsz -0.001 -0.38 0.701   0.021 2.57 0.010 ## 0.007 1.55 0.120   0.040 3.80 0.000 ### 0.031 4.39 0.000 ### 
nSmoothz 0.000 -0.26 0.795   0.006 0.69 0.487   0.005 1.15 0.249   0.020 1.95 0.052 # 0.020 2.81 0.005 ### 
ChgroaAccrualsz -0.028 -1.07 0.284   0.470 2.89 0.004 *** 0.459 6.19 0.000 *** 0.289 1.52 0.129 * 0.349 2.80 0.005 *** 
ChgroanSmothz 0.031 0.96 0.337   0.565 2.85 0.004 ### 0.239 2.63 0.009 ### 0.476 2.22 0.027 ## 0.446 2.94 0.003 ### 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.162       0.175       0.024       0.059       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
 
Panel F: PredictZ and nSmoothZ 
 
Chgsalary Chgbonus Chgcash Chgequity Chgtotal 
Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   Coef. t P>|t|   
Intercept 0.059 37.60 0.000   0.066 7.81 0.000   0.066 15.03 0.000   0.062 5.68 0.000   0.053 7.28 0.000   
Chgroa 0.074 1.62 0.106 * 5.912 22.56 0.000 *** 3.707 29.03 0.000 *** 1.901 5.98 0.000 *** 2.680 12.46 0.000 *** 
Return 0.011 3.18 0.001 *** 0.243 13.30 0.000 *** 0.132 14.40 0.000 *** 0.122 5.27 0.000 *** 0.153 9.92 0.000 *** 
Predictz 0.002 1.35 0.176   0.021 2.54 0.011 ## 0.009 2.14 0.032 ## 0.049 4.65 0.000 ### 0.034 4.74 0.000 ### 
nSmoothz -0.001 -0.62 0.534   0.006 0.66 0.511   0.004 0.86 0.389   0.015 1.45 0.147   0.017 2.34 0.019 ## 
ChgroaPredictz 0.021 0.83 0.406   1.429 9.93 0.000 *** 1.010 14.53 0.000 *** 0.430 2.55 0.011 *** 0.661 5.68 0.000 *** 
ChgroanSmoothz 0.018 0.55 0.584   0.123 0.61 0.540   0.021 0.23 0.818   0.378 1.73 0.083 # 0.299 1.94 0.052 # 
Adj R-Squared 0.002       0.179       0.197       0.026       0.063       
No.Obs. 6181       4445       6195       4471       6141       
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Table 15 Summary Results for Testing Reduced Model 
Panel A 
 
 Model Includes Salary Bonus Cash  Equity Total 
AccrualsZ, PredictZ, and  nSmoothZ Reduce Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Reduce*** 
P-value 0.112 0.146 0.039 0.032 0.1097 
 PersistZ, PredictZ, and  nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Reduce Reduce Reduce*** 
P-value 0.215 0.038 0.753 0.345 0.086 
 PersistZ, AccrualsZ, and  nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.144 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0004 <0.0001 
 PersistZ, AccrualsZ, and  PredictZ Reduce Reduce Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.655 0.523 0.699 0.068 0.013 
 
Panel B 
 
  Salary Bonus Cash  Equity Total 
PersistZ and AccrualsZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.303 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
PersistZ and PredictZ Reduce Reduce Reduce Reduce*** Not Reduce 
P-value 0.424 0.104 0.854 0.101 0.0071 
PersistZ and nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.2711 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
AccrualsZ and PredictZ Reduce Reduce Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.279 0.306 0.125 0.0177 0.0106 
AccrualsZ and nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.067 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.0004 <0.0001 
PredictZ and nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.105 0.038 0.1207 0.0474 0.0413 
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Table 15 Summary Results for Testing Reduced Model 
Panel C 
 
  Salary Bonus Cash  Equity Total 
 Only PersistZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.438 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Only AccrualsZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.1348 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 Only PredictZ Reduce Reduce** Reduce** Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.2151 0.0864 0.2306 0.0205 0.0036 
 Only nSmoothZ Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.1239 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 
 
Panel D 
 
  Salary Bonus Cash  Equity Total 
 No Earnings Attribute Reduce** Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce Not Reduce 
P-value 0.2178 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
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